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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the role of the guarantor in transactions involving the city state in the 
context of the debate regarding the unity of Greek law.  It asks whether it is possible to identify 
any principles of law or practice regarding guarantors in these transactions which were common 
to different city states or whether there were differences which were so significant as to make it 
meaningless to talk in terms of the unity of Greek law. 
Focussing on the evidence from classical Athens, independent Delos and the Boiotian 
confederation of the third century BC, the thesis seeks out similarities and differences of 
principle and practice in the following areas: (a) when guarantors were required, (b) how 
guarantors were vetted for suitability, (c) what was expected of guarantors, (d) how guarantees 
were enforced, and (e) how the interests of the guarantors were protected. 
The thesis concludes that whilst it is possible to identify some common principles and practices 
in these areas, important differences can also be observed such as to make it unwise to place too 
much reliance upon common principles in attempting to reconstruct the role of guarantors in 
those city states for which we have no or limited evidence. 
However, analysis of similarities and differences in principles and practices between city states 
can provide valuable insights into the problems and issues which particular city states faced in 
particular periods.  One example is found in the examination of the problem of what motivated 
guarantors.  Whilst there were various possible motivations, a shortage of guarantors may have 
been a problem for some communities.  This becomes evident from the local modifications to 
the common principles and practices identified by the research some of which may have 
developed or been introduced in an attempt to encourage guarantors to come forward.  
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The role of guarantors in agreements between the individual and the state in Classical and 
Hellenistic Greece. 
Introduction 
Guarantors and the City States in the Ancient Sources 
Guarantors appear in many contexts in documents from the ancient Greek world.  In the law 
court speeches of the Attic orators, we usually find them associated with transactions between 
private individuals: these include financial obligations such as the repayment of a loan with 
interest1, or the payment of the balance of a dowry2.  Guarantors also appear in the context of 
litigation, e.g. for the payment of a judgment debt3; or in arbitration agreements, to secure 
payment of whatever sum the arbitrators found to be due4.   
Sometimes the speeches mention guarantors provided for the fulfilment of an individual’s non-
financial obligation, for example to support a promise made by a trierarch to his successor that 
he would give him the same terms in regard to wear and tear of the ship’s equipment as other 
trierarchs gave to their successors5.  In another case, a guarantor was provided following 
settlement of an inheritance dispute, to support a promise by one party to transfer part of the 
estate in his possession to the other party6.  These guarantees meant what they said.  The case 
just mentioned was a legal action brought against the guarantor for failing to ensure the 
handover of the property concerned.   
But we also find in the Attic orators references to guarantees given by individuals to the 
Athenian city state.  Here, we learn that providing a guarantor was a way of securing release 
from imprisonment following arrest7, or preventing arrest in the first place8.  If the accused 
absconded, the guarantor could be liable to suffer the same penalties as the accused would have 
suffered had he not absented himself9.   
The law court speeches also provide evidence of the involvement of guarantors in supporting 
contracts entered into by individuals with the Athenian state.  We find guarantors of debts owed 
to the treasury10.  A person who was awarded a franchise by the state for the collection of taxes 
had to provide guarantors for payment of each instalment of the amount offered in his winning 
                                                
1
 Lys. 19.22; Isoc. 17.37; Dem. 33.7; 35.8. 
2
 Dem. 41.6. 
3
 Dem. 30.32; 31.10; 53.26. 
4
 Dem. 33.15 and 22. 
5
 Dem. 50.28. 
6
 Is. 5.18 and 34. 
7
 Andok. 1.2 and 1.17; Dem. 24.144-145. 
8
 Lys. 13.23; 23.9; Isoc. 17.42. 
9
 Andok. 1.44 and Dem. 25.87 with Lipsius (1905-1915:706); Partsch (1909:372); Beasley (1902:60). 
10
 Dem. 24.39. 
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bid11.  Stringent financial and even custodial penalties could be imposed upon a guarantor if he 
failed to pay when called upon to do so by the state12.   
But the vast bulk of the evidence for the activities of guarantors is to be found in inscriptions.  
This evidence shows their involvement with the city states, their civic subdivisions and their 
gods and goddesses; it comes not just from Athens but from many parts of the Greek world 
from the early fifth century BC and throughout the classical and Hellenistic periods.  Here, 
guarantors appear in connection with a very wide variety of transactions: 
1. for payment of rent due under leases of sacred lands in Attica13, of farming land and 
houses owned by Apollo on Delos14, of farms in Thespiai15, of sacred land on 
Amorgos16, Thasos17, lands at Amos on the Rhodian Peraia18, at Mylasa19, Olymos20 and 
Klazomenai21 and sacred land at Herakleia in Sicily22 ; 
2. for payment of sums due under a franchise for the collection of harbour dues in Attica23; 
3. for payment of sums due under the grant of a ferry franchise between Delos, Rheneia 
and Mykonos24; 
4. for delivery in Athens of tax on barley and wheat collected in kind from Lemnos, 
Imbros and Skyros25; 
5. for payment of sums due for the grant of a franchise for the collection of tax in Attica26 
and on Delos27; 
6. for payment of interest on money lent by the Attic deme of Plotheia28 and by 
endowment funds at Argos29 and Delphi30, and for repayment of money lent by the 
                                                
11
 Andok. 1.134. 
12
 Andok. 1.73; Dem. 24.144; Dem. 53.27. 
13
 e.g. IG II2 1590 and Ath.Ag.19 L6; IG II2 2498; Ath.Ag.19 L9-12. 
14
 e.g. IG XI,2 287A. 
15
 e.g. IThesp 48 LL6, 9, 11, 13, 14-15. 
16 IG XII 7 62 LL2, 7, 14, 33. 
17
 IG XII Suppl 353 LL16, 19. 
18
 e.g. IK Rhod. Peraia 352A L8, 352B LL13,15,19.  
19
 e.g. I Mylasa 201 L12. 
20
 e.g. I Mylasa 801 L16. 
21
 I Ery 510 LL8, 14. 
22 IG XIV 645 LL100, 104, 107, 108-109, 154, 155, 160, 163, 181- 183, 185. 
23
 IG I3 133 L9. 
24
 IG XI,2 153 LL19-20, 199B L97, 223A L50. 
25 Stroud (1998:4). 
26
 Ath.Ag.19 P26 B IV b LL469-490. 
27
 IG XI,2 199B L96 and 287A LL40-41. 
28
 IG I3 258 L22. 
29
 e.g. IG IV 498 L6. 
30
 e.g. SIG3 672 LL26-27. 
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temple of Apollo on Delos31, by the goddess at Tegea32, and by the mother of the gods 
on Amorgos33; 
7. for repayment of loans made by an individual to the state at Orchomenos34 and by the 
god to the state on Delos35; 
8. for repayment of loans made by one city state to another36; 
9. for grants of proxenia by cities in Phokis37, East Lokris38, West Lokris39, the Aitolian 
koinon40 and Stratos in Akarnania41; 
10. for citizens of Pellana in legal proceedings at Delphi (and vice versa)42 and for parties of 
non-citizen status in legal proceedings at Stymphalos43; 
11. for the performance of treaty obligations between city states on Crete44; 
12. for manumissions at Delphi45 and Argos46; 
13. for the due performance of building contracts at Athens47, Delos48, Epidauros49, 
Delphi50, Tegea51, Lebadeia (for the koinon of Boiotia)52, Eretria (on Euboia)53 and 
Koresia (on Keos)54; 
14. for the return of triremes lent by the Athenians to the Chalkideans55;  
15. for the provision of sacrificial animals at Andania in Messenia56; 
                                                
31
 e.g. IG XI,2 287A L180. 
32
 SIG3 306 LL40-41. 
33
 IG XII 7 237 LL48-54. 
34
 IG VII 3172 (Migeotte (1984:No.13)) passim. 
35
 e.g. ID 290 LL129-131. 
36
 e.g. Milet I 3 138 LL25-27 (Migeotte (1984:No.96)) (Knidos to Miletos). 
37
 e.g. IG IX 1 1 L8 (Antikyra). 
38
 e.g. IG IX 1 268 L6. 
39
 e.g. IG IX 12 3 667 LL11-13. 
40
 e.g. IG IX 12 1 17 passim. 
41
 IG IX 12 2 390 L7. 
42
 FD III 1, 486 IIA L15. 
43
 Thür and Taeuber (1994:No.17 LL173-177). 
44
 e.g. IC I xvi 4A LL32-42 (Chaniotis (1996:No.55B LL24-32)) (Lato and Olous). 
45
 SGDI 1804 LL3, 7-9. 
46
 IG IV 530 LL2-4. 
47
 e.g. IG II2  63 LL112-113. 
48
 e.g. ID 104 (5) L23. 
49
 e.g. IG IV2 1 102 passim. 
50
 e.g. CID 2.31 LL48-49, 56-57. 
51
 IG V 2, 6 LL34-37. 
52
 e.g. IG VII 3073 LL4, 25-28, 39-40, 47-48. 
53
 IG XII 9, 191 LL33-34. 
54
 IG XII 5, 647 LL5-7. 
55
 IG II2 1623Ba LL160-199. 
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16. for the sale of priesthoods at Erythrai57; and 
17. for the assurance to the state of the genuineness of a bidder’s offer at public auctions in 
Thespiai58 and on Delos59. 
Guarantors and the Question of the Unity of Greek Law 
Anyone reviewing this evidence inevitably encounters an issue which has been controversial 
among legal historians over the past fifty years: the question of the “unity of Greek law”.  
Gagarin’s recent summary of the debate provides a good starting point60: on the one hand, he 
says, there are those who believe that the laws of different city states “rested on the same juristic 
conceptions”.  According to these scholars, “Greek law was the realisation of an abstract 
spiritual unity that bound together the legal systems of the different Greek poleis and that 
differed from the spirit underlying the laws of other peoples.  Certain basic concepts are thus 
evident, however much the positive laws may differ.”61  On the other hand, there are those who, 
following Finley, argue that “significant substantive differences [in the laws of different Greek 
city states] are clearly evident even in those few places for which we have a reasonable amount 
of evidence.”  For Finley, the kinds of basic concepts identified by the “pro unity” scholars were 
too general to be of any use and could not be regarded as evidence for a uniform concept of 
Greek law62.  In Finley’s view, since there is no uniform concept of Greek law, such a concept 
cannot be used to determine what the law of a city state was where we have no direct evidence 
from that city state itself of what that law said. 
Gagarin’s own view is that Finley’s claims have a large degree of validity but he adds that this 
does not necessarily mean that we should ignore points of similarity or dismiss entirely the 
argument of the “pro unity” scholars that a common cultural heritage would necessarily 
manifest itself in the legal systems of the different city states63. 
Thür, on the other hand, as a “pro unity” scholar, has argued that in Greek cities matters that 
were not regulated by a particular law were left to tradition, to unspoken understandings64.  For 
him, the study of ancient Greek law is not confined simply to collecting and organising the legal 
content of the surviving literary and epigraphic sources.  It also involves uncovering the basic 
                                                                                                                                          
56
 IG V 1390 LL69-73. 
57
 e.g. I Ery 201 passim. 
58
 e.g. IThesp 53LL14-18. 
59
 ID 502 LL8-11 with Feyel (1941).  
60
 Gagarin (2005). 
61
 Gagarin (2005:30) citing from Wolff (1975b:20-22). 
62
 Gagarin (2005:30 and 31) citing from Finley (1975:137).  
63
 Gagarin (2005:32). 
64 Thür (2006:25). 
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legal principles that lay behind them65.  In Thür’s view, work on the sources of the law of a 
Greek city should take into account knowledge of legal principles derived from the whole of the 
Greek world.  Here are to be found underlying ideas that bring out more clearly the inner 
structure of the system of law under review66.  Thür argues that apparent differences between 
the laws of different cities could sometimes be explained by reference to these basic principles67 
and seeks in his article to demonstrate this in particular in relation to dispute resolution 
procedures68.  He explains the differences between the procedures found in the sources as 
developments from, additions to or adaptations of common procedural principles. 
In the particular case of the guarantee, the unity debate would manifest itself in the question: 
“were there any common legal principles and practices underlying the role and function of 
guarantors?”  The pro-unity scholars would argue that the underlying principles ascribed to the 
concept of the guarantee throughout the Greek world clearly favour the view that there were.  
These principles were expounded by Partsch: according to him, a guarantor was someone who 
undertook to be personally liable to another (“the creditor”) if a guaranteed event or result did 
not occur69.  The promise that the guarantor gave to the creditor was normally that a third person 
(“the principal debtor” or “contractor”) would do (or not do) something70.  If the contractor did 
not perform as the guarantor had promised, the guarantor was liable to the creditor71.  As far as 
my researches have been able to establish, no one has ever sought to dispute Partsch’s 
definition; and with reason, for it is consistent with all the available ancient evidence about the 
role of guarantors that I have reviewed in preparing this thesis.  Against this, the anti-unity 
scholars would argue that the principle underlying the definition of the guarantee, like the 
principle underlying the law of marriage, is far too general to make any discussion of it 
worthwhile.   
With a view to taking the “unity/no unity debate” further, I propose to enquire whether there 
were any other legal principles and practices that were shared by the Greek city states in relation 
to the role and function of guarantors in transactions involving the Greek city state, any of its 
subdivisions or its gods or goddesses (whom I will individually and collectively call “the 
community”).  I will also ask whether there were important differences.  To this end, I will 
investigate a number of aspects of law and practice concerning these guarantors in selected city 
states.   
                                                
65
 Thür (2006:27). 
66
 Thür (2006:28). 
67
 Thür (2006:28-34). 
68
 Thür (2006:34-57). 
69
 Partsch (1909:59; 288).  
70
 Partsch (1909:159). 
71
 Partsch (1909:194, 209-210 and 288). 
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Firstly, I will examine the circumstances in which a guarantor would be offered or requested.  
For example, it may sometimes have been a requirement imposed by law upon on the officials 
awarding contracts; or it may have been left to the discretion of the officials to decide whether 
to ask for a guarantor.   
Secondly, I will examine whether, if guarantors were required, there were any particular criteria 
that these guarantors had to meet.  It may have been simply a matter of wealth but perhaps other 
attributes were looked for too.  Sometimes we find that more than one guarantor is involved; I 
will examine whether there were any particular circumstances in which this was thought to be 
necessary.  I will also enquire who was responsible for vetting the proposed guarantors to see if 
they met these requirements, and what procedures were used for this purpose.   
Thirdly, I will examine what the guarantor was expected or required to do if the outcome he had 
guaranteed was not achieved.  He may have been obliged to achieve the outcome himself; or it 
may have been sufficient for him simply to pay compensation to the community.   
Fourthly, I will look at how the guarantee was enforced against the guarantor if he did not do 
what was required of him, who was responsible for enforcing the guarantee, what powers they 
had to enable them to enforce it, and whether the guarantor could expect any indulgence from 
the community in this respect.   
Fifthly, I will examine how the interests of guarantors could be protected and whether they 
received any assistance from the community in this regard.  This will involve an examination of 
the dynamics of the three way relationship between creditor, contractor and guarantor.  In some 
respects the interests of the guarantor and the creditor align – they both wish the contractor to 
perform.  In other respects the interests of the guarantor and the contractor align – neither 
wishes the obligations of the contractor to be excessively onerous and neither wishes the 
community to adopt an unreasonable attitude to the enforcement of its rights.   
Examination of these questions may reveal differences in approach between different types of 
transaction, different communities or different periods.  But we may also find that there were 
fundamental similarities in approach across all transactions, across a number of different 
communities or across an entire period of time.  The results of this enquiry will then have to be 
analysed.  For example, similarities may be due to factors other than an underlying unity of 
“Greek law”.  Conversely, the fact that there are differences of approach between the different 
communities may not necessarily mean that there was no underlying unity.  The differences 
could possibly be explained (as Thür sought to do in the case of dispute resolution procedures) 
as adaptations or developments of core principles.  On the other hand, if the differences are 
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significant and cannot be explained in this way, we may have to conclude that seeking out 
“Greek law” does not assist us in our examination and understanding of the law and legal 
practices of particular states.   
Reasons for agreeing to stand as a guarantor 
On the basis of the discussion of the matters outlined above, I will then tackle what is in many 
ways the most interesting and most difficult problem concerning the role of the guarantor in 
transactions involving Greek communities: given the apparent hazards involved in being a 
guarantor, what benefit guarantors could hope to obtain.   
If we can understand what Greek guarantors in transactions involving the community might be 
letting themselves in for, we may be able to understand better how the risks involved in 
becoming a guarantor may have been perceived by the guarantors themselves and what 
motivated them to put themselves forward.   
Scholarship to date 
There are two monographs on guarantors in ancient Greece; both are quite old and predate the 
debate on the unity of Greek law.  They address some but not all of the issues I have outlined 
above.  Their responses need to be reviewed in the light of inscriptions published since they 
were written as well as of developments in modern scholarship.  Nevertheless these works 
provide important starting points for my research.   
The first of these two monographs is Le cautionnement dans l’ancien droit grec by T.W. 
Beasley (1902), a relatively brief survey of what Beasley regarded as “the Greek law of 
guarantee” based upon both literary and epigraphical sources.  Beasley’s aim was “to study as 
completely as possible the contract of guarantee” and in doing so he examined the application of 
the guarantee in a number of fields, including leases72, public works73, loans74, banking75 and 
contracts of sale76.  He also examined briefly what he called “political guarantees”, which 
included guarantees associated with proxenia77, and “judicial guarantees” by which he meant 
guarantees for the appearance of a person at court and guarantees for the payment of judgment 
debts78.   
                                                
72
 Beasley (1902:15ff). 
73
 Beasley (1902:20ff). 
74
 Beasley (1902:24ff). 
75
 Beasley (1902:31-32). 
76
 Beasley (1902:32ff). 
77
 Beasley (1902:67ff). 
78
 Beasley (1902:49ff). 
 13
For Beasley, guaranteeship played a role of the utmost importance in social life, whether in civil 
matters or judicial, in the private life and public life of the citizen as well as in international 
relations between various states.  The act of standing as guarantor was considered a meritorious 
act and, argued Beasley, not without reason, for the risks could be great.  Yet the ubiquity of the 
practice of requiring guarantors could, in Beasley’s view, easily be explained by the fact that 
most Greek cities to which our documents pertain were in a state of almost constant political 
agitation, especially in the fourth and third centuries BC, which did not help to establish credit 
or assure the confidence of businessmen.  Further, Beasley argued, where a contract was 
concluded between a state and a foreign individual, it was very important that the foreigner 
provided guarantors for the performance of the contract79.   
As the title of his monograph indicates, Beasley assumed that an entity called “Greek law” 
existed.  Thus, if he found evidence of a particular aspect of the law of guarantee at Athens he 
seems to have assumed that this applied to “Greek law” generally.  For example, he says that at 
Athens, because of Athenian restrictions on the ownership of real estate, guarantors had to be 
citizens so that it would be easier to make them responsible for losses resulting from the 
insolvency of the contractor.  He seems to have assumed that the same principle applied on 
Delos.  Thus, where he finds a foreign guarantor on independent Delos, he argues that the 
foreigner must have been granted e)/nkthsij80.  He does not discuss the possibility that Delian 
law may have differed from Athenian law in this area, even to dismiss the idea.  Nevertheless he 
does note some differences in the law between different city states (for example on the 
enforcement of loans), but he makes no comment on those differences81.  When he discusses the 
evidence from Athens for the imposition of fines upon guarantors who defaulted in their 
obligations to the state, he says that we know nothing on this subject in other cities in Greece 
but argues that it was probable that they differed little82.   
The second, and more influential, monograph on guarantors is Partsch’s Griechisches 
Bürgschaftsrecht (1909).  This is a detailed study of what Partsch believed to be the Greek law 
of guarantee with citation and discussion of numerous ancient sources, both literary and 
epigraphic.  Partsch set out to produce a “description of the Greek guarantee” which “tries to 
trace the development of an ancient legal idea over the course of history”.  He perceived the 
value of his research to lie in providing an understanding of “how Roman law reacted to the 
Greek formulae”83.  He started with an analysis of the earliest surviving reference to a Greek 
guarantee – in Hom. Od. 8.351 - then described in detail, on the basis of the ancient sources, 
                                                
79
 Beasley (1902:73ff). 
80
 Beasley (1902:4-5). 
81 Beasley (1902:26). 
82 Beasley (1902:45). 
83
 Partsch (1909:4-5). 
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different aspects of the guarantee, including the giving of the guarantee, the legal position of the 
guarantor, the release of the guarantee and the protection of the guarantor.  To support the 
conclusions reached from the Greek sources, Partsch referred to “Germanic” law and to 
“Indian” law on the assumption that similar racial cultures were likely to have similar laws84.   
Partsch noted that other Greek states “developed their principles of the law of guarantee” 
differently from Athens but argued that there was “a panhellenic juristic thought process that 
prevailed in the particular laws of the Greek cities just as the Greek language lived in the 
colourful dialects even before the Hellenisitic koine had led to a firmer unity of the linguistic 
form.”  For this reason Partsch described “even Athenian law against the background of the 
entire body of ancient Greek sources available”.  He declared that he would not overlook “local 
manifestations of the shaping of Greek law” but observed that it was not possible to trace the 
development in individual jurisdictions because there were so many lacunae in the sources.  He 
merely noted “the evidence that did not fit with the Athenian picture” 85.   
Like Beasley, Partsch reviewed the use of the guarantee in particular transactions, including 
loans, tax collection franchises, leases and building contracts as well as in inter-state agreements 
and in grants of proxenia86.  In a chapter on guarantees in public law (“im Staatsrecht”), Partsch 
emphasised the strong powers of enforcement in the hands of the officials, who, Partsch argued, 
could in many cases seize the guarantor’s possessions without first having to obtain a judgment 
from a court.  Even where formal legal proceedings were required before execution could be 
levied against the guarantor’s property, special rules applied87.  Partsch argued that this gave the 
state a “hold” (“eine wirksame Handhabe”) over the guarantors, which in turn ensured that they 
did not take on excessive debt themselves88.   
Partsch made little general comment on the practical role of the guarantor.  However, in a 
discussion of the possible reasons for the apparent preference of the Athenian state for 
guarantors rather than other forms of security, he suggested that one of the advantages of the 
guarantee was that it placed a person alongside the contractor who would supervise the contract 
in his own interest89.  This is an important point, which I will discuss further in my thesis.   
The only other scholar who has focussed exclusively on guarantors is Donatella Erdas, whose 
paper on guarantors in the documents of classical Athens appeared in 201090.  Because she is 
                                                
84
 Partsch (1909: 7-8). 
85
 Partsch (1909: 5-6). 
86
 Partsch (1909: 289-336; 418-423). 
87
 Partsch (1909: 386ff). 
88
 Partsch (1909: 408). 
89
 Partsch (1909: 410). 
90
 Erdas (2010). 
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concerned only with Athens, she does not consider the question of the unity of Greek law.  
However, she touches on questions concerning the vetting of guarantors, the criteria for 
becoming a guarantor, numbers of guarantors and sharing of liability, the choice between 
personal security (guarantees) and security over real estate, whether there was a law concerning 
guarantors, and the enforcement of guarantees.  She also briefly discusses the motivation for 
standing as a guarantor, suggesting that it may have been practised at a professional level as a 
form of investment.   
Several other scholars have commented on limited aspects of the guarantee and the role of 
guarantors.  Whilst these scholars sometimes touch upon the questions I have outlined above, 
they were not aiming to address them fully.   
Some of these scholars were commenting in the context of studying a particular type of 
transaction in a particular city state.  They therefore did not usually need to consider, or make 
any assumptions about, whether there was such a thing as a “Greek law of guarantee”, nor did 
they, as a rule, consider possible differences in approach that may have prevailed in other Greek 
city states91.  Nor did these scholars in general consider the overall role of the guarantors even in 
the particular transactions in the particular city states with which they were concerned.  One 
exception was Walbank, who, in his study of the leasing of sacred properties at Athens, 
observed that standing as a guarantor may often have been an act of friendship or of kin helping 
kin but argued that where no such ties existed a guarantor probably agreed to act on behalf of 
the tenant only in return for some form of financial consideration92.   
Other scholars made their comments in the context of studies of a particular type of transaction 
throughout the Greek world.  This enabled them to note similarities in law and practice between 
different Greek communities in relation to that type of transaction, but in doing so none of them 
specifically addressed the unity question.   
Contracts for public and sacred building work have received most scholarly attention in this 
regard.  Davis, who was writing before the unity debate had surfaced, contrasted the building 
projects of fifth century Athens, as evidenced by the Erechtheion accounts, where large numbers 
of skilled workers were individually hired directly by the state, and those of Delphi and 
Epidauros of the fourth century, where we find fewer individuals taking on larger contracts.  
Davis argued that the reason for the difference was that whereas at Athens there had been a 
                                                
91
 Principal works: Behrend (1970) (Leases in Attica); Finley (1952) (Loans in Attica); Hennig (1983) (Leases of 
Sacred Houses on Delos); Kent (1948) (Leases of Sacred Estates on Delos); Molinier (1914) (Leases of Sacred 
Houses on Delos); Papazarkadas (2011) (Leases of Sacred Land in Attica); Prignitz (2014) (Building contracts at 
Epidauros); Reger (1994) (Leases of Sacred Estates and Sacred Houses on Delos); Vial (1985) (Transactions 
involving Apollo on Delos); Walbank (1983d) (Leases of Sacred Land in Attica).  
92
 Walbank (1983d:221). 
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large population of workers available for hire locally, this was not the case at Delphi and 
Epidauros.  As the size of the contracts grew, the state would ask contractors to provide 
guarantors to secure their responsibilities93.   
Wittenburg94 draws a similar contrast between the arrangements made for the construction of 
public works in Athens and Eleusis in the fifth and fourth century BC with those revealed by the 
building inscriptions from Delos, Boiotia and Epidauros from the fourth century BC and later.  
The evidence from the latter communities shows that contractors would take on obligations for 
large sections of work that would, unlike in Athens and Eleusis, include the supply of materials 
as well as the provision of labour.  Payments would be made in advance.  Local circumstances, 
he argues, must have contributed to this development.  This kind of contracting, he contends, 
meant that the state had to encourage contractors by various means to perform the obligations 
they had undertaken.  A requirement that they provide guarantors for their performance was one 
of these means.  Wittenburg argued that this reflected the weak bargaining position of the 
authorities in question95.   
In her study of Epidaurian building contracts, Burford remarked that there were sufficient points 
of comparison between the Epidaurian evidence and the material from elsewhere to suggest that 
temple building called forth much the same solutions to much the same problems96.  She saw the 
guarantors of building contracts at Epidauros in the fourth century BC as “yet another 
administrative sub-division”, “the building commission’s allies, so to speak”.  Emphasising the 
practical role of guarantors, she noted that in some sense they helped to control the contract; 
they were mostly citizens of Epidauros, appointed on the strength of their financial and social 
respectability, and were no doubt inspired to back contractors as a form of public service.  She 
expected that they had “some conception of what the work for the performance of which they 
were making themselves indirectly responsible required” and more especially of the character of 
the man they were backing.  While some guarantors may have remained completely ignorant of 
both these aspects and may have thought nothing of the risk (any loss being thought of as 
sustained in a good cause), many would have wanted to know what they could expect97.   
In his book on artisans in the Greek sanctuaries, Feyel seems to have taken it for granted that the 
same practice in relation to guarantors was adopted by all Greek city states and sanctuaries.  He 
emphasised the practical role of the guarantor in public works contracts.  He argued that the 
Greek building work force was very diverse, mobile and unstable, and that the sanctuaries tried 
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to stabilise the tradesmen by having recourse to what he described as “the system of contracts”.  
These contracts provided the contractors with certain advantages such as payments on account 
to help their cash flow.  In return for this the authorities imposed upon contractors, among other 
things, a requirement that they provide guarantors to be responsible in their place in case of 
problems.  Guarantees were thus part of an overall means (which included penalties for non-
performance) of stabilising the workforce98.   
On the basis of the building accounts from Athens, Delos, Epidauros and Delphi, Feyel 
distinguished between contractors remunerated on the basis of a contract, others remunerated 
for individual pieces of work and labourers paid by the day.  He found that these different 
methods of remuneration reflected differences in the type of work to be done and, further, that 
there was a hierarchy of contractors corresponding to this hierarchy of work types.  Feyel 
argued that tradesmen remunerated on the basis of a contract, i.e. those in the upper echelons of 
Feyel’s hierarchy, put in place for themselves a form of mutual support which involved 
contractors standing as guarantors for their colleagues.  This support was not entirely financial.  
In some cases the contractor and guarantor had the same professional specialisation.  In case of 
default, these guarantors could complete the work that had been started, which would have been 
reassuring to the administrators of the sanctuary.  Feyel gave examples of contractor guarantors 
from Epidauros and Delos, but added that it is not possible to conclude that the contracting 
parties always chose as guarantors men who were themselves in possession of the same 
professional skills as the contractor99.   
Outside the realm of building contracts, the study of guarantors has been very limited.  In his 
work on banks and bankers in the Greek cities, Bogaert noted that guarantors were sometimes 
required100 but he specifically excluded legal aspects on the basis that it was always hazardous 
for a non-lawyer to venture upon “ground strewn with traps”.  This severely restricted any 
enquiry into the overall role of guarantors in loan transactions.  Similarly, in her book on the 
possession of Greek sacred lands in the archaic and classical period, Horster offers very little 
analysis of the role of guarantors101.  More is provided by Pernin, who, in her book on rural 
leases in ancient Greece, suggests that those cases where lessors did not require guarantors 
could be explained on the basis that they were well acquainted with the wealth of the tenant102.   
Marek’s book on proxenia mentioned guarantors only briefly.  Marek noted that the appearance 
of guarantors in proxenia decrees seemed to be concentrated in central and northern Greece and 
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parts of the Peloponnese and he sought reasons for this apparent confinement of guarantors to 
particular geographical areas.  He argued that only in these areas did grants of proxenia 
originally include an express grant of epinomia (for which, Marek argued, a guarantor was 
required in order to make good any material loss suffered by the recipient of the grant if the 
grant was not fulfilled) and that the practice of appointing guarantors was maintained in these 
areas even after the specific references to epinomia had fallen into disuse103.  Chandezon pointed 
out certain difficulties with Marek’s view but did not proffer any alternative explanation for the 
apparent geographical limitation on the guarantee in proxenia decrees (that was not the purpose 
of the discussion in his book)104.   
This brief review shows that, since 1909, the scholarship on guarantors has, to say the least, 
been “patchy”.  A fresh look at the evidence, not only from Athens but from other Greek city 
states, is required with a view to identifying the similarities and differences in the law and 
practice of guarantees and guarantors, analysing the reasons for the similarities and differences, 
and understanding more deeply the role of the guarantors in these communities.  I hope that this 
thesis will constitute a first step in this process.   
The Scope of my Thesis 
As will have been seen from the beginning of this introduction, guarantors are found in a very 
wide range of different transactions all over the Greek world, from Sicily to Asia Minor.  They 
are also found over a very lengthy period of time.  In order to keep my thesis to the required 
limits, therefore, I have confined it within what are inevitably arbitrary boundaries in terms of 
subject matter, geographical area and period covered.   
Subject Matter 
I have confined my thesis to transactions in which an individual gave a guarantee to a city state, 
to a sub-division of a city state (deme, tribe etc), to a federal organisation (koinon), or to one of 
the gods or goddesses of a city state, one of its subdivisions or of a koinon.  Thus I do not 
discuss guarantees given by individuals on behalf of the city state as principal debtor (for 
example where the city state had borrowed money from a temple or an individual and had 
provided another individual as guarantor for repayment, or where a city state or koinon had 
made a grant of proxenia to an individual which named another individual as guarantor).  Here 
the dynamic of the relationship between creditor, principal debtor and guarantor is very different 
from that which applies where the city state or other organisation is the creditor.   
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I have also excluded guarantees of manumissions and guarantees provided in respect of the sale 
and purchase of property whereby the guarantor warranted that third parties would not make a 
claim to ownership of the property (bebai/wsij).  Here the nature of the guarantees given is 
very different from the guarantees given in support of a transaction such as a lease or a building 
contract (they were treated separately by both Beasley and Partsch).   
Geographical area 
In this thesis, I will concentrate on the evidence from Athens, Delos and Boiotia.  This is 
because these three areas offer the richest epigraphical record: together they provide the greater 
part of the epigraphical evidence; and they provide evidence of transactions of similar types, 
which thus permits comparisons to be made.  At the same time, however, these three areas 
provide differing political, economic and social environments within which the guarantors 
operated.   
Most of the evidence for Athens relates to the fourth century BC; the political, economic and 
social background is therefore that of an independent democratic city state with an agricultural 
and mercantile economy.   
I have treated evidence from Delos from the fourth century BC as part of the Athenian evidence 
because the island was under Athenian domination at this time 105.  However, the bulk of the 
Delian evidence is from the third century, when Delos was independent from Athens.  There 
were many similarities between Athens of the fourth century BC and Delos of the third and 
second centuries BC.  Both had similar political structures: an assembly, a Council exercising a 
probouleutic function, popular courts, and officials appointed on an annual basis from among 
the citizens to perform various functions.  As in Athens, only citizens could own real property 
on Delos, and, as in Athens, the assembly passed decrees affecting the administration of the 
sacred estates within the city-state’s jurisdiction.  These similarities are hardly surprising, given 
the lengthy period of Athenian domination of Delos in the preceding centuries (indeed, one 
particular issue to be considered when analysing the evidence will be whether any similarities of 
principle or practice between Athens and independent Delos regarding guarantors should be 
explained on the basis of this lengthy domination rather than any underlying unity of Greek 
law).  Nevertheless, there were a number of significant differences between Athens and 
independent Delos which should make a comparison worthwhile: Vial estimated that, on the 
basis of the available evidence, the adult male citizen population of Delos at the beginning of 
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the second century BC was in the region of 1200106; thus the population of Delos was tiny 
compared with that of Athens.  Likewise, the Delian assembly, the Delian Council, and the 
Delian law courts were all considerably smaller than their Athenian equivalents.  The number of 
official posts requiring to be filled was also much smaller on Delos than at Athens and so was 
the geographical size of the Delian state.  These differences are important for my analysis of the 
role of the guarantor: relationships between individuals in a small community are likely to have 
been very different from those in a community twenty times its size.  In the former it is 
extremely likely that the officials, the contractors and the guarantors will know one another 
well; they may even be related.   
Another difference between Athens and Delos is that Athens in the fourth century BC was a free 
and independent city-state; Delos was in practice subordinate to greater, often distant, powers 
for most of the period of its independence.  Nevertheless, Delos, as the birthplace of Apollo and 
Artemis, had complete control over their sanctuaries during the period of independence, much 
as the Athenians had had control over the sanctuaries of their gods in Attica one hundred years 
earlier.  Like the economy of Athens, the economy of Delos was both agricultural and 
mercantile107.  But the Delian economy was much smaller than the Athenian economy and in 
relative terms the sanctuary was much more important economically to independent Delos than 
the Athenian sanctuaries had been to classical Athens.  The sanctuary was Delos’ main means of 
generating wealth.  It attracted visitors from all over the Greek world who stimulated local 
demand for goods and helped to make the island an important centre for local redistribution 
within the Cyclades108.   
The evidence concerning guarantors in Boiotia all comes from the period of the Hellenistic 
koinon, which lasted from 338 to 172BC.  Relatively little is known about the details of the 
koinon’s constitution during this period109.  However, it is clear that the member cities of the 
koinon (of which there were at certain times up to twenty four in number) enjoyed a 
considerable amount of autonomy within the federation.  They could regulate their own affairs 
and could even establish and maintain direct relationships with other non-Boiotian states.  
However, in certain respects their autonomy was constrained by membership of the koinon.  
There was a federal council and a federal assembly.  The members of the federal council were 
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appointed by the cities.  The council may have had a probouleutic function110, reviewing and 
approving proposed laws and decrees which were then introduced into and voted upon by the 
federal assembly.  Any Boiotian citizen could attend the federal assembly111 and laws and 
decrees passed by the federal assembly were binding upon the member cities and applied 
throughout their territories.   
The koinon was principally concerned with foreign affairs and military matters.  But it also 
concerned itself with the administration of justice and with pan-Boiotian cults, festivals and 
sanctuaries.  In this last capacity it became involved with the organisation of religious festivals 
and the building and maintenance of sanctuaries.  For this purpose, the koinon would enter into 
contracts with individuals.  These contracts were administered by federal officials, who had 
been appointed either directly by the cities or centrally by the federal assembly.   
Politically, therefore, Boiotia contrasts starkly with Athens and Delos.  The centre of power was 
more remote, but the fact that the federal laws applied throughout the confederation could have 
an important bearing on the relationship between a city or its gods and the guarantors and 
contractors.  Further, the economy of Boiotia was very different from the economies of Athens 
and Delos.  According to Fossey, Boiotia was not a trading state in the same way as Athens or 
Delos was112.  Boiotia was more fertile than Attica.  Hansen observed that, in contrast with 
Athens, it was “unlikely that Boiotia had to import large quantities of grain even in normal 
years” and in good years the region must have “produced most of the foodstuffs consumed by 
Boiotians”113.  Bintliff and Snodgrass, too, argued that Boiotia was “largely self-supporting”114.  
Although the number of settlements in the areas of Boiotia from which our evidence comes was 
much reduced in Hellenistic times when compared with the classical period, the pattern of the 
economy of these areas appears to have remained very much the same and there appears to have 
been no significant reduction in population115.  Thus, Boiotia would have been less reliant upon 
trade than Athens but agriculture would in relative terms have been more important.   
Period 
I take the middle of the second century BC as the date beyond which I do not investigate the 
evidence.  The reasoning behind this is that whilst, before this date, Greek city states knew, as 
Fournier says116, how to play the ambitions of the Hellenistic kings so as to preserve for 
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themselves a certain liberty of decision making and action, from the middle of the second 
century BC Roman hegemony could no longer be disputed; the influence of Rome could not be 
ignored; and the role of guarantors could not be studied without taking into account the “Roman 
dimension”.   
The combination of my arbitrary cut-off date and the geographical areas covered means that the 
evidence I will review covers the following approximate periods: 
Athens: 434-180BC (although most of the evidence dates to the fourth century BC) 
Delos: 314-166BC (I have excluded evidence after 166BC, when Delos was returned to 
Athenian rule ) 
Boiotia: 250-200BC 
The Evidence  
Athens 
Most of the evidence is found in inscriptions.  Guarantors are referred to in thirty-seven 
inscribed documents of different kinds from Athens, two from Oropos dating to periods of 
Athenian domination of that territory and ten relating to Delos from the period in the fourth 
century BC when Athens dominated the island.  The earliest document is dated to 
c434/433BC117; there are seven other inscriptions from the fifth century BC, thirty-six from the 
fourth century, three are of uncertain date from the fourth to the second century, and two are 
from the third century.  There are two laws, six decrees of the Council and the People, two 
decrees passed by demes and one decree by a tribe.  We have records of transactions entered 
into by the city, by its gods, by its subdivisions and by the amphiktyons of dependant Delos.  
We have financial accounts published by officials of the city and the amphiktyons of Delos.  
There are three leases, and eleven documents that appear to be specifications or contracts setting 
out the terms and conditions governing transactions entered into by one of the gods, by a deme, 
by the Council of Oropos and by the amphiktyons of Delos.   
Although inscriptions mentioning guarantors are few, some of them, particularly the lease 
records of the Lycourgan era, record numerous transactions each backed by a guarantee.  The 
surviving documents are of many different types, and they provide information about a wide 
range of different transactions: building contracts, leases, sales of real property, loans, tax 
collection agreements, and debts owed by trierarchs.   
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Of the total of forty-nine documents, twenty-seven provide names of those contracting with the 
community and of their guarantors and, sometimes, the price (for example, the rent payable 
under a lease, or the sum payable to a building contractor for work to be done).  Information 
available from prosopographical studies provides us with evidence about the wealth of some of 
these guarantors and contractors or their families, and about their political and other activities.   
The period from which the Athenian epigraphic material dates coincides, uniquely, with a 
relatively rich literary record which supplements it and places it in context.  This literary record 
includes the forensic speeches, which contain numerous references to guarantors who have 
given guarantees to the city and to others who have entered into contractual commitments with 
the community.  [Aristotle] Ath. Pol. also contains information which is useful in providing the 
context in which the guarantors of transactions involving the city and its gods operated (for 
example, Ath. Pol 47.2-48 on the letting of public contracts and the collection of sums due).   
Delos 
For Delos during the period of its independence, the epigraphical evidence for the activities of 
guarantors in transactions in which Apollo was involved is far more extensive.  In particular, we 
have the extensive remains of the accounts of the hieropoioi, who, as administrators of the 
sanctuary of Apollo and other gods, managed the financial resources and other possessions of 
the god located on Delos itself and on the neighbouring islands of Rheneia and Mykonos.  
These accounts record many transactions of different kinds.  They note the grant of leases of the 
sacred farming estates, setting out the rent agreed, the names of the tenants and of their 
guarantors, and they contain records of rent received from the tenants, their guarantors and 
others.  The accounts contain similar information relating to leases of the sacred houses.  They 
also record loans made from the sacred funds to individuals and the receipt of payments of 
interest and repayment of capital from them and their guarantors.  The accounts also list 
payments received from the collectors of taxes, harbour dues, and fees for the ferry crossings to 
Rheneia and Mykonos.  For all these transactions, the accounts also show the amounts that were 
due and unpaid by various lessees, borrowers and tax collectors, and their guarantors.  The 
accounts record the award of building contracts for work on the sanctuaries of Apollo and other 
gods and payments made under building contracts and for the purchase of materials for building 
work.  The nature of some of this evidence is in many respects similar to the records of the 
grants of leases from Athens, although on Delos the records are far more extensive.   
In addition to the accounts, we have the remains of a number of building contracts containing 
information similar to that which has survived in the Athenian building contacts, including 
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references to guarantors118.  We also have the so called i(era\ suggrafh/, which contained a set 
of rules governing the administration of the leases of the sacred estates and which included 
numerous of references to guarantors119.  So far as concerns laws and decrees, however, the 
evidence from Delos is far more limited than that available from Athens, where nine decrees 
mentioning guarantors have survived.   
Boiotia 
The evidence from Boiotia mentioning guarantors consists of:  
• a group of twelve inscriptions dating from the second half of the third century BC 
relating to the grant or renewal of leases of sacred and public land at Thespiai120; 
• four inscriptions dating to the 220’s BC setting out some of the terms of building 
contracts for the construction of a temple of Zeus at Lebadeia121; 
• an inscription documenting the arrangements for the repayment of a loan by the city of 
Orchomenos to Nikareta daughter of Theon of Thespiai in 223BC, which, although it 
concerns enforcement by an individual against a city state, provides us with evidence of 
procedures which might also be relevant to the enforcement of guarantees more 
generally122.  
It can be seen that the evidence is much more limited than that available for Athens and Delos.  
Not only are there fewer documents, but such documents as there are concern only leases, 
building contracts and loans.  This inevitably limits the extent of the comparison that can be 
made with Athens and Delos.  Nevertheless, in the areas where comparison can be made, the 
evidence provides a good basis for useful comment.   
All the epigraphical material presents two main types of problem.  Firstly, the date of a relevant 
inscription is sometimes not certain.  This can make it difficult to place an inscription in its 
chronological and political/social context and has to be taken into account when assessing the 
evidence, particularly for the purposes of considering possible changes over time both within a 
specific community and across the different communities.  The second type of problem is that 
the inscriptions are in places poorly preserved.  Scholars have proposed supplements for parts of 
badly damaged text, but these need to be considered carefully before placing reliance upon them 
as evidence.   
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For ease of reference extracts from some of the epigraphic documents, together with selected 
literary references, are set out in the Catalogue of Literary and Epigraphic Sources attached as 
an appendix to this thesis and are referred to in my thesis thus: Cat#[number of the text in 
Catalogue].   
Method 
As a starting point I have examined the evidence provided by the documents and texts attesting 
the involvement of guarantors with a community.  The terminology used to refer to “guarantee” 
and “guarantor” in these documents varies.  It includes enguasthai and enguan, and their 
compounds; enguos, engue and enguetes, and their compounds; and anadechesthai and 
anadochos.  All these had variations in different dialects.  In Boiotia the term prostates was 
sometimes used123.   
Inscriptions do not, in themselves, tell us anything about the reasons why a man would agree to 
stand as a guarantor.  However, where the texts mention the name of the guarantor or the 
contractor, I have tried to find as much further information as possible about the individuals 
concerned with the help of prosopographical works, where available.  Any information about 
other obligations, duties and offices guarantors undertook or other guarantees they provided is 
potentially useful in setting their guarantee in context.   
However, the nature of the available evidence imposes limitations on this: regrettably, none of 
the building contracts from Boiotia provides us with the names of any of the contractors and 
guarantors involved.  By contrast, in the inscriptions that document the leases of Thespiai, the 
names of fifty seven tenants and seventy seven guarantors are reasonably well preserved.  At 
first sight, this might provide some encouragement for the would-be prosopographist.  
Regrettably, however, other evidence from Thespiai (and indeed Boiotia generally) is so scarce 
that we have hardly any useful information about these tenants and guarantors outside the lease 
documents themselves.  Therefore far less can be made of this information than the 
prosopographical information available to us from Athens and Delos.   
By contrast, the greater volume of information that has survived from Delos raises the 
possibility, at least in some areas, to adopt a statistical approach to the analysis of some of the 
evidence, for example in relation to the proportion of guarantors of the leases of the sacred 
estates who were from the upper strata of Delian society.  The minute detail included in some of 
the records, for example noting that tiny amounts (mere chalkoi) are owing or spent, suggests a 
thoroughness that might encourage us to proceed with confidence in the use of statistical 
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analyses.  However, one must never forget that, although extensive, the surviving records from 
Delos are nowhere near complete.  A statistical approach may therefore not always be reliable.   
Our knowledge about the role of the guarantor can be obtained not only from documents and 
texts mentioning their involvement in transactions but also from documents evidencing similar 
transactions which do not and clearly never did mention them.  Because of the fragmentary 
nature of the vast majority of inscriptions, only a very few such documents can be identified 
with certainty, but those that can are useful because they indicate possible limits upon the 
involvement of guarantors.  Other evidence not specifically mentioning guarantors also needs to 
be considered.  This includes evidence regarding the types of transaction (for example lease, 
loan, building contract etc) that underlie the guarantees, evidence of the role of the officials in 
Athens, Delos and Boiotia who had responsibility for the administration of these transactions, 
and evidence regarding the procedures for the enforcement of debts against those who were 
indebted to the community, including where the debtor was from outside the state where the 
debt was incurred (e.g. inter-state legal conventions).   
As well as the limitations on the available evidence already mentioned there are also a number 
of problems relating to the interpretation of evidence which have to be taken into account.   
Firstly, it is necessary to bear in mind that there are risks in assuming that a practice prevailed in 
a particular region on the basis of a single piece of evidence of that practice: the evidence may 
relate to an unusual or “one off” arrangement.  For example, we cannot necessarily assume on 
the basis of a sole surviving contract that all other contracts dealing with the same subject 
matter were in the same terms; the terms of a sole surviving contract may be the result of 
negotiations on specific points between the contractor and those awarding the contract.   
Secondly, a comparative analysis of the evidence available from different city states at different 
times is not free from difficulty, particularly where, as here, the extent and nature of the material 
available from the three regions are so different.  The fact that a particular law or practice is 
evidenced for one region does not necessarily imply that a similar law or practice also existed in 
another region.  On the other hand, the fact that that a particular law or practice is not evidenced 
for the latter region does not necessarily mean that the law or practice did not exist there.  Since 
the object of my research is to investigate similarities and differences of law or practice in 
different regions, I shall start with the presumption that the existence or non-existence of a law 
or practice has to be demonstrated.  This means that I am looking for direct positive evidence of 
the law or practice or its absence in the region concerned.  However, there may be 
circumstances in which it would be justifiable to draw upon the evidence of a law or practice in 
one region to support the possibility of a law or practice in another region for which there is 
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limited evidence.  This might be permissible where there is evidence of the use of the same 
practice for two regions but the evidence from one of those regions provides more detail than 
that for the other.  In such a case it might be justifiable to infer that similar details might have 
applied in the second region notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence for them.  For 
example, if, on Delos there is clear evidence for payments being made directly from the god to 
the guarantor of a building contract who has completed the work himself, but, at Athens, the 
evidence exists but is less clear, we may be able to able to infer that the practice existed in both 
city states.  Such an approach is, however, not without difficulty: the question arises of how 
much similarity there has to be between the attested practices of both city states before one can 
legitimately “fill the gaps” in the evidence of one city state by reference to the evidence from 
the other.  For example, Vial argued that the Delian Council would approve guarantors for all 
transactions entered into by Apollo.  We have direct evidence of the Council approving the 
guarantors for a building contract but no direct evidence of it approving the guarantors of other 
transactions with Apollo.  Here, Vial seeks support from the evidence from other parts of the 
Greek world where the authorities would examine the guarantors of persons who concluded a 
contract with the state or a sanctuary.  One may question whether Vial’s inference is justified 
here124; inevitably a judgment has to be made.  In my thesis I will adopt a conservative approach 
to the use of evidence from one region to support an interpretation of evidence from another 
region.  Where of interest, similarities will be pointed out but conclusions will not be drawn.   
Finally, with regard to Delos, the accounts of the hieropoioi contain numerous entries recording 
receipt of a payment made by one person “on behalf of” (u(pe\r) another125.  Homolle interpreted 
these as payments made by guarantors on behalf of contractors126.  The editor of IG follows him 
in this127.  A similar approach is adopted by Reger128.  However, Partsch noted that a payment 
that is simply described as u(pe\r someone need not necessarily mean that the payment was made 
pursuant to a guarantee; it could have been made as a result of a contract made between the 
payer and the debtor129.  We can go further than this: the payment may have been made out of 
friendship, or on behalf of an orphan, or by a deceased debtor’s heir, or because of a family 
relationship130.  u(pe\r is also used where a payment is made in respect of a loan secured on land 
that has been taken over or purchased by the payer131.  I have therefore ignored records of 
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payments made “on behalf of” someone unless it is clear from the entry itself or from other 
entries in the accounts that the payer had indeed stood as a guarantor132.   
Arrangement of my thesis 
I have arranged my thesis in six chapters.  The first five correspond to the questions raised 
earlier in this introduction as follows: 
• When are guarantors required? 
• Vetting of Guarantors 
• What did the guarantee cover? 
• How were the guarantees enforced? 
• How could the guarantor limit his exposure? 
In each chapter I will consider the question raised by the title of the chapter in relation to 
Athens, Delos and Boiotia and will compare the law and practice in the three regions and 
comment on similarities as well as differences.   
In the sixth and final chapter I will try to draw these threads together with a view to addressing 
the question of the unity of Greek law insofar as it related to the law and practice concerning 
guarantees and guarantors, and responding to the question of why a person would be willing to 
put himself forward as a guarantor.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
When are guarantors required? 
In this chapter I will ask whether the officials who were responsible for the relevant transactions 
on behalf of the community were required by the law to obtain guarantors or whether they were 
allowed a discretion to decide whether to ask for guarantors.  I will also discuss possible reasons 
for the legislators or the officials (if they had a discretion) asking for guarantors.   
I will review the evidence from Athens, Delos and Boiotia with a view to determining whether 
there were any similarities and differences between the three jurisdictions in regard to these 
questions.   
Athens 
A universal law requiring guarantors? 
I will start by enquiring whether there was a general law requiring all who contracted with the 
state to provide guarantors.  The evidence supporting the view that there was such a law comes 
from the scholiast Ulpian commenting upon Demosthenes 24.40 (Cat#A4), where the speaker 
sets out the law of Timokrates, which he attacks in the speech.  The law as it appears in the text 
of the speech seems to be genuine, although this cannot be free from doubt133.  It states that if 
any person in debt to the treasury has been or is in future subject to an additional penalty of 
imprisonment pursuant to any law or decree, the debtor can provide guarantors for payment of 
the debt and thus avoid imprisonment.  If, however, the debt has not been paid by the ninth 
prytany, the debtor is to be imprisoned and his guarantors are to have their property confiscated.  
However, in respect of tax farmers and their guarantors, and lessees and their guarantors, the 
existing laws (no/moi) relating to enforcement by the state are to apply.   
This last provision, which excluded from the scope of the proposed law tax farmers, lessees and 
their respective guarantors drew the following very confusing comments from the scholiast 
(Cat#A4): he informed his readers that tax farmers provided guarantors “from the beginning” 
(e)c a)rxh=j) so that if they did not pay by the ninth prytany either they or their guarantors had to 
pay double.  He then added that not just tax farmers, but all those in debt to the state 
(xrewstou=ntej tv= po/lei) did this.  As soon as they became indebted to the state, he says, 
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they had to provide guarantors that they would pay before the ninth prytany, and they 
themselves remained a)/timoi until they paid.  If the ninth prytany arrived and they still had not 
paid, they were imprisoned and had to pay double and were no longer permitted to provide 
guarantors for payment of the additional amount.  The scholiast says that Timokrates wished to 
relax this so that debtors (other than tax farmers etc) did not have to provide guarantors from the 
beginning, but in the ninth prytany, so that the debtors could pay at any time during the whole 
of the ninth prytany without having to pay double.  But if they had not paid by the end of the 
ninth prytany, then they were imprisoned.   
Partsch commented that it is clear from the end of the scholiast’s note that the scholiast has, in 
asserting that all debtors to the city had to provide guarantors, drawn an unjustified general 
conclusion from the proposed law134.  Rhodes, on the other hand, believed the source 
sufficiently reliable to enable him to provide a reconstruction (albeit conjectural) of a fourth 
century law governing public contracts, prescribing that those who became public debtors by 
undertaking to collect tax or by some other form of contract had to provide guarantors135.   
It seems to me, however, that the scholiast cannot be relied upon here.  The evidence of 
scholiasts generally has to be treated with care.  Rhodes himself points out that the 
concentration on the ninth prytany at the end of the scholion is an oversimplification (there were 
some payments that fell due earlier than the ninth prytany) and that the notion that contractors 
became a)/timoi before their payments were overdue is not credible (how could the consequence 
of non-payment by the due date possibly arise before the due date had arrived?).  Given these 
difficulties, the scholiast’s statement that all those in debt to the state had to provide guarantors 
from the beginning must in my view be regarded as equally suspect.   
Dem. 24.40 does tell us that there were laws dealing with the enforcement of guarantees against 
guarantors provided by tax farmers and by oi( ta\ misqw/sima misqoume/noi.  A similar 
expression is used in Ath. Pol. to describe the contracts let by the poletai (misqou=si de\ ta\ 
misqw/mata pa/nta - see Cat#A3 para 47.2).  According to Rhodes, this “covers all contracts 
by which an individual agrees to make a payment to the state in return for the right to pursue 
some activity for a stated period” and “contracts by which the state agrees to make a payment to 
men who will do a job of work for it”136.  Adopting Rhodes’ definitions, the expression would 
include contracts for working the silver mines, tax farming concessions and building contracts.  
On this basis, Dem. 24.40 shows that there were existing laws regarding enforcement against 
guarantors of these transactions.  However, it does not necessarily follow that there must have 
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been a general law requiring all those who entered into these transactions to provide guarantors.  
It is quite possible that the law merely stated that the enforcement procedures set out in it would 
apply to guarantors as well if they had been provided.  In addition, Dem. 24.40 does not provide 
us with any information about requirements for guarantors for transactions involving the gods or 
the civic subdivisions.   
Further investigation is required.  To that end, I will review the evidence by type of transaction.   
Tax Farming Concessions 
The evidence of Andokides 1.134 (Cat#A2) and Xenophon Poroi 4.19-20 (Cat#A9) clearly 
shows that in the fifth to fourth centuries BC it was a normal requirement that guarantors be 
provided for tax collection concessions.  But neither of these sources refers to a law.   
The Athenian grain tax law of 374/373BC LL29-31 (Cat#A40) requires successful bidders for 
the right to collect the grain tax to provide two creditworthy guarantors, to be approved by the 
Council, for each portion of grain to be collected.  One could argue that if there was a law that 
required all tax collectors to provide guarantors there would have been no need to say this again 
in the grain tax law.  However, as Stroud points out, the grain tax law may have spelled out 
“only those provisions that departed from or supplemented current practice.”137  Thus, the 
provision in the grain tax law may have been included because it was necessary to specify the 
number of guarantors required per portion of grain to be collected.  We cannot therefore 
conclude that there was no general law requiring all tax farmers to provide guarantors.  It is 
quite possible that there was such a law (for example a law governing the procedures for the 
award of tax collection concessions) and that the grain tax law is adding to it for the purpose of 
the grain tax law alone.   
The Athenian law of 338/337BC regarding the land known as the Nea includes a requirement to 
sell the right to collect the 2% tax arising from land (Cat#A32 LL11-15).  There is no reference 
to any requirement to obtain guarantors here.  However, even allowing for the fragmentary 
nature of the inscription, the treatment of the sale of the tax collection concession in this law 
must have been very brief, which suggests that there must have been a considerable amount of 
detail about it set out elsewhere.  If, as seems likely, the poletai were involved, the procedures 
to be followed may have been those mentioned in Ath. Pol. 47.2 (Cat#A3).  Here too, there is no 
reference to a requirement for guarantors, but the author does not describe the procedures which 
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the poletai followed when exercising their sale functions and it may be that these procedures did 
contain such a requirement.   
So far as tax collection concessions are concerned, then, all we can say is that it was the practice 
to require guarantors and that this may have been because there was a law that required it.  It 
appears from Andokides that the sums involved could be very high indeed.  This would explain 
the requirement for guarantors.   
Leases of public and sacred land by the state 
Whilst we have a substantial quantity of evidence regarding the involvement of guarantors in 
the leasing of sacred lands, we have no evidence of their involvement in the leasing of public 
lands.  This may in part be because the state did not normally engage in the grant of leases of 
public lands for cultivation by tenants138.  We do have extensive evidence of the leasing of silver 
mines in Attica, but no direct evidence of guarantors being involved in these transactions or of 
any law requiring it.  Faraguna has suggested that no guarantors were in fact required139.  We 
have records of leasing of land on the island of Salamis (IG II2 1590a) and the law regarding the 
leasing of the Nea (Ath.Ag.19 L7), both of which attest guarantors.  It is not clear whether the 
land concerned should properly be classified as public land.  As to the land on Salamis, 
Walbank took the view that the land was owned by the state140.  Taylor, on the other hand, 
canvasses a number of possibilities: that the land was owned by a religious organisation; that it 
was owned by the state; or that it was owned by the demos of the Salaminioi.  She does not 
express a preference for any one of these theories, although she notes that the theory that the 
land was owned by the state is based upon an assumption rather than upon any evidence141.  As 
to the Nea, this was part of the territory of Oropos, recently returned to Athenian control, and 
was to be used to generate income for the Lesser Panathenaia.  The poletai were probably 
charged with responsibility for leasing the land.  However, this is based upon a restoration of 
the text142 and scholars are divided as to whether the involvement of the poletai meant that the 
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Nea was regarded as public land143.  Even if the lands on Salamis and the Nea were public lands, 
the evidence of these inscriptions does not really permit us to conclude that it was normal 
practice to require guarantors for the leases of public lands, particularly having regard to the 
complete absence of guarantors from the leases of the silver mines.  As to the reasons for 
requiring guarantors in these two cases, the rents for the lands in the Nea may well have been 
quite high (a total income of two talents seems to have been anticipated144) which could have 
justified a decision to require guarantors.  The rents in the record of the grant of leases on 
Salamis, however, are very modest (ranging from just two drachmai three oboloi to eighty 
drachmai).  Here perhaps the reason was concern about the ability of tenants to pay even small 
amounts in rent.   
Turning now to the evidence for the involvement of guarantors in leases of sacred lands, we 
start with Xenophon Poroi 4.19-20 (Cat#A9), who indicates that in the fourth century BC 
guarantors were normally required from tenants of sacred land145.  This is overwhelmingly 
supported by the evidence of the inscriptions.   
Behrend’s analysis of leases granted by the Athenian state shows that, for the period covered by 
my thesis, all of those leases of sacred land which Behrend regarded as sufficiently well 
preserved to be used included a guarantor 146.  He asserted that the other surviving documents 
from which mention of them is missing were either not the kind of documents in which one 
would expect guarantors to be mentioned or are severely damaged.  Behrend therefore 
concluded that guarantors were always required for leases of sacred lands administered by the 
Athenian state147.   
When Behrend wrote, he did not have the benefit of the work carried out by Walbank on the 
bulk records of leases of sacred lands dating from 343/342BC to 320BC (Ath.Ag.19 L6 and L9-
12).  If he had, he would no doubt have regarded it as supporting his conclusions.  These records 
show that, where it is possible to tell without restoration148, there was at least one guarantor for 
each lease granted.  There is no reason to suppose that this pattern was not followed throughout 
this series of bulk records149.   
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Further, prosopographical evidence indicates that there were many cases in these records where 
the tenant was sufficiently wealthy to raise doubt about whether a guarantor was really 
necessary to protect the interests of the god and where the presence of one or more guarantors 
therefore indicates either that there was a universal requirement for guarantors, which gave the 
officials no discretion, or that even if the officials had a discretion they never exercised it in 
practice.  For example, we find in the bulk records of leases of sacred land for 343/342BC 
(Ath.Ag.19 L6 LL126-130) that the tenant of a gu/hj in the neighbourhood of Mesokomai was 
probably Kleotimos of Atene, a man of the liturgical class150, at a rent of only 106 drachmai per 
annum.  Notwithstanding his obvious wealth and the low rent, he nevertheless provided a 
guarantor.  Similarly, in the bulk records dating to 338-326BC (Ath.Ag.19 L10 LL40-44), one of 
the tenants was Arrheneides son of Charikles of Paiania, “a man active in the liturgical class 
from 357 to 325 BC”151, who leased a telma belonging to Athena for not more than 49 drachmai 
but still provided a guarantor.   
These were not isolated instances.  Walbank noted that 15 from a total of 86 tenants in the bulk 
lease records can be connected with the liturgical class or with prominence in Athenian public 
life152.  Different figures emerge from the database of leases contained in Shipton’s study of 
leasing and lending in fourth century Athens.  This indicates that 3 of the 45 tenants there 
identified were liturgists153.  Papazarkadas has however re-evaluated the prosopographical 
evidence and prepared a useful catalogue of lessees and guarantors of polis-controlled temene.154  
A review of this indicates that of a total of 50 tenants identified, 5 were liturgists and 4 were 
ascendants or descendants of liturgists.  It can be added here that, as Osborne notes, we know of 
only a small proportion of the total number of liturgists in any one generation, even in the fourth 
century BC155, so the number of wealthy tenants may have been higher than has been supposed.  
Papazarkadas also identifies a further 6 tenants who were “actively engaged in various fields of 
public life” and 10 tenants who “were very possibly active in public life or belonged to families 
which were active”.  But whether these individuals all belonged to “the upper strata of Athenian 
society”, as Papazarkadas suggests, we do not know.   
Scholars have generally taken the view that the uniform practice of providing guarantors for 
leases of sacred lands was the consequence of a requirement of the law.  Partsch asserted that an 
obligation upon the tenants of public and sacred land to provide a guarantor was prescribed by 
the no/moi telwnikoi/, but in what way these laws defined the duty to provide a guarantor is 
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not known156.  Behrend suggested that a requirement for guarantors was prescribed by law in the 
no/moi pwlhtikoi/ or in a general law on leases of public and state administered sacred land157.  
Such laws, he maintained, corresponded to the telwnikoi/ no/moi concerning the grant of tax 
collection concessions158.  Walbank contended that there was a law that dealt specifically with 
the leasing of sacred lands and suggested that it was possible that the terms and conditions of 
leases, including requirements for guarantors, were recorded either in that general law or in an 
enabling decree or similar document relating to the leasing of the lands concerned159.  Most 
recently, Papazarkadas has argued that the obligation upon tenants of sacred land to provide 
guarantors was contained in a no/moj peri\ tw=n temenw=n.  Some parts of this law may have 
been repeated in, or derived from, other laws such as the no/moi telwnikoi/160. 
Here the document preserved in IG I3 84 (Cat#A10) is of particular relevance.  This is a more or 
less completely preserved decree of 418/417BC which provided for the enclosure of the 
sanctuaries of Kodros, Neleus and Basile and the grant of leases of the land belonging to those 
sanctuaries.  The decree contains two references to a no/moj.  Firstly the decree required the rent 
to be paid annually in the ninth prytany to the apodektai who were then to hand it over to the 
treasurers of the other gods kata\ to\n no/mon (L18).  Secondly, the decree required the archon 
basileus to write up e)j to\n toiÍxon the name of the tenant, the amount of the rent and the 
names of the guarantors “according to the law that applies to sanctuaries” (kata\ to\n no/mon 
o(/sper kei=tai to=n temeno=n - LL23-25).   
Behrend argued that this no/moj could have included general requirements relating to 
suretyship161.  Walbank suggested that the law may have governed mechanisms regarding the 
grant of the leases of temene and the payment of rent, possibly including the provision of 
guarantors162.  Papazarkadas argues that the law included a requirement that guarantors be 
provided163.  However, whilst is is possible to argue that if the law required that the names of 
guarantors be recorded it must therefore have required that guarantors be provided in the first 
place, it is also possible, as Behrend acknowledged164, that it did not go as far as this.  It may 
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merely have provided, as Pernin has suggested, that the name of every individual who entered 
into a contract concerning a temenos had to be inscribed165.   
The one example we have from Athens of a no/moj dealing with leases is the law regarding the 
leasing of the Nea dated to 335-330BC.  It appears to have contained an express stipulation that 
tenants to whom leases were granted were required to provide guarantors ([mi]sqwtai=j 
e)gguhta\j lamba/nou[s] -Cat#A32 L11).  The text, as restored, appears to be referring to 
tenants “taking guarantors”.  As Lewis pointed out166, this expression is used in Dem.33.7 of the 
creditor taking guarantors from his debtor rather than the debtor providing them to his creditor.  
The text is, however, very fragmentary here.  Behrend suggested that either [mi]sqwtai=j 
belonged to a previous clause that has been lost and a new sentence starts with e)gguhta\j, or 
the sentence must be restored with para\ toi=j mi]sqwtai=j e)gguhta\j lamba/non[tej].  
Behrend noted that such a use of para\ with the dative is not found elsewhere and therefore 
suggested that the former alternative was more likely167.  The apparatus criticus in IG II3 records 
a restoration suggested by Matthaiou which proposes that the subject of the sentence here was 
Aiantis (or Aiantis and another tribe) and that lamba/nou[s......] should be restored as 
lamba/nousa so that the sense of the law here was that the tribe(s) should grant leases of the 
land “taking guarantors”.  There is no satisfactory answer to the textual problems here, but, if 
the no/moj did require that tenants of the Nea provide guarantors, one has to ask why, if there 
was already a law that required the tenants of sacred lands to provide guarantors, it was 
considered necessary to include this requirement again in the no/moj.   
One possible explanation is that the no/moj regarding the Nea was concerned with public lands, 
not sacred lands.  As already mentioned, scholars are divided on this, but if the Nea was public 
land, the no/moj tends to confirm the evidence of the leases of the silver mines that there was no 
general law requiring all who leased public land to provide guarantors.  That is why a specific 
requirement for guarantors was included in the no/moj regarding the Nea.   
A second possible explanation is that there was doubt in the minds of the legislators as to 
whether a general Athenian law (if there was one) requiring tenants of lands owned or 
administered by the state to provide guarantors applied to the Nea at all.  It may not have been 
clear whether land recently acquired by the state which was to be leased with a view to 
providing income for religious purposes (in this case the festival of the Lesser Panathenaia) fell 
within the law in question, and therefore, as a precaution, they included a provision specifically 
stating that guarantors were required.   
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A third possibility is that the law had changed over time: whereas at the time of IG I3 84 there 
may have been a law requiring all tenants of public or sacred land administered by the state to 
provide guarantors, this may no longer have been in force at the time of the law relating to the 
Nea.   
A fourth possible explanation is that there was no general law requiring all tenants of sacred 
lands to provide guarantors and that this is why a specific requirement was included in the 
no/moj relating to the Nea.  As indicated earlier168, the anticipated income from the Nea was 
very high.   
As to the requirement implied in IG I3 84 to provide guarantors for the leases of the sanctuary of 
Kodros, Neleus and Basile, this might have been contained in the sungrafai/ referred to in the 
decree, which stated that the basileus (and later the basileus and the poletai) must let out the 
sanctuary kata\ [t]a\j xsungrafa\j.  Walbank believed that these documents contained 
detailed instructions and specifications for the construction of the enclosure of the sanctuary, 
not the terms under which it was to be leased169.  However, they may go further than this.  In the 
main part of the decree (LL1-11), the enclosure of the sanctuary and the grant of the lease are 
separate transactions, with the poletai awarding the contract for the enclosure and the basileus 
granting the lease.  In LL4-5 the enclosure and the leasing are both to be kata\ ta\j 
sungrafa\j.  In LL5-7 kata\ [t]a\j xsungrafa\j is linked to the grant of the lease by the 
basileus, not the award of the enclosure contract by the poletai.  In the rider to the decree 
(L11ff) the enclosure of the sanctuary and the lease are now part of a single transaction – the 
tenant is to be responsible for construction of the enclosure at his own expense (LL11-14).  Here 
kata\ ta\j xsungrafa\j is linked to the grant of the lease.  In the light of this analysis of the 
decree it seems more likely that the sungrafai/ contained provisions relating both to the 
construction of the enclosure and the terms of the lease.  Pernin argues that the suggrafai/ 
referred to here were general regulations setting out stipulations governing leases of the type 
envisaged by the decree.  She suggests that they covered such matters as the duration of such 
leases and the enclosure of sanctuaries170.  In my view, however, the possibility that these 
suggrafai/ may have been specific to the present project cannot be ruled out, but in either case 
it is also possible that they obliged the archon basileus and the poletai to obtain guarantors from 
the tenants.   
It is relevant to note here that the amphiktyons of Delos also appear to have granted leases of 
sacred land belonging to Apollo on Delos during the period of the Athenian domination of the 
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island kata\ ta\j suggrafa/j (ID 89 L19) and there is evidence of the tenants of these lands 
providing guarantors (Cat#A42, A46 and A48)171, although it does not by any means follow 
from this that the tenants were obliged to provide guarantors by the terms of the suggrafai/ 
referred to here.   
What conclusions can be drawn from this?  Firstly, guarantors of leases of sacred lands were 
regularly required.  However, we may doubt whether, as argued by Partsch and Behrend, this 
was because there was a general law requiring all tenants of land owned or administered by the 
state to provide guarantors.  This is because there is not enough evidence to suggest that leases 
of public lands always required guarantors.  On the other hand it is certainly possible that, as 
argued by Papazarkadas, there was a law requiring all tenants of sacred land to provide 
guarantors.  However, a third view cannot be dismissed, namely that there was no such general 
law, and that the requirements for guarantors were included in other documents such as 
sungrafai/, which may have been prepared specifically for the project.  This view would 
require us to suppose that in the case of the bulk records of leases of sacred lands, the 
requirement for guarantors was to be found in no/moi, yhfi/smata or suggrafai/ in which it 
was decided that the lands should be leased out or pursuant to which the leases were granted.  
Where a large number of plots were involved it would not be surprising if the legislators were to 
introduce a blanket requirement for guarantors in every case regardless of the amount of the rent 
or the identity of the tenant.   
Leases granted by sub-divisions of the state 
Although guarantors were regularly required to be provided by tenants of sacred lands 
administered by the state, the same cannot be said in regard to land owned by a sub-division of 
the state.   
In his analysis of leases granted by civic sub-divisions (although necessarily based upon a very 
small number of usable examples), Behrend found a number of leases that were sufficiently well 
preserved for it to be possible to say that they did not require guarantors.  It could not be 
claimed, he observed, that these were exceptional cases172.  Papazarkadas contends that 
“placement of sureties was the exception rather than the rule amongst the Athenian political 
subunits”173.   
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Certainly, guarantors were not always required.  The general conditions published by the deme 
of Peiraieus in 321/320 or 318/317BC for the leasing of temene and ennomia of the deme 
(Cat#A28) provided that the form of security taken by the deme should be either guarantors or 
a)poti/mhma depending upon the amount of the rent (LL2-6).  If the rent was above ten 
drachmai, a)poti/mhma was required; if below ten drachmai, a guarantor.   
On the other hand, a decree setting out the terms of a lease granted by the phratry of the Dyaleis 
in 300/299BC required neither guarantors nor a)poti/mhma but provided that, in the event of 
non-payment of rent, the phratriarchs were to take possession of the land and, possibly, other 
possessions of the tenant, “as one does when bringing a di/kh” or “without a court judgment”174, 
and to lease the land to someone else (e)nexura/zein pro\ di/khj kai\ misqw=sai e(te/rwi to\ 
xwri/on) and that the tenant was to be subject to court proceedings if any of the rent was still 
outstanding thereafter (kai\ u(po/dikoj e)/stw Dio/dwroj e)a/n ti prosofei/lei th=j 
misqw/sewj) (Cat#A17 LL37-40).  Similarly, a fully preserved lease, granted by the deme of 
Aixone, did not require guarantors, but provided for e)nexurasi/a of the crops produced by the 
land and all the other possessions of the defaulter in the event of non-payment of rent (Cat#A26 
LL7-9)175.   
We must conclude from this evidence that there was no general law requiring all demes or 
similar organisations to obtain guarantors either generally from those with whom they 
contracted or specifically from those who took a lease of land.  This is the reason why we find 
that a decree of the deme of Eleusis of 333/332 BC expressly required the lessee of a quarry to 
provide two men as guarantors (Cat#A37 L29).   
Finley explained the apparent difference between the practice of the state, where, in his view, 
guarantors were invariably required, and that of the civic subdivisions (tribes, demes etc), where 
they were not, on the basis that the civic sub-divisions were in a different legal position.  If 
money was owed to them, they could not, as the state could, confiscate the debtor’s property 
without a court judgment and sell it in satisfaction of the debt.  Civic subdivisions were subject 
to private law.  They therefore asked for security over real property rather than guarantors on 
occasions176.  Alternatively, they might, as we have just seen in the leases mentioned above, 
reserve a right based on contract to exercise e)nexurasi/a over the debtor’s goods177.   
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One can only speculate as to the circumstances in which a civic sub-division would ask for a 
guarantor as opposed to some other form of security, or even no security at all.  Pernin has 
suggested that in the case of perpetual leases in most cases no guarantor was required178.  The 
Peiraieus inscription mentioned above used a financial threshold to determine when a guarantee 
would be required and when a)poti/mhma, but, as Whitehead pointed out, this was not a 
universal approach179.   
Finley argued that the civic subdivisions showed a tendency to seek security in the form of 
guarantors.  He suggested two possible reasons for this practice: firstly, with leases of 10, 20 or 
40 years’ duration, to ask for real estate as security would have tied up the property of the tenant 
for years; secondly, to ask for real estate as security would have excluded the landless tenant 
from seeking to rent a plot180.   
The latter point may have been the reason behind the financial threshold in the Peiraieus 
inscription.  Whitehead argued that it was intended to bar those without land or houses (to serve 
as security) from leasing the choicest of the deme’s te/menh and considered Isager’s view that 
the aim of this was to keep out the metics, of whom there were many in the deme of Peiraieus, 
to be possible181.  Papazarkadas argues that the important distinction was between cheaper 
pasture land (for which guarantors were required) and more expensive arable land (for which 
a)potimh/mata were required).  He speculates that at the date of this inscription (321-320BC or 
318/317BC), when Athens, having been defeated by the Macedonians, had recently lost her 
ancestral constitution, a large number of citizens had been disenfranchised and great numbers of 
impoverished ex-citizens may have been living in Peiraieus striving to earn a living out of the 
port.  The 10 drachma threshold in the decree would have enabled these landless people to rent 
some pasturage, if they could find a guarantor182.   
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However, these theories assume that a)poti/mhma always involved security over land and Finley 
pointed out183 that this was not necessarily the case.  Indeed, in the case of a debt of even 50 
drachmai (well over the 10 drachma threshold), it would in most cases be much simpler to take 
a pledge of personal possessions rather than a pledge over land as security.  If this is correct, the 
low threshold would not necessarily prevent metics, or landless ex-citizens, from renting land at 
a rent of over 10 drachmai.   
As Erdas has recently noted, the reason for the choice between real and personal guarantees 
depended upon the needs and requirements of each deme184.  It is possible that the reason for 
requiring guarantors on some occasions and not on others may simply have been that civic 
subdivisions may sometimes have had difficulty in finding guarantors, and that in these 
circumstances other forms of security were used.  Thus, for example, one reason why the deme 
of Peiraieus set such a low threshold for the provision of property as security may have been 
that it was unlikely to be able to obtain guarantors for sums above that amount185.   
Loans 
Here the evidence for Athens itself is very limited.  We have no evidence of lending to private 
individuals by the state or any of its gods.  However, there is evidence of loans by demes.  The 
decree of the deme of Plotheia (Cat#A12 LL19-22) required the officials to lend to the person 
who offered the highest rate of interest and “persuaded” the officials by “security or guarantor”.  
As Finley noted, the “language implies that the choice was left to the officials and was not 
determined by the size of the loan.”186  This is in stark contrast to all the evidence reviewed so 
far for all types of transaction, which suggests that the decision to require guarantors was not 
normally left to be decided by the officials on a case by case basis.   So far as loans are 
concerned, there is evidence from horoi inscriptions that the demes and other civic subdivisions 
did sometimes require loans to be secured on real estate187, but whether this was the result of the 
exercise of choice left to the officials, and if so what was the basis of that choice, we do not 
know.   
For Delos during the period of Athenian domination of the island, we have in ID 98 a record of 
individuals who have borrowed significant sums from Apollo but who have not paid interest 
due (Face B LL10-23).  If guarantors had been provided, we could expect them to be mentioned 
as debtors as well but not a single mention of guarantors is found.  We can tentatively conclude 
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that there was no requirement, legislative or otherwise, upon the amphiktyons of Delos at this 
time to obtain guarantors.   
Sales 
Again, the evidence is very slim and indirect.  The author of the Ath. Pol. tells us that one of the 
tasks of the poletai was to “sell the confiscated property of men who have gone into exile after a 
trial before the Areopagus and of other convicted men” (Cat#A3 para 47.2-3)188.  That it may 
have been the practice of the poletai, when performing this task, to obtain guarantors is shown 
by the records of the poletai of the sale of property confiscated by the state from the Thirty 
Tyrants and some of their supporters (Ath.Ag.19 P2) in which, as far as it is possible to tell from 
the surviving parts of the records, a guarantor was provided for every sale.  The word e)ggu, 
which appears repeatedly in the record, has been read to be an abbreviation of e)gguhqei/j.  It 
applied to the purchaser (see for example Cat#A29, where the purchaser was Sosinomos son of 
Aristonomos) and has been translated as “properly bonded”189.  Two of the purchasers were 
members of the liturgical class190, but they still provided guarantors notwithstanding the 
relatively modest purchase prices, indicating that it may have been a general requirement that all 
purchasers of property confiscated by the state must provide guarantors, allowing the poletai no 
discretion in the matter.  This requirement may have been imposed by a law or by a decree or 
some other document authorizing the sale.  We know from these records that the purchase prices 
could vary quite significantly.  With a large number of properties involved, it would not be 
surprising for the legislators to insist on guarantors in every case regardless of the purchase 
price and the identity of the purchaser.   
The same approach seems to be evidenced by the record of sales at Athens dated to 350-325BC 
(Cat#A19), which lists the names of the purchasers and the guarantors.  One guarantor is named 
for each transaction.  As has been observed191, the record contains no descriptions of what was 
being sold or of the price paid.  Various possibilities of what these transactions concerned were 
reviewed by Walbank192: sales or leases of land, leases of mines, contracts for public works.  
Whatever was being sold, however, must have been identical in description and value.  
Papazarkadas rejects all the possibilities canvassed by Walbank and suggests that the inscription 
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recorded the sale of the right to collect taxes in kind similar to the tax collection concessions in 
the Athenian grain tax law193.   
Regrettably we cannot really tell what property or rights were the subject of this record.  
However, it does appear that two of the purchasers were Xenokles and Androkles the sons of 
Xeinis of Sphettos.  They were both of the liturgical class194; yet they were required to provide 
guarantors notwithstanding the fact that the price was the same for each sale, again suggesting 
the existence of a general requirement for guarantors, perhaps imposed by a law or enabling 
decree or other instrument.   
Building Contracts 
Here again the evidence is very fragmentary.  The author of the Ath. Pol. tells us that the poletai 
were responsible for the award of building contracts (Ath. Pol. 47.2 – Cat#A3) but does not say 
whether they were required to obtain guarantors from the contractors.  The fact that the very 
extensive remains of the Erechtheion accounts for the year 408/407 BC (IG I3 476) reveal only 
two references to a guarantor (and those in relation to the same contract – see Cat#A13) is 
surely significant and suggests that at that time contractors did not have to provide guarantors.   
On the other hand, when we reach the fourth century BC, the law of 337-336BC for the 
reconstruction of the long walls, the walls of Peiraieus, and the harbour moles assumes that 
guarantors were required as a matter of course (Cat#A14 L34).  This may be because: (a) it was 
normal practice at that time to obtain guarantors from building contractors, or (b) there was by 
then a general law that required guarantors for all public works contracts, or (c) there was a 
specific requirement for guarantors for this project in another part of the law that has not 
survived, or (d) there was a specific requirement for guarantors that has not survived in the 
suggrafai/ for the works, which the law required to be drawn up by the architects and which 
were recorded on the same stone as the law.   
The suggrafai/ attached to a decree of 307/306BC concerning the reconstruction of the City, 
Peiraieus and Long Walls also appear to assume that guarantors were required (Cat#A15 L112).  
They state that when the contractors have provided guarantors they will receive payment “in 
accordance with the law”.  We do not know what this law provided for.  It may, for example, 
simply have laid down the procedures for making payments to contractors on public works 
contracts; alternatively it may have been a general law governing all public works contracts, 
requiring contractors to provide guarantors and stipulating that it was a condition of any 
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payment being made to a contractor that he should first have provided such guarantors.  
Whatever the law may have said, we cannot assume that it was in force earlier in the fourth 
century BC.  Significant political changes had occurred at Athens in 322BC with the abolition 
of the democracy.   
The requirement for guarantors evidenced by the law of 337-336BC and the suggrafai/ 
attached to a decree of 307/306BC may have been included as a consequence of the use of 
fewer, larger contracts for the purposes of procuring these public works as opposed to use of 
large numbers of very small contracts in the last part of the fifth century195.  The larger contracts 
placed greater responsibilities upon contractors for the performance of which the community 
would have wished to obtain assurance from guarantors.   
If there was a law during the democracy requiring public works contractors to provide 
guarantors, it may have applied only to public works strictly so called (i.e. where the works 
concerned were solely for the purpose and use of the state and did not have any religious or 
cultic purpose).  A document dated to 360/350BC that describes itself as a suggrafh/ for work 
on the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos (Cat#A43) contained a specific requirement for guarantors: 
tou\[j de\ e)gguh]ta\j kaqista/nai kata\ :X: a)cio/xrewj (LL17-18).  Two lines further on, 
provision is made for the naopoioi to recover penalties for late completion of the work from the 
contractor and his guarantors and “to do all other things in accordance with what is written in 
the suggrafh/ for other contractors and guarantors of works” (LL19-21).  Partsch argued that 
the suggrafh/ referred to here was a statute of the Delian administration196 and certainly the 
reference does seem to be to a document which applied generally to the collection of fines from 
contractors for building works and their guarantors.  It may have been a suggrafh/ relating to 
the execution of works on sanctuaries administered by the amphiktyons of Delos generally.  It is 
possible that this provided not only for the enforcement of fines but also for contractors to 
provide guarantors.  If this is correct, LL17-18 of Cat#A43 set out above would have to be 
interpreted as supplementing the suggrafh/ by stipulating the number of guarantors required, 
just as the Athenian Grain Tax Law may have supplemented a general law requiring the 
provision of guarantors by tax collectors, as discussed above197.  Whether, as Partsch suggested, 
this suggrafh/ was a Delian instrument can only be a matter of speculation, but if the theory of 
the existence of a suggrafh/ dealing with contracts for work on the sanctuaries of Apollo on 
Delos is correct, the conclusion must follow that these projects fell outside the scope of any 
Athenian law that required all contractors for public buildings to provide guarantors.   
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Work on the sanctuaries of Delos may not have been the only building work falling outside the 
scope of any general Athenian law.  A record containing what are described as suggrafai/ 
relating to the construction of the so-called Portico of Philo at the sanctuary of Eleusis dated to 
the third quarter of the fourth century BC, almost contemporary with the law of 337/336BC for 
the repair of the walls and harbour moles, indicates that the work was divided into five parts; 
three parts were awarded to one contractor and each of the other two parts to one other 
contractor.  Notwithstanding apparently differing sizes in the scope of work awarded, one 
guarantor appears to have been required for each of the three contracts (Cat#A22 LL28-34).  
This suggests that the officials in charge had little or no discretion as to whether to ask for a 
guarantor.   
It also appears from this inscription that the procedures for the award of these contracts (and 
therefore, probably, for the award of other contracts from this period for work on the sanctuary 
at Eleusis198) may have involved a dikasterion of five hundred and one at some stage in the 
procurement process.  Perhaps the contracts were awarded in the presence of the dikasterion.  It 
is probable therefore that the procedures described by the author of the Ath. Pol. for the award 
of building contracts by the poletai did not apply to the award of contracts for work at the 
sanctuary of Eleusis, and therefore that a separate instrument specific to the project at Eleusis 
covered the award of contracts for that project199.  It is possible that a requirement for guarantors 
was contained in that instrument.   The work involved the formation of joints between the 
stones, an important activity from the point of view of the structural stability of the portico.  It 
could have been for this reason that guarantors were required.  If urgent repairs were necessary 
because the contractor had not carried out the work properly, the guarantor could be called upon 
to pay for them.   
Independent Delos 
We have no evidence which directly attests a law requiring all those who entered into a contract 
with Apollo, or with the city state of Delos, to provide guarantors.  As in Athens, therefore, the 
most convenient way to approach the question of whether guarantors were always required from 
those who entered into transactions with the Delian state or its gods is by examining the 
evidence for each type of transaction separately.   
Tax farming concessions 
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The accounts of the hieropoioi contain numerous entries recording amounts due and payments 
recovered from guarantors of tax farming concessions, ferry boat franchises for crossings to 
Rhenaia and Mykonos, and concessions for the operation of the boat haul on Delos.  Regrettably 
the evidence does not provide any answers to the questions I am investigating in this chapter.   
Leases of the Sacred Estates 
There is no evidence of leasing of public land on Delos.  With regard to the sacred estates, 
however, we can say with some confidence that guarantors were always provided.  This is clear, 
for example from the accounts of the hieropoioi for 250BC (IG XI,2 287A LL143-180), which 
record the grant or renewal in that year of leases of all the estates then known to have belonged 
to Apollo on Delos and Rheneia.  In each case a guarantor was provided.   
Even here, however, the position is not entirely free from doubt: when in 250BC the tenants of 
Rhamnoi, Skitoneia, part of Charoneia and part of Chareteia all failed to renew their guarantors, 
the estates were re-let to new tenants for whom no guarantors are recorded200.  It is possible that 
since the leases were in their last year, the hieropoioi decided not to require the new tenants to 
provide guarantors.  However, this would be surprising, since the widespread failure to renew 
may have been a sign of general financial problems, for example as a result of a poor harvest201.  
Other possible explanations are that the hieropoioi simply omitted to record the names of the 
guarantors; or that the engraver made an error.  Whatever the reason for this apparent anomaly, I 
do not think it sufficient to compel us to depart from the very clear evidence that guarantors 
were always provided by the tenants of the sacred estates.   
This does not necessarily mean that the hieropoioi were legally obliged to obtain guarantors.  
However, as at Athens, the records reveal that wealthy tenants were, notwithstanding their 
wealth, required to provide guarantors, which suggests either that there was a universal 
requirement for guarantors, which gave the hieropoioi no discretion, or that even if the 
hieropoioi had a discretion they never exercised it in practice.  For example Hegesagoras son of 
Anaximenes was tenant of Nikou Choros in 278BC at a rent of 271 drachmai.  He was a 
wealthy man; five years earlier he had stood as prodaneistes for a loan to the city of 24,971 
drachmai (almost one hundred times the rent on Nikou Choros)202.  Yet he provided a guarantor 
for his tenancy.   
This is not an isolated example.  Kent took the view that most tenants belonged to the moneyed 
class.  They were gentlemen farmers to whom the estate and its lease meant not the opportunity 
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to earn a livelihood but an opportunity to invest capital.  He supported his view by noting 
evidence that mentions slaves being sold by the hieropoioi to recover unpaid rent.  This, Kent 
argued, indicated that the estates were worked largely, if not wholly, by slave labour203.  I am 
not sure that this evidence supports Kent’s conclusion.  The fact that a tenant owned slaves does 
not necessarily mean that he was a wealthy investor.  Kent also argued that the large number of 
tenants of the temple estates who are known to have had leading roles in public affairs at Delos, 
and the large number who served as guarantors of contracts and whose credit was good for loans 
of considerable size, showed that for the most part the tenants were men of high social standing 
and considerable wealth204.  But Kent did not identify the tenants he was referring to here, nor 
did he say what criteria he used to identify a tenant who was “of high social standing and 
considerable wealth”.   
Vial, followed by Pernin, was more cautious.  She argued that in reality we have no idea about 
the number of tenants who could be classified as rich, noting that whilst, with the exception of 
the period 240-220BC, we know who most of the tenants were, we know relatively little about 
who were the holders of official posts such as the choregoi (whom Vial was prepared to classify 
as wealthy if they held that office at least twice)205.  Pernin estimates that rich tenants 
represented about 10% of the total tenants of the estates206.   
Hennig pointed out the difficulties in making an assessment of whether the holding of a 
particular office or the proposal of a decree by a particular individual meant that he was a man 
of wealth or influence207.  Hennig adopted the view that holding office as archon, hieropoios or 
tamias was an indication that the person concerned belonged to the upper strata of Delian 
society.  However, he stressed that this was not an inflexible rule and that there might be other 
indications of such status (for example acting as a prodaneistes or as an ambassador to another 
city-state).  Even Hennig’s approach is however open to criticism.  Vial has shown that it is 
likely that archons were chosen by lot on Delos during the third century BC and that only at the 
turn of the second century did the method of their selection change to election by vote from 
among the wealthier levels of Delian society208.  This suggests that, during the third century at 
least, being an archon was not necessarily an indication of wealth or influence.   
In order to develop appropriate criteria for an analysis of the numbers of wealthy tenants who 
nevertheless provided guarantors, I start by adopting the criteria that Vial used for determining 
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whether a person belonged to “la couche la plus riche de la population délienne.”  In her view, 
anyone who agreed to act as prodaneistes in relation to a loan taken out by the city, and anyone 
who agreed to act as guarantor for a prodaneistes, belonged to this class209.  To these people, I 
have added those who borrowed 1200 drachmai or more from Apollo; according to Vial, these 
were among the richest citizens as they had to provide real property as security for the loan210.  I 
have also added the hieropoioi, who, Vial concluded, came from the richest section of the 
Delian population211, and the treasurers of the city, who were probably required to possess a 
particular level of wealth in order to hold office212.  My criteria necessarily have to be treated 
with caution.  For example, the accounts of the hieropoioi for 250BC record that Timesidemos, 
the tenant of the estate of Charoneia, provided no fewer than eight guarantors213.  As Kent 
commented, confidence in his reliability was justifiably small, since Timesidemos failed to pay 
the rent in full that year214.  In the same year he forfeited the lease because he was unable to 
provide guarantors215.  Yet Timesidemos was once a wealthy man – he was prodaneistes in 
282BC for a loan to the city of 24,975 drachmai216.  We do not know how common it was for 
men to suffer a fate similar to that of Timesidemos.  On the other hand, there are many 
examples of families that continued to be wealthy over a lengthy period of time217.  This 
encourages reliance upon the criteria I have used, albeit tempered with a certain amount of 
caution, particularly having regard to the further problem that has to be born in mind that the 
identification of individuals as members of wealthy families may not be one hundred percent 
reliable, even where the patronymic of the individual concerned is known, particularly if his 
name was one commonly found on Delos218.   
For the period up to 250BC we know of forty-two tenants who provided guarantors and we have 
further information about twenty-nine of them and their families.  As will be seen from 
Appendix A, these twenty-nine families produce six hieropoioi, nine prodaneistai, two 
anadochoi, one treasurer and three borrowers of a sum of 1200 drachmai or more.  Applying 
the criteria set out above, ten of the tenants could be regarded as wealthy or of wealthy families.  
Yet the wealth of the tenant appears to have made no difference to whether a guarantor was 
provided, suggesting that there was indeed a rule that required it or that, if the hieropoioi had a 
discretion, they never exercised it.   
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It is probable, however, that there was actually a requirement for guarantors and that this was 
contained in the so called i(era\ suggrafh/ (Cat#B32).  In the accounts of independent Delos, 
suggrafh/ usually means a document in which an agreement is recorded, such as a building 
contract or a loan document; when the accounts recorded the purchase of whitened boards “for 
the contracts” (tai=j suggrafai=j), they must surely have been for recording single contracts 
governing specific transactions.  Where references to legal authority or powers are required, the 
accounts often use the noun yh/fisma, the verb yhfi/zomai and less often the noun no/moj, 
usually in the introductory words to a section of the accounts that records the award of building 
contracts or the grant of loans pursuant to the legal authority referred to.  Sometimes, however, 
the word suggrafh/ (usually in the plural) is used in this context as well, often in conjunction 
with the references to yhfi/smata or no/moi.  An example is IG XI,2 156A L22ff, where the 
hieropoioi record that they have awarded works (e)/rga) kata\ yh/fisma tou= dh/mou kai\ 
kata\ suggrafa\j.  Here the term suggrafai/ may be referring to documents setting out 
regulations or rules governing several transactions (in our example, a number of building 
contracts) of which records follow in the accounts (as in our example) or are appended to the 
suggrafh/ itself (as in Cat#B33 B LL6-11) .  The i(era\ suggrafh/, however, appears to be a 
slightly different sort of document.  It was of a more general nature than other suggrafai/ and 
set out rules applicable to all leases of the sacred estates rather than to, for example, a specific 
building project219.  It is possible that it was drawn up by the hieropoioi in consultation with the 
Council and formally approved by the Council and the assembly so as to give it the force of 
law220.   
Cat#B32 does not describe itself as the i(era\ suggrafh/.  There are, however, two entries in the 
accounts of 250BC which suggest that it has rightly been given this name by scholars.  In the 
first entry, the hieropoioi record that they re-let the estate of Rhamnoi, ou) kaqista/ntoj 
Cenomh/douj tou\j e)ggu/ouj kata\ th\n i(era\n suggrafh\n.  In the second, they record that 
they “granted leases of the sacred lands for ten years in accordance with the i(era\ 
suggrafh/”221.  These entries concern the provision of guarantors and the granting of leases, 
which are precisely the kinds of matter addressed by the document that has survived as ID 503.  
It seems reasonable to conclude from this that the references in the accounts to the 
i(era\ suggrafh/ are likely to be to that document222.   
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Although the surviving parts of the i(era\ suggrafh/ do not contain a specific requirement that 
the tenants of the sacred estates must provide guarantors, it is highly probable that it did contain 
such a provision223.  There are a number of reasons for this.  Firstly, the best preserved section 
of the document, LL30-51, concerned the steps that the hieropoioi were required to take against 
tenants who did not pay the rent.  There are numerous references to guarantors here.  Secondly, 
there are references to guarantors earlier on in the document in connection with the provisions 
that applied in the event of the death of the tenant.  These were followed by rules that came into 
play if a guarantor died.  Thirdly, the entries following the second of the references to the 
i(era\ suggrafh/ in the accounts of 250BC referred to above consisted of a list of the tenants 
who had been granted leases of the sacred estates in accordance with the i(era\ suggrafh/.  
Their guarantors are named in every case.  Further, these same accounts show that when a 
tenant who had been awarded a lease failed to provide guarantors, the lease was cancelled and 
awarded to a different person who did provide guarantors224.  In the case of leases of sacred 
houses, as we shall see225, the original tenant was obliged to make good the difference if the rent 
under the new lease was less than the rent under the original lease.  We have no direct evidence 
of this happening in the case of the sacred estates226, but it seems likely that the same rule 
applied, suggesting that the failure to provide guarantors had been a violation of the 
i(era\ suggrafh for which compensation would be payable to the god.  Fourthly, the first of 
the references to the i(era\ suggrafh/ in the accounts of 250BC referred to above indicates that 
it was also probably a requirement of the i(era\ suggrafh/ that the tenant must renew his 
guarantors every year227.  If the i(era\ suggrafh/ contained an obligation to renew, it almost 
certainly contained an obligation to provide guarantors in the first place.   
The income from the sacred estates represented the greater part of the income derived by the 
god from the sanctuary’s assets.  If the i(era\ suggrafh/ did oblige the tenants to provide 
guarantors, it may well have been because of the importance of this income to the god and 
hence to the Delian community as a whole.   
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The i(era\ suggrafh/ probably came into effect in either 300BC or 290BC228.  The question 
therefore arises whether the hieropoioi had also been under an obligation to obtain guarantors 
for leases they granted before this date.  Accounts dated to about 304BC recorded tenants of 
estates who owed rent and their guarantors as e)ggegramme/noi kata\ th\n suggrafh\n229.  
Tréheux argued that this must be a reference to a general ordinance and that this was a 
suggrafh/ promulgated by the Athenian amphiktyons230.  What this suggrafh/ stated is not 
known.  From the reference in the accounts of 304BC just mentioned, it must have contained 
provisions regarding the recovery of unpaid rent from the tenants of Apollo’s estates and their 
guarantors.  Kent thought that it also included a requirement that tenants provide guarantors, 
although he conceded that there was no direct evidence for it231.  Fragmentary accounts dated to 
the last decade of the fourth century BC record the re-letting of an estate after the tenant had 
failed to renew his guarantor232.  The amphiktyonic suggrafh/ may therefore have obliged the 
tenant to renew his guarantors, and this in turn suggests that the tenant may also have been 
obliged to provide guarantors from the very beginning of the lease.  Again, however, there is no 
direct evidence for this.   
There is in any event some doubt about the extent to which any amphiktyonic rules still applied 
after independence.  The evidence of the inscriptions from the start of the period of 
independence to 300BC, the earliest date when it is likely that the i(era\ suggrafh/ came into 
effect, shows that there were guarantors and that there were attempts (not wholly successful) to 
recover from defaulting tenants233.  In one year payment of a proportion of the rents was 
postponed to the following year234.  Tréheux was of the view that the hieropoioi continued to 
work to the amphiktyonic suggrafh/ after independence235.  However, the differences in the 
lengths of the leases granted by the hieropoioi in the years following independence caused Kent 
to argue that during those years “neither the hieropoioi nor the lessees felt any particular need 
for rigid regulations”, although, in Kent’s view, the hieropoioi did require lessees to furnish 
guarantors “who were supposed to pay the rent if the lessee were to default.”236  Reger argued 
that the irregularity of rental levels during this period strongly militated against the view that the 
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regulations covering estate rentals during the amphiktyonic period continued in force in 314BC 
without a break.237   
One possible scenario may have been that the hieropoioi were seeking to enforce those parts of 
the amphiktyonic suggrafh/ they considered should be enforced.  This may well have been 
resisted by the tenants and their guarantors, who may have argued that the amphiktyonic 
suggrafh/ no longer applied at all. Only the introduction of the i(era\ suggrafh/ would then 
have regularised the position.   
Leases of the sacred houses 
When compared with the sacred estates, there is much less evidence regarding whether it was 
the norm for tenants of the sacred houses on Delos to provide guarantors.  However, it does 
seem to have been the case.  As Hennig noted, only four accounts from the period of Delian 
independence have survived which actually record the grant of leases of sacred houses238.  The 
first two, dated to the 260’s and to 257BC respectively, are far from complete, but the entries in 
the surviving parts take the form of a description of the property, the name of the tenant, the rent 
and the name or names of the guarantors.  A guarantor appears to have been recorded in every 
case, although caution is necessary because many parts of the texts are restored239.  The fourth of 
the accounts, dated to 192BC, is the most detailed.  It is well preserved and in every case gives 
the name of the property, the name of the tenant, the rent and the name of the guarantor240.  
However, the third of the accounts, dated to 207BC, merely lists the names of the properties, the 
names of the tenants and the rent; there is no reference to any guarantors241.  Hennig noted that 
this is “surprising” but offered no explanation242.   
The possibility cannot be ruled out that, for some reason, in 207BC the hieropoioi did not ask 
for guarantors.  If so, however, it appears to have been the exception.  The other three accounts 
suggest that the hieropoioi would usually require guarantors.  It seems more likely that the 
absence of any record of guarantors in 207BC was merely an oversight in record keeping on the 
part hieropoioi.  This is suggested by the fact that one of the tenants, Pherekleides, who was 
granted a lease that year is recorded in a list of tenants owing rent in the same year for the 
property that he had leased (the andrones).  The list is introduced by the words243: kai\ oi(/de 
                                                
237
 Reger (1994:218). 
238
 Hennig (1983:444). 
239
 IG XI,2 268 LL8-16; 226A LL11-22.  
240
 Cat#B26 LL1-31. 
241
 Cat#B22 LL94-99. 
242
 Hennig (1983:447). 
243
 ID 366A LL95, 130 and D LL26-27. 
 53
tw=n ta\j i(era\j oi)ki/aj misqwsame/nwn o)fei/lousi kai\ oi( e)/gguoi: This suggests that 
Pherekleides had provided a guarantor but that the hieropoioi had omitted to record it at the 
time.   
The view that it was the usual practice for the tenants of the sacred houses to provide guarantors 
derives further support from the words used in the accounts themselves.  Words such as those 
which introduced the list of tenants owing rent in the accounts of 207BC (oi(/de tw=n ta\j i(era\j 
oi)ki/aj misqwsame/nwn o)fei/lousi kai\ oi( e)/gguoi: or similar) appear in many other 
accounts of the hieropoioi.  For example, in 279BC, the hieropoioi prefaced a list of tenants of 
the sacred houses who have not paid their rent with the phrase: oiàde e)noi¿kia ou) [te]qh/kasin 
........ , a)lla\ o)fei¿[lousi] tw½i qew½i au)toiì kaiì oi¸ e)gguhtai¿:244  Similar words appear in 
the accounts of 274BC245.  Sometimes, notwithstanding the wording of the introduction, the 
names of the guarantors were not actually included in the list on the stone, suggesting that the 
words have now become essentially formulaic.  Nevertheless, the underlying assumption of the 
words is that all the tenants will have provided guarantors; it was standard practice.   
That it was standard practice is also supported by the fact that the records reveal that there were 
wealthy tenants of the sacred houses who nevertheless provided guarantors, as was the case with 
the sacred estates.  Molinier claimed to identify a number of tenants who were important 
persons.  Several, he argued, were choregoi and possessed a large fortune246.  However, my 
criteria for the measurement of wealth are different from those used by Molinier; for instance, I 
have not included choregoi, on the basis that Vial concluded from the numbers of choregoi 
required each year that the minimum wealth qualification cannot have been very high247.  
Particular difficulties in identifying wealthy tenants of sacred houses are, as Hennig pointed out, 
created by the fact that, often, a tenant might be named without a patronymic248.  Nevertheless, 
applying my own criteria of wealth249, there are examples of tenants of sacred houses who were 
wealthy or from wealthy families but who provided guarantors.  For example, Apollodoros son 
of Amnos, tenant of one of the Xylones in 192BC (ID 400 LL18-19), may according to Hennig 
and Vial previously have been hieropoios250.  Yet Apollodoros provided a guarantor for the rent 
on the sacred house.  Although the evidence regarding the tenants of the sacred houses is less 
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extensive than that for the sacred estates, it does seem that the example of Apollodoros was not 
an isolated one251.   
Molinier was of the view that the tenants of the sacred houses were actually obliged to provide 
guarantors252.  Hennig regarded them as essential for the coming into effect and continuation of 
the leases253. The evidence suggests that they were probably correct.  Firstly, as Molinier and 
Hennig both pointed out, if the tenant did not provide guarantors at the beginning of the lease, 
the lease was terminated and the house re-let254.  Molinier gave an example of this from the 
accounts of 192BC, which have already been mentioned above.  A total of 16 properties were 
let; the hieropoioi record that one of these (fifteenth in the list) was originally leased to Demeas 
son of Silenos at a rent of 50 drachmai; Demeas failed to provide guarantors and the property 
was therefore re-let to another tenant, who did provide a guarantor but paid a lower rent.  
Demeas was recorded as owing the shortfall255.   
Molinier also argued that, as with the tenants of the sacred estates, the tenants of the sacred 
houses were obliged to renew their guarantors annually and that failure to renew meant that the 
lease would be cancelled and awarded to a new tenant.  In support of this view, Molinier 
referred to among other evidence the accounts of 189BC.  These recorded that the hieropoioi re-
let the andrones after Agatharchos had failed to provide guarantors.  Molinier pointed out that 
this occurred three years in to a five year lease256.   
Hennig, on the other hand, did not believe that there was a requirement on the tenants of the 
sacred houses to renew their guarantors annually.  He argued that such a requirement, whilst it 
may have been essential and unavoidable for the leases of the sacred estates, cannot in general 
have been in the interests of the administration of the temple.  It was not always easy for tenants 
to find guarantors.  In the case of the sacred houses the rents were considerably lower and the 
term of the leases was half that which applied to the sacred lands.  Hennig believed that it was 
more likely that the guarantors were permitted to limit their liability in time and that if a 
guarantee expired without being replaced, the lease would come to an end.  This explains why, 
in the example cited by Moliner, Agatharchos had to provide guarantors three years into the 
term of his lease257.   
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In my opinion, Molinier’s view is to be preferred.  Hennig failed to recognise the importance to 
the temple of the requirement to renew the guarantors.  It provided the hieropoioi with a means 
of checking the tenant’s continuing ability to perform his obligations under the lease and served 
as an early warning bell of potential problems thus enabling the hieropoioi to avoid an actual 
payment default by cancelling the lease for non-renewal of guarantors and granting a new lease 
to a different tenant 258.  However, irrespective of whether Molinier or Hennig is correct, the 
important point is that the records of the failure to replace guarantors during the term of the 
lease suggest that there may well have been an obligation upon the tenants of the sacred houses 
to provide guarantors.   
Although this evidence points towards the existence of an enactment requiring guarantors for 
the sacred houses, no regulation equivalent to the i(era\ suggrafh\ has survived in relation to 
the leasing of these properties.  There is a reference to a suggrafh\ in the accounts of 257BC, 
where it is recorded: [a)nemisqw/samen de\ ta\j i(era\j oi)ki/aj ..... kai\ oi(/de kata\ 
suggr]afh\n e)misqw/sato.259  This sentence has been extensively restored.  Nevertheless the 
restoration of suggrafh\n does seem, as Hennig thought, reliable260.  Molinier was of the view 
that this was a reference to a set of regulations analogous to the i(era\ 
suggrafh\ but applicable specifically to the leasing of the sacred houses261.  Ziebarth believed 
that this was incorrect and Hennig too considered the evidence insufficient to permit such a 
conclusion.262  However, most of the evidence reviewed above tends to indicate that there was a 
rule that the tenants of the sacred houses were required to provide guarantors.  Whether such a 
rule was found in a suggrafh/, a yh/fisma or a no/moj is impossible to say but, based upon the 
parallel of the sacred estates the likelihood is that it was contained in a suggrafh/ and it is 
distinctly possible that the suggrafh/ in the inscription just mentioned may have been a 
suggrafh/ which was the equivalent for the sacred houses to the i(era\ suggrafh./   
When compared with the income derived by Apollo from the sacred estates, the income from 
the leasing of the sacred houses was very small.  Yet guarantors were still required.  It is hard to 
explain this other than in terms of the importance of the income, however small it may have 
been, to the god.   
Loans to individuals 
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Here the evidence from Delos is much more extensive than that from Athens.  In the Delian 
accounts, the surviving records of the grant of loans by the sanctuary to individuals usually 
record the name of the borrower, the amount of the loan, the names of the guarantors and the 
name of the person with whom the suggrafh/ relating to the loan was deposited.  There appear 
to be only four grants where no guarantor was mentioned.  These omissions may perhaps be 
explained as an oversight; alternatively it is possible that the guarantors may have been named 
in the suggrafai/ that were identified in the record of the grant of the loans concerned263.   
In addition, it appears to have been normal practice for the borrower to provide not only 
guarantors but also security over land and the borrower’s other possessions.  The provision of 
such security is found without exception in all the records of the grant of loans that have 
survived.  This cautious approach may reflect the great importance the Delians attributed to the 
prosperity of the sanctuary and their economic dependence on it.   
That it was normal practice for borrowers to provide guarantors is reflected in the fact that, as 
with the tenants of the sacred estates and the sacred houses, we find wealthy persons among the 
borrowers who nevertheless provided guarantors.  For example, Autokles son of Teleson 
borrowed 600 drachmai in 250BC (IG XI,2 287A LL126-129).  He came from a family that 
produced two prodaneistai (his uncle, Demeas son of Autokles (IG XI,2 203A LL75 and 78), 
and his brother, Diogenes son of Teleson (ID 354 L12)), one hieropoios (his brother, Diogenes 
son of Teleson (ID 316 L2)) and one treasurer (his cousin, Antigonos son of Demeas (ID 355 
L5)).  Also in 250BC, Diaktorides son of Theorylos borrowed 400 drachmai (IG XI,2 287A 
LL129-131).  He was a hieropoios in 247BC (IG XI,2 287D L11 and ID 290 L142), his father 
(Theorylos son of Diaktorides) was a prodaneistes in 269BC (IG XI,2 203A L75), his brother, 
Kallisthenes, had been an anadochos with one other for a loan of 2,400 drachmai in 269BC (IG 
XI,2 203A L75) and another Kallisthenes son of Theorylos (who, Vial argues, belonged to the 
same family264) had been a hieropoios in 298BC and a prodaneistes in 282BC (IG XI,2 148 L2 
and 158B LL14-15).  Both Autokles and Diaktorides provided guarantors notwithstanding their 
considerable wealth and the relatively modest amounts of the loans.   
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Again as with the tenants of the sacred houses who had not paid rent, the hieropoioi recorded 
the names of borrowers who had not paid interest.  Often a list is introduced by words such as 
kaiì oiàde to/kouj o)fei¿lousi kaiì eÃgguoi265.  Sometimes the guarantors are not named but 
the assumption underlying these words is that all borrowers provided guarantors.  From the last 
quarter of the third century an entry sometimes appears in the accounts stating for example: ei) 
de/ tinej o)fei/lontej to/kouj tou= i(erou= a)rguri/ou mh\ a)podedw/kasin, e)ggra/fomen o)
fei/lontaj au)tou\j kai\ tou\j e)ggu/ouj.  Here again the underlying assumption is that 
guarantors were always provided266.   
Despite the fact that it appears to have been normal practice for borrowers from the god to 
provide guarantors, there is no direct evidence from which we can definitely conclude that this 
was because there was a legal obligation upon borrowers to do so and upon the hieropoioi to 
require them.  No no/moj, yh/fisma or suggrafh/ concerning the grant of loans by the temple 
of Apollo has survived267.  The accounts for 281BC speak of the hieropoioi lending money from 
the i(ero\n a)rguri/on kata\ to\n no/mon268.  Regrettably, however, the lines that follow are too 
mutilated to enable us to know whether the borrowers provided guarantors.  Vial noted that the 
assembly would decide the amounts that the sacred treasury could lend to borrowers, citing the 
accounts of 179BC in which the hieropoioi record that they withdrew 500 drachmai from a 
particular jar for the purposes of a loan to Euboeus269.  It is possible that individual decrees of 
the assembly authorising the grant of specific loans may have dealt with the requirement to 
provide guarantors but we cannot be sure.   
As to the reasons for including a requirement for guarantors, this can probably only be 
explained on the basis of the importance to the god of the ability to obtain repayment of the 
loans should this be necessary.   
Building Contracts 
In an entry in their accounts for 274BC, the hieropoioi record that they have awarded 
(e)ce/domen) works with the architect and the epimeletai kata\ to\n no/mon.  These introductory 
words are then followed by a list in which the work, the contractor and the price are given, but 
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there are no references to guarantors270.  Indeed there are many other lists in the accounts of the 
hieropoioi recording the award of building contracts in which the works are described, the price 
stated (usually) and the name of the contractor given, but guarantors are not mentioned271.  
When one compares this with the records of the grant of leases of the sacred estates or the 
sacred houses as well as the records of the grant of loans, the omission of any reference to 
guarantors is surprising and might suggest that for these building contracts no guarantors were 
provided.  However, that this is not necessarily the case is shown by two such entries for which 
the actual contracts awarded have survived.  For both these entries the contracts themselves 
record the names of the guarantors272.  It appears, therefore, that the hieropoioi recorded the 
award of building contracts in a different way from the grant of leases and (perhaps with a few 
exceptions273) loans.   
Nevertheless, it does appear from other records that guarantors were not always provided for 
building contracts.  For example, the accounts for 246BC contain a long list of entries in which 
the hieropoioi record the payments they made to contractors under their contracts.  In each case 
they briefly describe the works, name the contractor and give the agreed contract price before 
going on to record payments of the instalments due under the contract.  A total of twenty-nine 
of these entries has survived on the stone.  We can be certain that no guarantors were named in 
twenty-four of the entries.  In one entry we cannot be sure whether guarantors were mentioned 
or not (although it is likely that none was named since there appears to have been insufficient 
space on the stone).  In four entries, however, the hieropoioi recorded that they made payment 
of the first instalment after the contractor had provided guarantors (e)ggu/ouj katash/santi)274.   
It could be argued that the absence of any reference to guarantors from twenty-four of the 
entries does not necessarily mean there were none.  They were simply recorded elsewhere, for 
example in the contracts themselves.  The reason why the guarantors appear in the four entries, 
it could be argued, was that their names had not been recorded in their contracts.  On the other 
hand, the accounts of 246BC are (as are many other accounts recording payments to building 
contractors) notable for their caution and defensiveness.  In all but three of the twenty-nine 
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entries, the hieropoioi carefully record that the last payment, and occasionally other payments as 
well, was made on the instruction of the architect (a)rxite/ktonoj keleu/ontoj, or similar)275.  
The purpose of these repeated references to the instructions of the architect is clear: it was to 
protect the hieropoioi from any criticism (and possible suspicion of corruption) in relation to the 
payments made.  By the same token, one would expect the hieropoioi, if guarantors were 
required, to mention specifically that the contractor had provided his guarantors when recording 
the payment of the first instalment in the accounts, even if the requirement for guarantors or the 
names of the guarantors provided had been recorded elsewhere.  However, in many of the 
entries the hieropoioi do not do this276.  One is driven to the conclusion that if a guarantor was 
not mentioned in this inscription, no guarantor was required277.   
In the light of this conclusion it seems unlikely that, when the hieropoioi recorded in their 
accounts of 274 BC that they had awarded certain building contracts kata\ to\n no/mon and 
then set out the names of the contractors and the prices278, the no/moj referred to included a 
requirement that all building contractors had to provide guarantors (even if, in that instance, 
guarantors were in fact provided and their names recorded elsewhere).   
The only other reference to a no/moj in connection with the award of building contracts is in a 
building contract dated to 250BC.  This provided that the contractor was to receive the first 
payment when he had provided a guarantor acceptable to the hieropoioi and the epimeletai and 
a)cio/xrewj kata\ to\n no/mon279.  Again, in the light of the discussion above, it seems unlikely 
that this no/moj required that all building contractors had to provide guarantors before receiving 
any payment (or the first instalment where the price was payable in instalments) under their 
contracts.  However, it may have provided either (a) that if, in relation to a given project, a 
building contractor was required to provide a guarantor, the guarantor had to be acceptable to 
the hieropoioi and the epimeletai and a)cio/xrewj (and the no/moj may have specified what that 
adjective meant), or (b) that if, in relation to a particular project, a building contractor was 
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required to provide a guarantor, he had to provide the guarantor before receiving any payment 
under the contract.   
If a requirement for guarantors was not laid down in a no/moj, it is possible that it was contained 
in a  yh/fisma or a suggrafh/.  Vial noted that the assembly decided upon the works to be 
carried out to the temples and the properties of the god280.  An example is found in the accounts 
of 246BC already discussed: [ta/de e)/]rga e)ce/domen yhfisame/nou tou= dh/mou meta\ tou= 
a)rxite/ktnoj kai\ tw=n e)pi[me]lh[tw=]n281.  Here we have seen that a guarantor was required 
for only some of the contracts.  It seems unlikely, therefore, that the yh/fisma referred to 
required the contractors to provide guarantors.  Similar wording can be found, for example, in 
the accounts for 282BC.  In this case it is followed by a list of awards of numerous contracts 
stretching over several lines of well-preserved inscription but no guarantors are mentioned282.  
However, as has already been seen, the absence of any mention of guarantors (or the failure to 
name them) does not necessarily mean that there were none.  So here the yh/fisma may or may 
not have required guarantors.  In the accounts for 224BC, on the other hand, similar 
introductory wording is followed by not only the award of the contract, but also by the 
payments made under it; and the first payment is recorded as having been made only after the 
contractor had provided guarantors283.  It is possible, therefore, that some yhfi/smata required 
guarantors and others did not, depending upon the nature of the work involved.  Regrettably, we 
cannot draw any firm conclusions284.   
The earlier building accounts sometimes refer to contracts being awarded also in accordance 
with a suggrafh/.  An example is found in the accounts of 297BC in which the hieropoioi 
record that they have awarded contracts for work in the Asklepeion kata\ yh/fisma [tou=  
dh/mou kai\ kata\ s]uggrafh\n meta\ tw=n e)pi[melh]tw=n kai\ a)rxite/ktonoj285.  Similar 
wording can be found in other accounts from the first half of the third century BC286.  Some 
refer to contracts being awarded u(po\ kh/rukoj e)n th=i agora=i kata\ suggrafh\n287 or 
simply kata\ suggrafh\n (without reference to a yh/fisma)288.  However, later accounts do 
not refer to a suggrafh/ when recording the award of building contracts, but only to a decree of 
the people.  As already discussed, some examples of suggrafai/ for building works have 
survived.  The suggrafh/ for the construction of the strw=ma for the temple of Apollo also 
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dated to 297BC, if correctly restored by Feyel, required the successful bidder to provide 
guarantors within three days of the day upon which he is awarded the work289.  This suggests the 
possibility that the requirement for guarantors came from the suggrafh/ itself.  A part of the 
suggrafh/ needing no restoration makes the first payment conditional upon the contractor 
having provided guarantors290.  This again suggests that the requirement for guarantors may 
have come from the suggrafh/.   
A suggrafh/ such as that just referred to differed considerably in content from the i(era\ 
suggrafh/ discussed earlier.  The latter was a general regulation governing all leases of the 
sacred estates; the former a specific building contract for a particular project.  Yet it may be that 
the process by which each came into existence was the same.  Both may have been drawn up by 
or under the direction of the Council and approved by the assembly291.  Both thus had the force 
of law.  Both required guarantors.   
I have already mentioned the contract of 250BC in connection with the possibility that a no/moj 
may have required guarantors.  This contract, like that of 297BC, said that the contractor was to 
receive the first payment when he provided a guarantor292.  It may be, therefore, that here too the 
requirement to provide a guarantor was laid down in the contract itself.  If so, when the contract 
stated that the guarantor had to be acceptable to the hieropoioi and the epimeletai and 
a)cio/xrewj kata\ to\n no/mon, the no/moj referred to stipulated that guarantors of building 
contractors should be acceptable to the hieropoioi and the epimeletai and a)cio/xrewj (i.e. 
alternative (a) on page 59).  Such a law would ensure that proper processes were put in place 
every time a guarantor was required but, if my theory is correct, it would be either the 
suggrafh/, drawn up by the hieropoioi, the epimeletai and the architect and approved by the 
assembly or the yh/fisma authorising the project and the expenditure that stipulated the 
requirement for guarantors for the contracts on that project.   
It seems probable, therefore, that on independent Delos the requirement for building contractors 
to provide guarantors (unlike the requirement for tenants of the sacred estates and houses) was 
stipulated on an ad hoc basis for particular projects, depending upon the extent and nature of the 
work concerned, either in the yh/fisma that authorised the project or in the suggrafh/ (or 
suggrafai/).  The latter may have been drawn up for the project by the hieropoioi, with help 
from the architects and epimeletai.  Here, therefore, the position seems to have been similar to 
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that which prevailed in Athens of the fourth century BC in relation to building contracts for 
sanctuaries (for example at Eleusis discussed above293).   
It is possible that on occasions the hieropoioi may have asked for an additional guarantor to 
address the problem that could arise if the contractor, having been awarded a contract for certain 
work, failed to provide guarantors acceptable to the hieropoioi.  The evidence comes from the 
contract for the construction of the strw=ma for the temple of Apollo dated to 297BC referred to 
above.  The relevant lines are fragmentary.  However, based upon a re-reading of the stone by 
Davis in 1933 and similar arrangements found at Thespiai294, Feyel proposed restorations which, 
if correct, required bidders to provide an e)gguhth\j tou= yeu/douj.  Feyel described such a 
guarantor as a “provisional” guarantor who was only obliged to guarantee the god against the 
risk of irresponsible bidding.  Three days later, the bidder was required to provide definitive 
guarantors (called th=j a)lhqei/aj e)gguhta/j in this inscription).  Upon provision of such 
guarantors the e)gguhth\j tou= yeu/douj was released.  But if the successful bidder failed to 
provide th=j a)lhqei/aj e)gguhtai/, the works were to be offered again to bidders, and if the 
contract was let at a higher price, the hieropoioi were entitled to recover from the erstwhile 
bidder and his guarantor the amount by which the contract price under the new contract 
exceeded the contract price that would have been payable under the original contract, had it 
proceeded295.   
Boiotia 
For Boiotia, we have evidence only for leases of public and sacred land and building contracts.  
I will start with the leases.   
Leases of Public and Sacred Land 
A number of documents pertaining to the leasing of public and sacred land survive from 
Thespiai from the last half of the third century BC.  Of those that record in reasonably complete 
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form the grant of leases all except one show that guarantors were provided296.  In one case, a 
tenant who leased land for as little as 6 drachmai per annum nevertheless provided a guarantor.  
There were three other cases where tenants who leased land at a rent of 8, 12 and 13 drachmai 
respectively all provided guarantors297.   
The one exception is a document (Cat#C8) which records the leasing of lands purchased with 
money received from King Ptolemy and Queen Arsinoe.  The names of the tenants, the rents 
and the durations of the leases are recorded, but there is no reference to guarantors 
notwithstanding the relatively high rents (1451 drachmai in one case, 250 drachmai 1 obolos in 
the other).  It is possible that the guarantors may have been recorded in another part of the 
inscription which has not survived.  However, this is in stark contrast to the other Thespian 
records which include guarantors as well as the tenants and the rent, all in the same place.  
Although the possibility cannot be excluded that there may have been special reasons for the 
absence of guarantors from this inscription (for example the source of the monies may have 
meant that the leases fell outside the terms of any law requiring guarantors), the evidence of this 
inscription prima facie suggests that there was no law in Thespiai at this time that placed an 
obligation on the officials to obtain guarantors.   
This view is supported by the fact that where guarantors were provided, this reflected a specific 
requirement to do so298 found in documents, described as prorrh/seij (in dialect: 
pro/rreiseij)299, which set out the terms and conditions upon which leases of public or sacred 
lands were granted300.  There would be no need for such a specific requirement if there was a 
law that already provided it.   
The prorrh/sij found in Cat#C1 LL5-7 required a maximum of two guarantors301, approved by 
the katoptai.  The pro/rrhsij in Cat#C2 LL5-7 contained a similar provision302.  Here, 
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however, it was stated that the guarantors were to be approved by the a)rxa/ responsible under 
the prorrh/sij for granting the leases303.  Both these prorrh/seij also provided that if the 
tenant, having gone onto possession, failed to provide guarantors from the beginning, the 
officials were to resume possession and to repeat the tender process, and, if the amount of the 
new rent was less than the original rent, they were to write the tenant’s name on a whitened 
board for the amount of the shortfall plus a penalty of the hemiolion (Cat#C1 LL9-12 and 
Cat#C2 LL9-11))304.  The accounts of the hieropoioi on independent Delos show that the same 
applied in relation to the sacred houses and, probably, the sacred estates on Delos305.   
Under these prorrh/seij, the tenant’s payment obligations if he failed to provide guarantors 
and thus forfeited the lease were not guaranteed by anyone306.  This could leave the god exposed 
if the tenant, having failed to provide guarantors, then failed to pay any shortfall in rent and its 
attendant penalty.  Indeed, the very reason why a tenant may be unable to provide guarantors 
might be that he did not have the means to pay the rent and no one was therefore prepared to 
stand as his guarantor.  In such a case it is probable that the tenant would also not be able to pay 
the shortfall in the rent and the penalty.   
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It seems that those responsible for the award of the leases may have appreciated this difficulty, 
since two other surviving prorrh/seij307 (both of which post-date the two to which I have 
already referred) introduced a system of requiring two sets of guarantors that may also have 
been used on Delos for building contracts as mentioned above308.  The Thespian prorrh/seij 
required that the tenant firstly had to provide guarantors tw= yeu/deoj and secondly had to 
provide guarantors o(/laj ta=j misqw/sioj.  If the tenant failed to provide guarantors o(/laj ta=j 
misqw/sioj, the officials were to re-let the land; if there was a shortfall between the original rent 
and the rent under the new lease, the names of the original tenant and his guarantors tw= 
yeu/deoj were to be written up by the officials on a whitened board for the amount of the 
shortfall and the hemiolion (see e.g. Cat#C6 LL18-19).  Thus, whereas in the earlier 
prorrh/seij the god had no recourse if the tenant failed to provide guarantors and then was 
unable to pay the shortfall between the rent he had agreed and the rent under the new lease, 
under these later prorrh/seij, the god would have recourse to the guarantors tw= yeu/deoj.   
In these two prorrh/seij, the purpose or scope of the guarantees provided by both types of 
guarantors is described by a noun in the genitive case: tw= me\n yeu/deoj and o(/laj de\ ta=j 
misqw/sioj.  There are numerous examples of this construction from Athens, Delos and 
elsewhere309.  Feyel suggested that the yeu=doj referred to in the description of the first set of 
guarantors was the “lie” committed by the bidder who obtained the award of a lease that was 
beyond his means310.   The “lie” would be demonstrated by the inability of the tenant to provide 
guarantors for the rent.  In other words this first set of guarantors stood as guarantors for the 
good faith of the prospective tenant’s bid for the lease.   
The point at which the guarantor tw= yeu/deoj had to be provided would have been important 
for the effectiveness of these arrangements.  Feyel suggested that the guarantor had to be 
provided in order to obtain an award of the lease; Velissaropoulos-Karakostas suggests that the 
guarantor was provided when the leasing agreement was concluded311.  Both the prorrh/seij 
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talk of o( misqwsa/menoj being under the obligation to provide these guarantors312.  The aorist 
tense suggests that the tenant had already been awarded the lease and Velissaropoulos-
Karakostas’ interpretation is therefore to be preferred.  However, unlike the earlier 
prorrh/seij, these later ones do not describe the tenant as o( e)mba\j.  This suggests that, 
although the tenant has been awarded the lease, he has not yet gone into possession.  It seems 
likely, then, that the tenant was required to provide his guarantors tw= yeu/deoj as a condition 
of his being permitted to go into possession.  Having taken possession, he would then have three 
days to provide his guarantors o(/laj ta=j misqw/sioj.  If the tenant had been allowed into 
possession before providing his guarantors tw= yeu/deoj, the later prorrh/seij would not have 
been much of an improvement on the earlier ones: the landlord would still have been left 
without recourse to guarantors if the tenant, having gone into possession, failed to provide the 
guarantors tw= yeu/deoj.  The requirement to provide guarantors before being allowed into 
possession has an equivalent in the Delian building contracts, which required the contractor to 
provide guarantors before he was paid the first instalment313.   
All the prorrh/seij are very similar in their content, as can be seen from the table in Appendix 
B.  Some of the gaps in the table may be explained by the fragmentary nature of some of the 
prorrh/seij.  Yet despite the common themes there are numerous differences of detail. This 
can be seen from an examination of Appendix C.  Differing dates for payment of rent, differing 
amounts of e)nne/xuron (sic) and the introduction of the guarantor tw= yeu/deoj are obvious 
examples.   
We have already seen that different officials appear to have been responsible for approving 
guarantors in Cat#C1 and Cat#C2.  Appendix C shows that in other prorrh/seij yet other 
officials were sometimes involved in various aspects of the administration of the leases314.  
Cat#C3 records that the hierarchs have granted the leases of the land.  They also approve the 
guarantors and have similar duties to those of the a)rxai/ mentioned in Cat#C1 and 2 in the 
event of tenant default.  The hierarchs appear again in Cat#C4, which contains a fragment of a 
prorrh/sij concerning sacred land.  Here they have similar duties on tenant default.  In Cat#C6 
we find an a)rxa/ with responsibility for granting leases, approving guarantors and re-letting the 
land in the event of tenant default.  Yet the treasurer of the Muses also received the specific duty 
of writing down the names of the tenant and his guarantors in the event of non-payment of the 
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rent315. As noted by Osborne, the absence of any consistency in regard to the officials suggests 
an ad hoc approach316.   
This ad hoc approach is reflected in the wording of the prorrh/seij themselves.  In relation to 
one of the prorrh/seij (Cat#C6), Feyel argued that the draftsman was working from a model 
that he was altering to suit the particular requirements of the leasing of the land in question317.  
In LL20-24 of this prorrh/sij, the treasurer (singular) is given the power to impose (verb in 
the singular - e)sgra/yi) a fine for non-payment of rent; but in the rest of the same sentence the 
requirement to re-let the land and to record the name of the tenant and his guarantors in the 
event of a shortfall in the rent is expressed by two verbs in the plural (e)pammisqw/sonti, 
e)sgra/yonqi) with no express subject.  Feyel thought that in the model from which the 
draftsman had been working the hierarchs (in the plural) were the subject of the whole sentence 
with the first verb in the plural as well as the other two.  The draftsman had replaced hierarchs 
with the treasurer and altered the first verb to the singular but left the other verbs in the plural 
with the a)rxa/ of hierarchs understood as the subject.  Roesch considered that Feyel’s 
explanation was “laborious” and proposed a simpler explanation318: the subject understood for 
the two plural verbs did not have to be the a)rxa/ of hierarchs; it could be the special a)rxa/ 
appointed for the purposes of the prorrh/sij and referred to in LL10, 15, 18 and 19 of the 
inscription (a)rxa/, a board of officials, could take either a singular or a plural verb; examples 
were cited by Feyel).   
Roesch may be right in this.  Yet the change from the singular verb to the plural verbs in this 
sentence without a clear identification of the subject of the latter is stark and is consistent with 
Feyel’s theory that the draftsman was working from a model.  Indeed, a comparison of the four 
prorrh/seij contained in Cat#C1, C2, C3 and C6 (particularly the provisions regarding failure 
to provide guarantors and failure to pay the rent - see Appendix C) suggests that in each case the 
draftsman may well have been working from an earlier prorrh/sij which he was using as a 
model, adjusting it to suit the circumstances of the particular project on which he was working.   
The prorrh/sij for a particular piece of land appears to have been issued by a board appointed 
pursuant to a decree of the people of Thespiai for the purposes of administering the leasing of 
the land concerned.  This can be seen from Cat#C7.  It refers to a decree which recorded that the 
leases of certain agricultural plots belonging to the city have expired and that the original 
prorrh/sij setting out the terms of those leases permitted the tenants to renew their leases at 
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the same rent, if they wished (LL1-3).  Accordingly, the decree provided for a board to be 
established who would lease the plots in accordance with the prorrh/sij pursuant to which 
they had originally been leased (LL3-6).  If a sitting tenant had irrigated his land and complied 
with the terms of the prorrh/sij, he could, if he wished, renew his lease by presenting himself 
to the board.  If a tenant had not irrigated his land, the board was to put the lease of the plot 
concerned out to tender upon terms appearing to them to be advantageous (LL7-9).  The decree 
is immediately followed in the inscription by a statement recording that the board, whose 
members and secretary are now named, has leased the lands “in accordance with the decree of 
the people and the existing prorrh/sij that was made during the archonship of Empedokles” 
(LL11-14).  There then follows a list of the leases renewed or newly granted.   
It appears from this that the primary authority in regard both to the renewal of existing leases 
and to the grant of new ones came from the assembly.  Whilst an existing tenant who was 
entitled to and did renew had to do so on the terms of the existing prorrh/sij, the detailed 
terms of the leases granted to new tenants were left to the board (kaq' a(/ ka fh/neith auth= 
su/nforon ei)=men).  The board has made the obvious choice to re-use the existing prorrh/sij, 
which included a requirement for the tenants to provide guarantors.  Nevertheless the assembly 
had made it clear in its decree that the board had the discretion to decide those terms.   
Overall, the evidence of the Thespian inscriptions indicates that the question whether to require 
guarantors from the tenants of sacred or public lands was left to the discretion of the officials 
charged with responsibility for the grant of the leases.  As a matter of practice, the officials 
would use a previous prorrh/sij as a model and this would normally mean that they required 
guarantors, but there would be the occasional exceptions where the particular circumstances 
were different from the norm.   
Building Contracts 
The terms for a building contract recorded in one of the inscriptions relating to the construction 
of the temple of Zeus Basileus for the Boiotian koinon make the provision of guarantors “in 
accordance with the law” a condition of the contractor receiving his first payment (Cat#C9 
LL47-48).  We find the same type of provision in both Athens and Delos.319   
The purpose of the brief reference to a no/moj here must have been, as Roesch pointed out, to 
save having to set out at length in the contract what was already set out in the law.  In order to 
answer the question what was set out in the law, Roesch referred in particular to the Thespian 
prorrh/seij discussed above.  On the assumption that the provisions of the law probably would 
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not have been very different from those which the Thespians agreed for their leases of public 
and sacred lands, Roesch argued that the no/moj referred to in the Lebadeian inscription 
required all bidders, upon award of the contract, to provide an e)/gguoj tw= yeu/deoj and, 
within three days of being awarded the contract, to provide creditworthy guarantors for the 
performance of the contract itself.  If a bidder failed to provide the second set of guarantors, the 
tender process was repeated and, if the resulting price differed adversely from the koinon’s point 
of view, the bidder and his e)/gguoj tw= yeu/deoj were responsible for paying the difference 
plus the hemiolion320.  Further, he argued that the law referred to in the Lebadeian building 
contract was introduced after the date of the Thespian prorrh/seij and that it also applied to 
the grant of leases of public and sacred land in member states of the koinon, such as Thespiai.   
This is a very ingenious argument.  There is no reason why the principles relating to the 
requirement for an e)/gguoj tw= yeu/deoj for the grant of leases should not be applied to the 
letting of building contracts and Thespiai as one of the leading cities in the Hellenistic Boiotian 
Confederation321 may have had some influence with the council and assembly of the koinon 
when it came to the introduction and passing of laws relating to sanctuaries of the koinon.   
Even so, there is no direct evidence to support Roesch’s arguments and we cannot discount 
other theories about what this law provided.  It could have been a law governing the procedures 
for payments for works being carried out for the koinon, a confederate city, or one of their gods 
or goddesses; or governing the procedure that had to be followed for the approval of guarantors 
for building contracts (and perhaps leases and other contracts) entered into with the koinon, a 
confederate city, or one of their gods or goddesses.   
Nor does it follow that, even if Roesch is right about the content of the law, it applied, as 
Roesch contended, to the letting of building contracts and the grant of leases of public or sacred 
land in member states.  Roesch is right in arguing that the law referred to in the Lebadeian 
building contract terms must have been a federal law.  This is clear from the fact that the 
contract concerned work at the sanctuary of Zeus Basileus, which was a federal sanctuary, and 
that the contract was administered by the naopoioi, who were federal officials322 and were 
required to comply with the law when making payments under the contract323.  However, the 
fact that the law was a federal law does not necessarily mean that it applied to local contracts 
and leases.  It could have been confined to contracts entered into by the koinon or to land which 
was sacred to the gods of the koinon.  It would depend upon what the law itself said about its 
scope.   
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In sum, we cannot say that guarantors were always required for building contracts in the 
Boiotian confederation of the third century BC but neither can we comment on the 
circumstances in which guarantors might be required.   
Common legal principles and practices underlying the requirement for a guarantor. 
My review of the evidence indicates that there was no fundamental principle to the effect that all 
those who entered into contracts (of whatever kind) with the community had to provide 
guarantors.   
If any principle is to be derived from the evidence, it is that if guarantors were to be required 
this was to be provided in an instrument having the force of law.  Only very few of these have 
survived: the Athenian no/moj relating to the Nea, the Delian i(era\ suggrafh/ and the Thespian 
prorrh/seij.  This (perhaps not very startling) principle permits us to say that where the 
evidence shows that guarantors for particular types of transaction were always provided (even 
by apparently wealthy contractors) this was because there was a no/moj, yh/fisma, suggrafh/ 
or similar document requiring it even if we cannot identify the particular instrument concerned.  
This would apply for example to tax collection franchises, the sale of properties and the leases 
of sacred lands at Athens; the leases of sacred estates and sacred houses on Delos during the 
amphiktyonic period; and the leases of sacred houses and the loans to individuals on 
independent Delos.   
This leaves open the question of the circumstances in which those responsible for drawing up 
the relevant instrument, for example, at Athens, the Boule, the Thesmothetai, the demarchs, the 
phratriarchs or the officials charged with the responsibility for a particular project, would or 
would not include a requirement for guarantors.  There is some evidence that those who drew up 
the legal documents requiring guarantors may simply have been following a precedent.  Where 
the relevant instrument was to apply to a large volume of transactions, the simplest approach 
may have been to require guarantors for each of them.   
In the case of the civic subdivisions at Athens, the arrangements concerning guarantors (or the 
absence of them) for the leasing of lands and the granting of loans may have been driven by the 
practical realities of the availability to the subdivision of tenants, borrowers and guarantors or 
other forms of security.   
In the case of building contracts, much may have depended upon the nature of the bulding 
project concerned.  There were large differences in the levels of skills required, in the types of 
contracts awarded and in the prices paid.   
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The evidence reviewed in this chapter has also shown that there were differences in principles 
and practices between the three jurisdictions.  For example, there seems to have been a 
requirement for guarantors tw= yeu/deoj at Thespiai and, possibly, Delos but not at classical 
Athens.  Although it has to be remembered that the absence of evidence for such a practice at 
Athens does not necessarily mean that it did not occur there, it is possible that this difference 
indicates that there was a greater risk on Delos and at Thespiai than at Athens that the contractor 
would be unable to provide acceptable guarantors.  It may also indicate that the community on 
independent Delos and at Thespiai was in a weaker bargaining position than at Athens, so that 
there was a greater risk that when the community went back into the market to find another 
contractor it would be compelled to accept a contract which was financially inferior to the one it 
had had to reject because of the inability of the original contractor to provide guarantors.   
Another difference appears to have been that on independent Delos there was a requirement that 
the guarantors of leases of the sacred estates and, probably, of the sacred houses be renewed 
annually whereas this type of requirement does not seem to have existed at Thespiai or Athens.  
As mentioned earlier324, this requirement was important to the community.  A failure to renew 
rang an early warning bell of potential problems with the tenant and would have allowed the 
community to take action before there was an actual failure to pay the rent.  This may be a 
reflection of the importance of the income from the sacred estates and, to a lesser extent, houses, 
to the sanctuary at Delos, which in turn may be an indication of the importance of the prosperity 
of the sanctuary to the economy and prosperity of Delos itself and the strength of the influence 
of the sanctuary in the economic life of the Delian community.   
The importance of the prosperity of the sanctuary at Delos may also have been the reason for 
another difference between that community and those of Athens and Boiotia, that the god 
required that borrowers secured their loans by the hypothecation of real property as well as by 
provision of guarantors.   
                                                
324
 p55. 
 72
CHAPTER TWO 
Vetting of Guarantors 
Where guarantors were required, an appropriate choice of guarantor was clearly important from 
the point of view of the community.  Questions arise as to who approved guarantors, how 
guarantors were vetted, and what criteria a guarantor had to meet for him to be acceptable.  In 
this chapter I will consider these questions in relation to each of my chosen states in turn and 
then discuss the question of whether or not there were any common principles underlying the 
approach taken to these matters in the three jurisdictions.   
Athens 
In classical Athens the choice of guarantors may not always have been left entirely to the 
officials in charge of the transaction.  The author of the Ath. Pol. says (47.2 – Cat#A3) that the 
poletai “let out contracts for the …… taxes …… in the presence of the Council”325.  If this 
process included the nomination of a guarantor by the contractor and acceptance by the 
poletai326, the Council could presumably have objected to a guarantor if it considered that he 
was inappropriate.  The grain tax law of 374/373BC (Cat#A40 L31) expressly provided that the 
Council had to approve the guarantors of those who were awarded franchises for the collection 
of taxes under the law.  However, this does not necessarily mean that the same was required for 
the tax contracts referred to in Ath. Pol.: the requirement that guarantors be approved by the 
Council may have been included in this law precisely because it was not a requirement for other 
tax contracts327.   
As already mentioned328, the author of the Ath. Pol. also says, in the same passage, that the 
poletai “sell in the presence of the Council the confiscated property of men who have gone into 
exile after trial before the Areopagus and of other convicted men, and the sale is ratified by the 
nine archons”.  As we have seen329, the records of the poletai of the sale of land of the thirty 
tyrants described each purchaser as having been “properly bonded” (e)gguhqei/j).  In the light of 
what the author of the Ath. Pol. says, this expression may mean that the Council and the nine 
archons had approved the guarantors.  At the very least the Council and the archons were 
involved in some way.   
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Finally, Ath. Pol. (Cat#A3 para 47.4) records that the archon basileus introduced to the Council 
the leases of sacred lands.  Perhaps this would have given the Council an opportunity to reject 
any guarantor of such leases whom the Council considered unacceptable.330   
There is also some evidence from other transactions of similar procedures for the vetting of the 
guarantors by the courts.  We have seen331 that the record of three contracts relating to the 
construction of the Portico of Philo at the sanctuary of Eleusis indicates that the award of the 
contracts may have taken place before a dikasterion of five hundred and one (Cat#A22 L35).  
Each contract was also accompanied by a guarantee.  We do not know whether the guarantors 
made their commitment before the jurors as well.  But if they did, this would be an opportunity 
for the jurors to vet the suitability of the guarantors.  One can only speculate about what 
procedures might have been adopted by the dikasterion for this purpose.  If an analogy can be 
drawn with the procedures for the letting of an orphan’s estate, briefly mentioned in Isaios 6.36-
37 and Hyperides’ speech Against Timandros, as elucidated by Thür332, it is possible that the 
guarantors may have been offered at the same time as the competing contractors’ financial bids 
and that the procedure took the form of a diadikasia between the bidding groups333.   
Similar procedures may have been used for the approval of building contracts for work on the 
sanctuaries on the island of Delos in the amphiktyonic period: it will be recalled334 that the 
contract in Cat#A43 required the guarantors to be a)cio/xrewj.  This implies that some kind of 
vetting procedure was involved (L18), and here we also find a reference to the dikasterion 
(L28).  Another contract for work on the island of Delos (Cat#A44 dated to 359-358BC), for 
which it appears that a guarantor was named, mentions the d[ikasth/rion to\ prw=ton t]w=n 
kainw=n (LL19-20).  The editor of ID based his restoration on a reference to the 
[dikasth/rion] to\ prw=ton tw=n kain[w=n] which appeared in the poletai records of 342-
341BC (Ath.Ag.19 P26 LL365-366).  This was one of the court buildings in Athens, which were 
brought together in one complex at about this time or perhaps earlier335.  We find a further 
reference to a dikasterion in yet another contract for works on Delos in which it appears that a 
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guarantor was required (Cat#A45 L24).  The Athenian court seems to have had a role to play 
here, although it is not known what that role was.   
In transactions involving subdivisions of the state, however, it appears that the vetting was 
sometimes left to the officials who were in charge of the transaction.  As mentioned earlier336, 
the decree of the deme of Plotheia (Cat#A12) providing for the loan of the deme’s money 
required to\j danei/zontaj a/)rxontaj to lend it to the person who “persuaded” them by 
“security or guarantor” (LL18-22).  Here the officials were charged with assessing the 
creditworthiness of guarantors as part of the process of determining the most advantageous 
terms available for the loan.   
By contrast, the decree of the deme of Eleusis of 333/332 BC provided for the lease of a quarry 
to be granted by the demarch at a meeting of the demesmen.  The guarantors were to take an 
oath, apparently at this meeting, to pay the rent in full on time (Cat#A37 LL29-31).  This gave 
the demesmen, and the demarch, the opportunity to satisfy themselves that the guarantors were 
suitable before the guarantors took their oaths.   
Criteria – Citizenship 
The evidence strongly suggests that, in Athens, the guarantors were usually Athenian citizens.  
In the one hundred and thirty nine instances in the inscriptions where it is possible to tell 
whether a guarantor was an Athenian citizen or not, there is only one case where a guarantor 
may not have been an Athenian citizen and this was where the guarantor of a lease of land on 
Delos may have been a Delian (discussed further below337).  The fact that the guarantor was an 
Athenian citizen meant that, if he failed to pay a sum due to the state or one of its gods he 
became a)/timoj.  This would have provided a strong incentive upon him to pay.  Further, if he 
owned real property in Attica, the state would have access to it, in addition to any real property 
the contractor may have owned, in the event that the contractor and the guarantor defaulted338.  
This would be of particular reassurance where the contractor was a metic and therefore owned 
no real property in Attica339.   
A fortiori, it would also be advantageous to take an Athenian guarantor where the contractor 
was a non-resident foreigner.  In the contract for work on the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos 
recorded in Cat#A43 (360/350BC), the contractor, Kanon son of Dionysodoros, was from 
Thespiai.  There were five guarantors; four of them were Athenian citizens and the name of the 
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fifth has not survived340.  We have seen341 that the contract provided for the enforcement of the 
payment of fines imposed by the naopoioi.  Given the likely date of this inscription, it seems 
unlikely that any agreement would have existed between Athens and Thespiai or the Boiotian 
koinon at this time which might have permitted the Delian naopoioi to come to Thespiai to 
recover any fines from Kanon via the courts of Thespiai or of the Boiotian koinon342.  The 
naopoioi would therefore have had to look primarily to the guarantors, in Athens, for payment 
of any fines.   
None of the guarantors of that building contract was certainly a Delian citizen.  Similarly, the 
amphiktyons’ records of the leases of the sacred properties show that, whilst there were both 
Athenian and Delian tenants in roughly equal numbers, the guarantors were overwhelmingly 
Athenian.  There is a probable Delian guarantor in 375/374BC343 but sixteen of the remainder 
for whom details have survived were certainly Athenian and a further five were probably 
Athenian344.  Clearly the amphiktyons preferred Athenian guarantors.   
The evidence of the building contract and of the leasing records shows that mechanisms must 
have existed during this period for the enforcement in Athens of debts incurred to the 
amphiktyons on Delos.  These mechanisms may have been more effective than those which 
existed on Delos for the enforcement of debts against local guarantors.  Coupry suggested that 
the amphiktyons may have decided to accept as guarantors only people over whom they had real 
power, i.e. Athenians345.  However, in relation to leases, the amphiktyons may have been 
prepared to involve the court on Delos on occasions.  An extremely fragmentary record, which 
can only be dated to the amphiktyonic period generally, refers to the local dikasterion in the 
context of what appears to be non-payment of rent and the tenant vacating the estate (Cat#A47 
LL1-4).  In 375/374BC, however, there may have been additional reasons for selecting 
Athenian guarantors.  In the previous year, seven Delian citizens had dragged the amphiktyons 
from the temple of Apollo and assaulted them (ID 98B LL24-27).  Circumstances such as these 
may well have made enforcement on Delos extremely difficult.   
Criteria - Wealth 
Erdas and Papazarkadas thought that wealth was the key requirement for guarantors346.  
Certainly one would expect that the assets possessed by the guarantor would be an important 
factor from the point of view of the community in deciding whether to accept a particular person 
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as a guarantor.  This is confirmed by (a) the decree of the deme of Plotheia (Cat#A12 LL18-22), 
which, as we have seen, required the officials to take into account the financial worth of the 
security or the guarantor offered by borrowers; and (b) the contract for building work on the 
sanctuary of Apollo on Delos (Cat#A43 LL17-18) and the grain tax law of 374/373BC 
(Cat#A40 LL30-31), which both specifically required the guarantors to be a)cio/xrewj.  
We find numerous examples of wealthy Athenian guarantors in the epigraphic sources in a wide 
variety of cases.  In the field of building contracts, there is the example of a contract for the 
supply, delivery and fitting of metal ties for column drums for the Portico of Philo at Eleusis 
dating to the Lycourgan period (Cat#A23 L33).  The guarantor for that contract was 
Kephisophon son of Kephalion of Aphidna, an Athenian citizen, and a man of the liturgical 
class, who was a trierarch and a successful general347.   
From the bulk records of leases of sacred lands dating from 343/342 BC to 320BC (Ath.Ag.19 
L6 and L9-12), Walbank concluded that, out of a total of 92 guarantors, 21 could be identified 
as connected with the liturgical class and/or with prominence in Athenian public life348.   The 
database in Shipton’s study of leasing and lending in fourth century Athens shows that out a 
total of 46 guarantors included in her database, 4 were of the liturgical class or attested as active 
in areas other than public land leasing349.  Papazarkadas’ review of the evidence has produced a 
much higher proportion of wealthy guarantors.  He identified 46 guarantors of sacred estates of 
whom 7 were, in Papazarkadas’ view, certainly or very likely members of liturgical families, 3 
apparently actively engaged in various areas of public life even if they did not demonstrably 
belong to the upper echelons of Athenian society, and 12 very possibly active in public life or 
belonging to families which were active350.   The reason for the large difference in the number of 
guarantors identified by Walbank and those identified by Shipton and Papazarkadas is that 
Walbank’s figure is the total number of guarantors who appeared in the bulk records, whether 
the guarantor can actually be identified or not, whereas Papazarkadas and, probably, Shipton 
refer only to those guarantors who can be identified by name in the records.  As to the 
identification of those guarantors who could be considered to be wealthy, Papazarkadas’ review 
produces a figure very close to that of Walbank and seems to be the most reliable.   
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In regard to sales of property, one of the guarantors of a sale in the record dated to c350-325BC 
(if indeed this was a record of the sale of property351) may have been Philonides son of Onetor 
of Melite, a member of the liturgical class (Cat#A19 L20)352; another was Philippos of Halai 
who may also have been quite a wealthy man (Cat#A19 L10)353.   
Other criteria 
Although wealth would clearly have been important, the epigraphical records also provide 
evidence from which it could be argued that sometimes the technical knowledge or skill of the 
guarantor may have provided additional assurance to those responsible for vetting and 
approving the guarantors.   
The two references to a guarantor in the Erechtheion accounts for the year 408/407 BC 
(Cat#A13) were both to Herakleides of Oe, who stood as guarantor for Dionysodoros for 
encaustic painting work.  Herakleides may have been the father of a tradesman who was paid 20 
drachmai for a frame for the coffered ceiling of the Erechtheion the previous year354.  It is 
possible therefore that Herakleides was in the building trade himself.   
The bulk records of leases of sacred lands (Ath.Ag.19 L6 and L9-12) include three guarantors 
who could themselves have been tenants of other plots of land355; and one of them stood as 
guarantor for property of the same type as that of which he was himself a tenant356.   
Where the guarantor was himself a contractor under a contract of the same type as the contract 
he was guaranteeing, his familiarity with the subject matter of the contract would enable him to 
anticipate problems and difficulties and give the contractor advice so that he could avoid errors 
in his performance of the contract.  If any problem did arise, the guarantor would have the 
technical skills to enable it to be resolved.  The guarantor could be expected to take an interest 
in order to avoid a call being made upon his guarantee.  In the case of Herakleides of Oe, for 
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example, his technical knowledge may have been important given the nature of this work.  
Similarly, a guarantor who had knowledge of farming an estate similar to that of the tenant 
whom he was guaranteeing would be able to give the tenant any advice needed to make a 
success of that farming, so increasing the likelihood of the rent being paid.  Here, too, expertise 
may have facilitated the identification of problems at an early stage.   
Guarantors who are relatives of contractors whom they guarantee 
The Athenian records contain seven examples of fathers standing as sole guarantors for their 
sons357, one example of a son standing as sole guarantor for his father358, and one example of a 
man standing as sole guarantor for a relative, their actual relationship being unknown359.  
Accepting a relative of the contractor as guarantor could be seen as advantageous from the point 
of view of the community: a guarantor might be regarded as being more willing to provide 
financial and practical help to a fellow family member than to someone to whom he was not 
related.   
However, there could also be disadvantages.  Firstly, because of the family relationship between 
contractor and guarantor, the financial wellbeing (or otherwise) of the one could affect the 
financial wellbeing of the other.  To take the most common relationships found in the evidence 
(a father guaranteeing a son and vice versa), if the father had not divided his property with his 
son360, the ability of the son to pay might depend to a significant extent on his father’s ability to 
pay.   
Secondly, the fact that the guarantor had a close relationship with the contractor might make the 
guarantor less, rather than more, effective in persuading a defaulting contractor to perform.  
From the point of view of the contractor, the appointment of a close relative as guarantor could 
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give him “an easier ride” in the performance of his contract.  If this happened, the community 
might lose out.   
Thirdly the perceived advantages from the point of view of the contractor of having a close 
relative as his guarantor could increase the possibility that corruption of the officials in charge 
of the transaction could be involved in procuring acceptance or recommendation of the 
guarantor by the officials.  This possibility would not necessarily have been reduced by the 
approval procedures for guarantors already described, where the council or other body may have 
been involved.  In such cases the approval by a “yes” or “no” vote by a body comprising 
hundreds of citizens would have meant that those proposing acceptance of a particular person as 
guarantor were in a strong position to influence the result361.  However, it would be wrong to 
assume that wherever we find evidence of a family relationship between the contractor and his 
guarantor, corruption must have been involved.  There may have been cases where the 
community had no choice but to accept the proposed guarantor, notwithstanding the fact that he 
was a close relative of the contractor, because no one else had offered to undertake that role.   
Other, more remote, links between guarantors and contractors could also work to the 
disadvantage of the community.  The bulk records of leases of sacred lands record the grant of 
leases of two apparently adjacent properties in c330-320 BC (Cat#A33 LL27-37).  The first of 
these was leased to [????] son of Charios of Paiania and guaranteed by [???]exandros son of 
Charidemos of [Probalinthos or Prospalta].  The second was leased to [???]os son of 
Charidemos of [Probalinthos or Prospalta] (the brother of the guarantor of the first lease362) and 
guaranteed by Chair[???] son of Charios of Paiania (the tenant, or the brother of the tenant, of 
the first lease363).  Because the guarantors already occupied property in the same area, or within 
commuting distance, Walbank reasonably speculated that this was an instance of consolidation 
of family holdings364.  However, it can also be seen that the god may have been rather exposed 
by this arrangement.  If the tenant of one of the properties (call him “A”) failed to pay the rent, 
his guarantor (“B”) would be called upon to pay.  But B was the brother of the tenant of the 
other property (call him “C”) and, if the financial affairs of B and C were closely linked (as 
could have been the case if the brothers had not divided the family property on their father’s 
death365), the call on B could put C in difficulty.  But the guarantor of C (call him “D”) was the 
brother of A, who was already in financial difficulty, having failed to pay the rent on his lease.  
If the financial affairs of A and D (again, as could have been the case if they had not divided 
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their inheritance) were closely linked, D’s guarantee might not have been worth very much.  
This can be illustrated diagrammatically as follows: 
 A (tenant)   B (guarantor)  
 Brother of A   Brother of C 
 D (guarantor)   C (tenant) 
Of course, we do not know whether the bleak picture just painted was a real possibility in this 
case, but it may have been something that the officials in charge of the letting of the sacred 
lands would have investigated when deciding whether these guarantors should be approved.  In 
particular they might need to investigate whether the assets held by the tenants and guarantors 
would be sufficient to withstand any “credit shocks” such as those contemplated in our bleak 
picture.  Highly relevant would be the value of any unencumbered land owned by the tenants 
and guarantors.  If as Faraguna contends registers of land ownership were maintained at Athens 
in the fourth century BC366, this may not have been too difficult a task.   
Numbers of Guarantors 
One might expect that the number of guarantors would depend upon the wealth of the guarantor 
relative to the size of the contract.  However, there is considerable evidence that the number of 
guarantors was frequently dictated only by the commercial value of the transaction: the larger 
the contract the more likely it would be that more than one guarantor would be involved.  This 
suggests that some general rule may often have been in play; it is, therefore, best to approach 
the evidence by reference to the nature of the transaction concerned.   
Tax Farming Concessions 
The grain tax law of 374/373BC (Cat#A40 LL29-31) required the tax farming contractor to 
provide two guarantors for each portion of tax (in the form of grain) that he was committed to 
deliver to the city.  Thus, the greater the quantity of grain the contractor committed to deliver, 
the more guarantors he had to provide.  If the same approach was adopted in relation to 
“conventional” tax farming concessions (where the contractor would be committed to handing 
over a stipulated amount of money), then the number of guarantors would depend upon the 
amount that the contractor had agreed to pay.  Erdas thought that this was the case and that the 
number of guarantors was governed by law, as it was in the case of collection of the Athenian 
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grain tax in kind367, but we have no direct evidence for this.  For example, when Andokides 
(1.134 – Cat#A2) claimed that he purchased a tax farming concession for thirty six talents, he 
added that he provided sureties (in the plural), although he does not say how many.  This at least 
does not contradict the view that the number of guarantors was dependent upon the amount 
committed to be paid, but more than this we cannot say.   
Building Contracts 
Erdas argued that in the case of building contracts, the number of guarantors certainly varied 
according to the misqw/sij for which the contractor had been made responsible and that the 
relationship between the numbers of guarantors and the contract price varied from case to 
case368.  In my view, however, it is possible to go further.  One can discern from the evidence 
that the number of guarantors was greater for larger contracts.  The Erechtheion accounts 
(Cat#A13) included payments for encaustic painting of the moulding of the inner epistyle.  The 
price for the work appears to have been ninety-four drachmai one obol369.  One guarantor is 
recorded.  By contrast, the building contracts awarded in 307/306BC for the reconstruction of 
the City, Peiraieus and Long Walls were much higher in value and here more than one guarantor 
was provided.  For example, for the first section of the City wall, the contract price was 2 talents 
1000 drachmai (Cat#A15 Col III L122).  There were two contractors for this section who 
provided at least seven guarantors between them.   
A similar contrast can be seen by comparing the three contracts for the construction of a portico 
on the south wall of the sanctuary at Eleusis (Cat#A25 Fragment a).  The first was for 
foundations for 400 drachmai, the second for the erection of 16 columns for which no price is 
stated and the third for roof work for 2000 drachmai.  Significantly, in view of the value of the 
work, two guarantors were required for the third contract, whereas only one was required for the 
first.   
The building contract for work to the sanctuary of Apollo (Cat#A43 LL17-18) appears to have 
stipulated that the number of guarantors required was to be determined by reference to the 
contract price.  It will be recalled that the contract required the contractor: tou\[j de\ 
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e)gguh]ta\j kaqista/nai kata\ X a)cio/xrewj. Although most scholars have interpreted this 
to mean that for every 1000 drachmai of the contract price the contractor was required to 
produce one creditworthy guarantor370, Erdas has taken a slightly different view371.  On her 
interpretation, the requirement does not relate to the number of guarantors required.  Rather, it 
merely required that each guarantor must be able to pay 1000 drachmai.  It may be doubted 
whether this interpretation accurately reflects kata\ X a)cio/xrewj here.  However, the 
problem with both interpretations is that we know that in this case the contract price was 7337 
drachmai but only five guarantors were provided, so that, as Erdas observed, the combined 
liability or worth of all the guarantees did not cover the total of the contract price.  The answer 
to this may lie in the terms of payment.  We do not know what they were, but if they involved 
only 5000 drachmai being paid in advance with the rest to be paid only after the work had been 
done, this could mean that the “debt” that the guarantors had to be worthy of would only be 
5000 drachmai rather than the full contract price and therefore only five guarantors were 
required.   
The requirement for one guarantor for every 1000 drachmai of the contract price appears to 
have been specific to that project.  In another record of a contract for work on Delos the 
contractor was awarded a contract for 1200 drachmai and provided not two but just one 
guarantor (Cat#A44 LL23-24).   
The overall trend, however, seems reasonably clear: the larger the contract the greater the 
number of guarantors.  But there is no direct evidence that there was actually a law to this effect.  
Erdas argues372 that the number of guarantors was decided by the contractor.  This does not in 
my view appear correct.  The evidence shows that the officials (and the Council or dikasterion, 
as the case may be) would still have had to be satisfied that the guarantors were sufficient in 
number.   
Leases 
Some evidence that the number of guarantors reflected the amount of the rent is provided by the 
fragmentary record of the grant of leases on Salamis of the mid fourth century BC (Cat#A18).  
Of the four grants recorded the rents range from 80 drachmai to 2 drachmai 3 obols.  Two 
guarantors are recorded for the lease with the highest rent; all the others have only one guarantor 
including that with the second highest rent, 34 drachmai.   
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Walbank’s analysis of the bulk records of leases of sacred lands (Ath.Ag.19 L6 and L9-12) 
shows that there was one guarantor in the case of thirty three leases under which the rents 
ranged from 60 to 450 drachmai per annum373 and that there were two guarantors in the case of 
five leases for which the rents were 636, 681, 600+, 600 and 742 drachmai per annum374.  The 
higher the rent the greater the number of guarantors attested.  This was the case even when the 
tenant was a wealthy man.  Kephisophon son of Kephalion of Aphidna leased a house in 
Kollytos belonging to Artemis Agrotera in 343/342BC for an annual rent of 636 drachmai.  
There can be no doubt about his wealth375.  Nevertheless he provided two guarantors for his 
lease obligations.  It looks, therefore, as though there may have been a strict rule regarding the 
number of guarantors required for these leases.  Erdas argues that this was a requirement of a 
law376 and Papazarkadas has suggested that such a requirement was contained in the 
no/moj tw=n temenw=n377 but we have no direct evidence to confirm either of these suggestions.   
Walbank placed the threshold for the requirement for two guarantors at 600 drachmai378 and 
suggested that if the rent was more than 1200 drachmai three guarantors were required379.  
However, the highest rent for which only one guarantor is recorded is 450 drachmai380.  The 
threshold for the increase in the number of guarantors does not therefore have to be 600 
drachmai; it could have been a lower figure – 500 drachmai for example; it is not possible to be 
certain.  No lease in these records commanded more than two guarantors and we cannot 
therefore be sure whether there was a threshold above which three guarantors were required and 
if so what that threshold was381.   
The contrast between the high threshold for the increase to two guarantors in the case of the 
leases of sacred lands and the low threshold for land leased on Salamis is remarkable.  If there 
was a law concerning the numbers of guarantors it clearly did not apply to the Salamis leases.   
Nor did it apply to the leasing of land by demes.  It will be recalled382 that the decree of the 
deme of Eleusis of 333/332 BC providing for the lease of a quarry required the lessee to provide 
two guarantors (Cat#A37 LL29-31).  The inscription also records that the quarry was eventually 
leased to Moirokles son of Euthydemos.  He made a one off payment of 100 drachmai as a 
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contribution towards the cult of Herakles-in-Akris and took a five year lease at an annual rent of 
150 drachmai (LL6-8), which is way below any threshold for two guarantors applicable to the 
sacred lands.  It may be that at the time when they passed their decree in which they stipulated 
the number of guarantors required, the demesmen thought that their quarry would command a 
higher rent383, but it seems unlikely that the expected rent could have been as high as the 
threshold for two guarantors found in the bulk records of the leases of sacred lands.  It is 
possible that the requirement for more than one guarantor may be an indication that the deme 
encountered greater difficulty in finding wealthy guarantors than did the state384.   
Requiring guarantors to provide security 
One way of ensuring that a guarantor would be acceptable to the community would be to require 
him to provide security for his obligations.  A possible example of this is to be found in the 
general conditions of leasing published by the deme of Peiraieus (Cat#A28).  It will be recalled 
that these provided (LL3-6) that, for rents above 10 drachmai the tenant had to provide adequate 
security for the rent (a)poti/mhma th=j misqw/sewj a)cio/xrewn), whereas for rents under 10 
drachmai he had to provide an e)gguhth\n a)podido/menon ta\ e(autou= th=j misqw/sewj.   
There has been some debate about the proper interpretation of this document.  Some scholars 
have interpreted a)podido/menon ta\ e(autou= th=j misqw¯sewj in L6 to mean that the 
guarantor undertook to be liable for the rent from his own resources385.  Others have taken the 
view that the words required some form of a sale with a right of redemption (pra=sij e)pi\ 
lu/sei), although there were differences of view between these scholars on the detail of what 
this involved386.  Beasley contented himself by merely saying that the guarantor was required to 
pledge his property as security for the rent387.  The problem with the view that the words 
required a pra=sij e)pi\ lu/sei is that, as Finley pointed out, it fails to explain why security over 
property should be required of the tenant for larger sums but both a guarantor and security over 
property for “smaller, virtually infinitesimal amounts”.  On the other hand, the problem with the 
interpretation that the words required the guarantor to be liable from his own resources is that it 
adds nothing further to the usual obligations of a guarantor who guaranteed payment of a sum of 
money or performance of an obligation, i.e. to pay that sum himself, or to perform or procure 
the performance of the obligation from his own resources.  As Partsch noted in his discussion, 
this interpretation attributes no significance to the verb used here, a)podido/sqai (a point which 
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Finley conceded).  Beauchet suggested that one could understand the word to mean that the 
tenant had to provide a guarantor who was prepared to pledge (but did not actually pledge) his 
possessions for the guarantee of the rent, but this is not very convincing; such a promise would 
not really amount to much at all.  If circumstances arose when the guarantor was actually called 
upon to give the pledge, he might at that point be extremely reluctant to do so.  If a pledge was 
to be worth anything, it had to be given at the time the guarantee was given.  Merely being 
“prepared” to pledge would not be sufficient388.   
A search of the Attic orators and inscriptions shows that a)podido/sqai is never used to mean 
“pay”, but usually to mean “sell” (although in some cases it carries with it the pejorative 
overtone of selling too cheaply or without proper regard for the consequences) with the price in 
the genitive case.  The closest parallel is to be found in the poletai records of 367/366BC 
(Ath.Ag.19 P5 L23), where a)podido/sqai is used to describe the provision of security over a 
house in respect of a debt of 100 drachmai owed to a phratry.  It is generally agreed that the 
security referred here was in the form of a pra=sij e)pi\ lu/sei389.   
However, as Harris has pointed out, there was often a lack of clarity in the language the 
Athenians used to describe the grant of security over property390 and in his study of Athenian 
terminology for real security in leases and dowry agreements, Harris has shown that giving 
particular words and expressions a definite legal meaning may not be the right approach to 
understanding the terminology used for the provision of security in Athens of the fourth century 
BC.  Much depended upon the context in which the expressions were used, particularly the 
nature of the underlying transaction in respect of which security was given391.   Harris does not 
consider the Peiraieus general conditions in his discussion.  However, the use of the word 
a)poti/mhma in those conditions to refer to security for payment of rent under a lease certainly 
supports his theory that the word was often used where the obligations under the underlying 
transaction were mutual obligations (upon the tenant to pay the rent; upon the landlord to allow 
the tenant to occupy the land).  Further, the use of the term a)podido/menon in relation to a 
guarantee similarly supports his theory that words of sale were used to describe the provision of 
security where the obligations under the underlying transaction were one sided: as was the case 
with a loan where the obligations were all upon the debtor (to repay), so with a guarantee the 
obligations are all on the guarantor.   
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It may therefore be unwise to conclude from the use of the words a)podido/menon ta\ e(autou= 
here that a particular form of security was required.  Rather we should merely note, as Beasley 
did, that the guarantor had to provide security.   
As to the point made by Finley that, if the guarantor was required to provide security, this would 
provide the deme with greater security overall for lower rents than the security it would receive 
for higher rents, I think that the answer is that these general conditions have to be read in the 
context of the very small sums involved.  The threshold for the provision of security as opposed 
to a surety was very low.  The general conditions therefore allowed for situations where the 
tenants below the threshold would be unlikely to have any assets that they could provide as 
security for the payment of the rent and performance of their other obligations.  They would 
therefore have to provide others who had assets that could be used to provide such security.  
These others might be poor too; they merely had to have sufficient assets to cover the modest 
amounts of rent and other obligations.  For rents above the threshold, the general conditions 
assumed that the tenants would be able to provide security from their own assets, sufficient to 
cover the rent and other obligations (a)cio/xrewn).  The intended result may have been that the 
deme was protected equally whether the tenant provided security via a guarantor who would 
provide security or whether the tenant provided security himself.   
Independent Delos 
Numerous accounts of the hieropoioi record expenditure by them on leukw/mata ei)j 
diegguh/seij392.  The hieropoioi normally use the term diegguh/sij in their accounts to refer to 
the process of the provision and acceptance of guarantors.  It is used in this sense in relation to 
the guarantors of the leases of the sacred estates.  In the accounts of 250BC the hieropoioi 
recorded that they re-let the sacred estate of Rhamnoi ou) kaqista/ntoj Cenomh=douj tou\j 
e)ggu/ouj kata\ th\n i¸era\n suggrafh\n oÀte hÅsan ai¸ diegguh/seij393.  This entry relates to 
a renewal of guarantors under an existing lease, but the same procedures must surely have 
applied to the provision of guarantors under a new lease394.  The entry suggests that, in relation 
to the leases of the sacred estates, there was an appointed time when the tenant was expected to 
produce his guarantors395.  Here, Xenomedes had either failed to put forward any guarantors or 
had put individuals forward who were then not approved.  The numerous references in the 
accounts to leukw/mata ei)j diegguh/seij must mean that the approval of the guarantors was 
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recorded in writing by the hieropoioi.  The i(era\ suggrafh\ itself may well have required the 
hieropoioi to publish the names of the tenants and their guarantors on whitened boards396.   
With regard to the sacred estates, Kent argued that the diegguh/sij was a “ceremony of naming 
the guarantors”, which took place in the month of Lenaion each year.  He speculated that it was 
probably one of the first items on the agenda of the incoming hieropoioi397.  In relation to the 
leasing of the sacred houses, Molinier described the diegguh/seij as a sitting of the hieropoioi 
at which they received the guarantors they had to approve as part of their responsibility398.  Both 
Kent and Molinier could well be right.   
The existence of a similar formal procedure for approval of guarantors of building contracts is 
supported by the formalities that appear to have surrounded entering into the contracts.  In a 
building contract dated to 297BC the names of the contractors and the guarantors are followed 
by the names of witnesses, who are the archon for that year, the councillors and the 
agoranomoi, as well as private individuals399.  Another building contract of the same date also 
contains a list of witnesses immediately after the names of the contractor and his guarantors.  
The list includes “the eleven”, the secretaries of the Council, the hieropoioi and the 
agoranomoi, the treasurer of the city, the agoranomoi themselves, all of whom are named, and 
certain named private individuals400.  Vial thought that “the eleven” were probably a special 
commission created at the time the people had decided on the project although its precise 
function is not known401.  The accounts of the hieropoioi for 208BC402 record amounts expended 
on building work kata\ ta\j suggrafa\j kai\ ta\j diegguh/seij.  This implies that the 
procedures for the approval of guarantors formed an integral part of the award of the contract, 
the compound with dia/ suggesting that this procedure saw not only the giving but also the 
acceptance of the guarantors.   
It is likely that the hieropoioi were responsible for the vetting of guarantors of the sacred estates 
and the sacred houses.  With regard to building contracts, we have already seen403 that there may 
have been a no/moj that provided for the approval of guarantors by the hieropoioi and 
epimeletai.  The Council may have been involved as well in the approval of these guarantors.  A 
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building contract dated to 280BC, after listing the names of the guarantors and of the witnesses, 
added specifically: tou\j e)[ggu/]ouj e)doki/masen h( boulh/404.  Vial suggested that the 
epimeletai and the hieropoioi could accept or refuse a guarantor proposed by a building 
contractor and, if they accepted one, the Council would then vet him405.   
Vial thought it probable that the Council undertook the approval of the guarantors of tenants of 
the sacred estates and sacred houses and of borrowers as well.  She argued that throughout the 
Greek world the authorities (“les autorités”) would examine the guarantors of persons who 
concluded contracts with the state or a sanctuary although Delos was, according to her, the only 
city where this dokimasia was done by the Council and not by magistrates or a commission406.  
However there is no evidence which can confirm the involvement of the Council in the approval 
of guarantors for transactions other than building contracts and the fact that we know of at least 
one building contract where the guarantors were approved by the Council does not mean that 
the Council was required to do so in the case of every building contract in which guarantors 
were provided.  It may be that the building project in the case in which the Council approved the 
guarantors was regarded as so important that the decree or other enabling instrument authorising 
its implementation required the Council to become more involved than it normally would.  This 
would explain the specific mention in the contract of the fact that the Council had approved the 
guarantors.  It may have been something out of the ordinary and therefore required a mention.  
Further, even if the Council was required to approve the guarantors for all building contracts in 
which guarantors were provided, it does not necessarily follow that it had a similar 
responsibility and function in relation to the sacred estates, sacred houses and borrowers.  
Indeed we have already seen407, when reviewing the question of whether guarantors were always 
required, that building contracts seem to have been treated somewhat differently from other 
transactions.   
Criteria 
Information derived from the records and accounts of the hieropoioi about who the guarantors 
were provides some indication of what the criteria for acceptance of guarantors may have been.   
Citizenship 
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In contrast with the period of the Athenian amphiktyony408, there are only two instances in the 
surviving records from the period of Delian independence of a guarantor who is not a Delian 
citizen: Kleosthenides of Rhodes and Apollonios of Phoenicia.  Both attestations date from the 
second century BC and both of them concern guarantors of leases of sacred houses.  We know 
that only Delian citizens could own real estate on Delos and Rhenaia409.  Thus, as in Athens, 
where the guarantor was a Delian citizen, and it became necessary to enforce the guarantee, the 
temple could have access to a valuable immovable asset of the guarantor if he owned property 
on the islands.  In the case of the two foreign guarantors, it is possible that (a) they had been 
granted the right to own land on Delos and Rhenaia and owned real estate there, or (b) there was 
a legal convention between Delos and the guarantors’ home states that allowed the hieropoioi to 
take the guarantors to court over any unpaid rent410, or (c) Delos had relaxed its restrictions on 
who could own real estate on the islands.   
However, it is not possible to ascertain which, if any, of these possibilities applied: 
Kleosthenides of Rhodes never seems to have been called upon to pay.  He had stood as 
guarantor of Noumenios (no patronymic but described as dida/skaloj), tenant of the house 
“next to Bremes” in 192BC.  It appears from the accounts of 189BC that the lease was cancelled 
and the house re-let at a lower rent.  However, Noumenios was recorded as having paid 10 
drachmai shortfall himself and Kleosthenides did not have to be called upon as guarantor411.  
This problem was evidently only a temporary one, because we find Noumenios again as tenant 
of the same house in 179BC, although we do not know who his guarantor was412.   
The other foreign guarantor, Apollonios of Phoenicia, was the guarantor of Ostakos son of 
Ostakos, tenant of Sosileia413.  If there were any problems with his tenancy, they have not 
manifested themselves in the surviving accounts of the hieropoioi.   
Although the number of non-Delians who entered into transactions with the god seems to have 
been relatively small, the evidence shows that their guarantors were in the majority of cases 
Delian citizens.  However there is insufficient evidence for us to be confident that this was 
always the case: 
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• from the list prepared by Kent of two hundred and fifty tenants of the sacred estates414 
there is only one foreign tenant: Sotadas of Crete tenant of Panormos who provided one 
Delian guarantor, Antigonos son of Andromenes415;   
• in the period 314 to 246BC, there are five foreign building contractors who provided 
guarantors whose names have survived, and all their guarantors were Delian citizens416;   
• of those individual borrowers who are recorded as having provided guarantors during 
the period of Delian independence two were foreigners: Xenon of Hermione, who 
provided a Delian guarantor417 and Apollodoros son of Apollonios of Kyzikos, the 
names of whose guarantors are unknown418.  Xenon’s guarantor paid interest on his 
behalf in 278 and 270BC.  However, he and his guarantor are recorded as owing interest 
in 269, 257, 250 and 248BC – it appears that notwithstanding the fact that the guarantor 
was a Delian citizen, the hieropoioi still encountered difficulty in recovering the interest 
owed on the loan419.  Apollodoros had been granted citizenship and the right to own 
land and houses by a decree dated to between 300 and 250BC420 and we can therefore 
regard him as a Delian citizen for current purposes421.   
• From Molinier’s list of one hundred and sixty four tenants of the sacred houses422 and 
from the further ten tenants identified by Hennig423, only two are certainly foreigners: 
one was Tolmides of Paros, who was tenant of Epistheneia in 279BC and provided two 
Delian guarantors.  Tolmides’ guarantors paid the rent on his behalf on this occasion 
(279BC) and in the following year.  This is a good example of the potential usefulness 
from the temple’s point of view of having a Delian guarantor where the tenant was a 
foreigner: the hieropoioi could simply collect the rent directly from the guarantor.  In 
274BC, however, having a Delian guarantor did not help: both Tolmides and his 
guarantor were recorded as debtors of the god for his rent424.  The other foreign tenant 
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was Alexipolis of Thera, tenant of Epistheneia in 258BC425; the names of the 
guarantors, if there were any, have not survived.  Four other tenants have been 
identified who may have been foreigners: (a) Noumenios (the dida/skaloj already 
mentioned above).  His guarantor was Kleosthenides of Rhodes, one of the two foreign 
guarantors mentioned above426; (b) Pyrros (no patronymic but described as 
purfuro/bafoj)427, listed in the accounts of 192BC when he was granted the lease of 
the house of Aristoboulos; he provided a Delian guarantor, Diogenes son of 
Diogenes428; (c) Sotas429 but no mention is made of any guarantors for his tenancy; and 
(d) Pathon son of Euporion430 but, again, no mention is made of any guarantors.   
The evidence set out above suggests that, whilst having guarantors with assets located on Delos 
or Rhenaia could be advantageous from the god’s point of view, there were occasions when this 
advantage did not materialise.   
Wealth 
As at Athens, so on independent Delos, one would expect the guarantors to be wealthy 
individuals.  In the case of building contracts, this is supported by two contracts which 
specifically included a requirement that guarantors be a)cioxre/oi431.   
With regard to the sacred estates, Kent thought that it likely that the financial status of 
guarantors was subject to scrutiny in much the same manner as guarantors of building 
contracts432.   
As to the sacred houses, Molinier argued that the choice of the hieropoioi in general fell 
judiciously upon persons whose wealth provided all assurances, men who played a part in the 
affairs of the island and who were known by their fellow citizens433.  He gave some examples: 
                                                                                                                                          
163) and Lacroix (1932:520) thought, Poros, a metic, who was included in a list of choregoi of 284BC (IG XI,2 105 
L11): the fact that Cat#B13 B L94 records this individual as tenant of one of the Epistheneia houses (albeit misspelt) 
seems to me to compel the conclusion that there was an error by the engraver here and that “Poros” should read 
“Parios”).  
425
 IG XI,2 224A LL19-20. 
426
 p89. 
427
 Noumenios and Pyrros were identified by Durrbach (1911:82) and Molinier (1914:37); they argued that the 
profession of these two individuals indicates that they were foreigners. Hennig (1983:461) argued that there was no 
ground for such a conclusion. 
428
 ID 400 LL7-8. 
429
 IG XI,2 203A L27: Durrbach (in his notes to IG XI,2 203) and Lacroix (1932:520 and 512) suggested that this 
might be the metalworker and metic, Sotas son of Dexias, who appeared in a list of choregoi of 261BC (IG XI,2 114 
L17 and 204 L54). 
430
 ID 459 L35: Durrbach in his notes in ID thought he was a Tenian, brother of a building contractor, Philophron son 
of Euporion of Tenos (ID 442B L225).  But Hennig (1983) 461 emphasises the uncertainty of the reading in ID 459, 
acknowledged by Lacroix (1932:520).   
431
 Cat#B31 L9 (as restored by Feyel (1941:161) – see p62 note 295); Cat#B35 L22; Vial (1985:104). 
432
 Kent (1948:275). 
433
 Molinier (1914:38). 
 92
(1) Aristeides son of Teleson was epistates of the festivals434; Molinier remarked that to be 
chosen for that role in a place such as Delos where religious life held a very large place, a man 
had to be a wealthy and honoured figure; (2) Demonous son of Nikon had been hieropoios435; 
(3) Antigonos son of Charistios was probably the grandson of an archon, as well as being a 
tenant of one of the sacred estates, a guarantor of a loan, epistates of the festival and a tax 
farmer; he is also known from a statue dedicated by him to the memory of his father, the work 
of the sculptor Theon436.  Hennig437 argued that archons, hieropoioi and tamiai belonged to the 
upper strata of Delian society and identified some guarantors whom he regarded as members of 
these upper strata on that basis.  He added that others could be regarded as belonging to the 
upper strata if corresponding indications mounted up and he gave as an example Polyboulos son 
of Phokaieus (guarantor of Amnos son of Hierombrotos tenant of certain andrones in 192BC438) 
on the basis that his brother, Apollodoros was prodaneistes in 208BC439 and probably a member 
of the Council in 206BC440, another brother, Polyxenos, was choregos in 215BC441 and a 
nephew, Phokaieus son of Polyxenos, was archon in 180BC442.  However, both Molinier’s and 
Hennig’s criteria are open to criticism.  A man was not necessarily wealthy simply because he 
was an archon or a tenant of one of the sacred estates or guarantor on another transaction ten 
years later.   
In order to test the expectation that guarantors would have to be wealthy, and the views 
expressed by the scholars summarised above, I have analysed the evidence from the records of 
the hieropoioi of the wealth of the Delian guarantors and their families for all types of 
transaction, adopting for that purpose the criteria for wealth described in chapter 1443.  For this 
purpose I have not gone beyond one generation before or after the guarantor’s generation, 
taking into account that fortunes could be rapidly won or lost.  The results are tabulated in 
Appendix D.  They show relatively high proportions of wealthy guarantors.  These figures have 
to be treated with some caution.  They are based upon necessarily limited information.  But they 
do tend to confirm our expectations.   
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In the case of building contracts, the financial standing of the guarantors seems to have been 
particularly important.  This may be an indication that the contractors were either men with few 
assets or men whose assets would not be easily accessible to the hieropoioi on Delos.  If this is 
correct, it may be no accident that the only documents that expressly require the guarantors to 
be a)cioxre/oi are documents relating to building contracts.   
Other criteria 
The records of the hieropoioi of Delos support the view that, as at Athens, other criteria than 
wealth may sometimes have played a part in the approval of guarantors.  The best evidence 
concerns building contracts, where it appears that, although, as has been seen, financial standing 
was important, knowledge of construction and of the skills necessary to carry out the work may 
have mattered as well.   
Thus, Nikon son of Demonous, one of the two guarantors of the building contract dated to 
297BC for paving work at the temple of Apollo444, was an official (epimeletes) for public 
building works in subsequent years445.  His son, Demenous, was also an epimeletes of the works 
as well as a hieropoios446.  Vial suggested that another branch of his family may have had a 
particular interest in the temple of Apollo447.  Nikon and his family thus combined knowledge of 
the building process with an understanding of the extreme importance to the sanctuary in having 
the work done properly; these were important attributes for a guarantor of a significant building 
contract.  This was in addition to the advantages of wealth offered by the family448.   
One of the guarantors of the building contract dated to 279BC for tiling work to the temple of 
Artemis was Sosimenes449.  According to Vial, this was Sosimenes son of Antigonos, who was a 
member of another branch of the family to which Nikon son of Demenous belonged450.  Of 
particular significance here is the fact that the accounts of the hieropoioi for 269BC record that 
Sosimenes was paid the sum of 133 drachmai 2 oboloi, being the first instalment under a 
contract for the supply of stone for the treasury451.  In other words, Sosimenes sometimes traded 
as a contractor himself.  His knowledge of the building trade would have enabled him to give 
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useful advice to the contractor if he encountered difficulties.  This may have been borne in mind 
when Sosimenes was approved as a guarantor in this case452.   
Similarly, for the reasons discussed in relation to the sacred lands at Athens453, the fact that a 
proposed guarantor for a tenant of the sacred estates on independent Delos had himself been a 
tenant of a sacred estate may have influenced the hieropoioi in accepting him as guarantor.  The 
evidence supports this possibility: out of the twenty-seven guarantors of the sacred estates 
appearing in the records of the hieropoioi from 314-250BC for whom we have further 
information, five had already had experience as tenant of one of the sacred estates and two of 
those five had previous experience of farming the very estate that they were guaranteeing454.  Of 
particular interest is Polyboulos son of Parmenion: he had been the tenant of Skitoneia since 
258BC, or before, but lost the lease in 250BC when he was unable to provide guarantors.  The 
lease was then re-let to Kallisthenes son of Diakritos.  Surprisingly, the hieropoioi accepted 
Polyboulos as Kallisthenes’ guarantor.  Polyboulos cannot have been accepted upon the ground 
of his financial standing as he had been unable to produce guarantors for himself as tenant.  
Perhaps more important was the fact that Polyboulos had been tenant of Skitoneia for the past 
eight years of more.  Ironically, Kallisthenes failed to pay the rent in full and Polyboulos and his 
fellow guarantor had to pay the balance.  Fortunately for them, this only required a payment of 
18 drachmai 3 oboloi and 7 chalkoi455.   
In addition, the accounts show that a further three guarantors were relatives of men (father, 
brother or uncle) who had previous experience of farming the sacred estates456.  Of particular 
interest here is Antikrates son of Aristodikos, who was accepted as guarantor of a new lease of 
Pyrgoi granted in 250BC notwithstanding that his uncle, Timesidemos, had, earlier in the same 
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year, as tenant of Charoneia, failed to pay his rent and then failed to renew his guarantors.  
Timesidemos and Antikrates’ father, Aristodikos, had farmed Charoneia from at least 274BC 
until 250BC.  It is possible that concerns about the financial standing of Antikrates’ family were 
outweighed by the advantages that his family offered in terms of experience of farming the 
sacred estates.   
Guarantors who are relatives of contractors whom they guarantee 
Vial commented upon the particular strength of family ties on Delos.  She listed the instances of 
sons guaranteeing fathers: eight loans, two sacred estates, one ferry operation franchise and one 
sacred house.  She noted that there is only one example of a father guaranteeing his son (the son 
was a tenant of a sacred estate).  She also highlighted examples of solidarity between brothers, 
listing eleven instances of one brother guaranteeing the obligations of another: six loans, three 
sacred estates and two sacred houses457.   
In relation to the leases of the sacred estates, we may add one example of a man guaranteeing 
the obligations of his cousin, two instances of guarantors being almost certainly related to the 
tenants whose obligations they were guaranteeing and three instances where this was probably 
the case458. Of the twenty-seven guarantors of the sacred estates for whom we have further 
information for the period 314-250BC, eleven were certainly, probably or possibly related to the 
tenant whose obligations they were guaranteeing.   
In relation to the leases of the sacred houses, Molinier argued that there was at Delos “a system 
of familial guarantees” and he gave examples from the accounts of 279BC of a tenant being 
guaranteed by his son and of another tenant being guaranteed by his nephew and by his brother, 
and from the accounts of 192BC of a tenant being guaranteed by his brother459.  It may be going 
too far to say that there was a “system” simply on the basis of a few surviving examples.  
However, it is interesting to note that, of the eight guarantors of the sacred houses for whom we 
have further information for the period 314-250BC, three were related to the tenant whose 
obligations they were guaranteeing460.   
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The records of the tax collection and ferry franchises provide a similar picture.  Here, of the 
eight guarantors for whom we have further information for the period 314-250BC, two were the 
sons of the contractor who had been awarded the franchise461.   
Similarly with regard to guarantors of loans, of the twelve guarantors of personal loans for 
whom we have further information for the period 314-250BC, two were the brothers of the 
borrower and one was the borrower’s cousin462.   
By contrast with the other transactions, no records survive of a guarantor who was related to a 
contractor under a building contract during the period 314-246BC.  This may not be a mere 
accident of survival.  As has already been seen, building contracts seem to be a case apart.  
Foreign contractors were more common.  The financial strength of the guarantor was a key 
consideration.  The likelihood that the contractors and guarantors would move in the same 
social and economic circles was smaller.   
As discussed in relation to Athens463, accepting as guarantor someone who was a relative of the 
man whose obligations he was guaranteeing could be perceived to have advantages (for 
example by allowing wealthy families to have control over their leases of sacred lands464) but 
could also have placed the god at greater risk of not being able to recover sums due.  The 
information available from Delos provides a means of checking whether the latter was a real 
possibility: four of the eleven tenants of the sacred estates referred to above (two of whom were 
“wealthy” according to my adopted criteria) failed to pay the rent, either wholly or partly.  In 
three of these cases, it appears that the guarantor-relatives paid up instead, so the sanctuary was 
not out of pocket.  In one case, however, it appears that the rent was not paid in full and we have 
no record of the outstanding balance being paid465.  The evidence is starker in the case of the 
leases of the sacred houses.  For the period 314 – 250BC, both of the tenants who are known 
from the accounts to have been related to their guarantors defaulted in payment of their rent and 
                                                
461
 Both were guarantors of their father’s obligations under franchises for the ferry to Rheneia, one dated to 296-
279BC (IG XI,2 153 L20), the other to 274BC (IG XI,2 199B L96) (Vial (1985:292 and 137 note 70)).   
462
 The two instances of brothers guaranteeing brothers are listed by Vial (1985:292).  In addition, Antigonos son of 
Demeas guaranteed the obligations of his cousin, Autokles son of Teleson, under two loans taken out in 250BC (IG 
XI,2 287A LL126-129).   
463
 pp78-79. 
464
 Vial (1985:334-338); Brunet in Prêtre (2002: 263-264); Pernin (2014:517). 
465
 The defaulting tenants were: (1) Maisiades son of Herakleides tenant of Panormos, whose brother, Gnosidikos, 
was his guarantor.  In 300BC Gnosidikos paid the share of the rent allotted to him as guarantor (IG XI,2 147A LL15-
17). We do not know who, if anybody, paid the rest of the rent but Maisiades was still tenant in 297BC when he paid 
the rent in full (IG XI,2 149 LL5-6 – Reger (1994:281-282)); (2) Amphistratos son of Hypsokles, tenant of 
Sosimacheia, whose father, Hypsokles was his guarantor.  Hypsokles paid all but one drachma of the rent (Cat#B10 
A LL39-40 – Vial (1984:293)); we do not know whether the one drachma was ever paid; (3) Kallisthenes son of 
Diakritos, tenant of Skitoneia, whose son, Hermon, was guarantor.  Kallisthenes paid most of the rent but the balance 
was paid by Hermon and by Kallisthenes’ other guarantor, Polyboulos son of Parmenion (IG XI,2 287A LL26-27 and 
D LL27-29 with Kent (1939:239)); (4) Timesidemos son of Antikrates, tenant of Charoneia, was probably related to 
three of his eight guarantors, Eukleides son of Pyrrhides, Polystratos son of Timothemis and Polyxenos son of 
Alkimachos.  Timesidemos paid the rent in part and his three relatives, along with this other guarantors, contributed 
to paying the balance (IG XI,2 287A LL29-31).   
 97
in each case the tenant and his guarantor-relatives were listed as indebted to the god466.  Both the 
ferry franchise holders who are known to have provided relatives as guarantors defaulted in 
their payments and were listed, along with their guarantor-sons, as owing money to the god467.  
On the other hand, those who provided relatives as guarantors of loans are not recorded as 
defaulting.  This difference may be purely accidental but is a salutary warning as to the 
reliability of the evidence for all types of transaction: we are dealing here with very low 
numbers and the evidence is incomplete and randomly preserved.  We therefore need to proceed 
with caution.  Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence does seem to suggest that in many cases 
the hieropoioi were exposing the sanctuary to greater risks of default by agreeing to accept 
family members as guarantors.   
The evidence from Delos also suggests that it may have been more common for sons to 
guarantee fathers rather than for fathers to guarantee sons, whereas the evidence from Athens 
suggests that it may have been the other way round.  Vial thought that the reason for fathers not 
guaranteeing their sons more often may have been the risk of disadvantaging any other sons if 
things turned out badly468.  This may well have been the case.   
Vial further noted that two members of the same family, usually two brothers, frequently acted 
as guarantors together for a third person.  Vial listed eleven cases of this phenomenon of which 
seven involved brothers469.  By contrast, we have only one example from Athens470.  Vial 
thought that the phenomenon was explained by the closeness of families in financial matters.  If 
this explanation is right, the acceptance by the hieropoioi of guarantors from the same family 
could again have been exposing the sanctuary to risk, especially if, in the case of brothers, they 
had not divided their father’s estate between them.  Even if they had divided their father’s 
estate, if Vial is correct about the closeness of the family ties, this could have meant that if one 
guarantor brother suffered a financial disaster it would be more likely that the other guarantor 
brother would be affected by it than if the two guarantors were truly independent of each other.  
Here again, we can use the evidence to test this theory.  This shows that in two of the eleven 
instances in which the guarantors were related to each other the guarantors failed to pay when 
called upon to do so: Hegesagoras son of Metrodoros and Metrodoros son of Amynos (father 
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and son guarantors) failed to pay the rent they had guaranteed on one of the sacred houses in 
279BC471, and, in 250BC, Hierokles and Phrasilas the sons of Ammonios (guarantor brothers), 
were recorded as owing one half of the 419 drachmai and 3 oboloi shortfall in rent (plus a 
hemiolion) following the re-letting of part of the estate of Chareteia after the tenant had failed to 
renew them as his guarantors472.  The evidence is rather limited but, again, the “failure rate” 
appears high and we may tentatively conclude that the hieropoioi may well have been taking a 
risk on behalf of the god in accepting guarantors who were related to each other.   
Numbers of guarantors 
For the leases of the sacred estates, Kent noted that in the vast majority of cases there were two 
guarantors, that in a few cases there was only one and that on two occasions at least there were 
more than two.  Kent concluded that two guarantors were not obligatory under the 
i(era\ suggrafh/ but were customary: all that the i(era\ suggrafh/ required was that the 
guarantors be adequate473.   
Appendix E shows the numbers of guarantors provided by the tenants of leases of the sacred 
estates taken from the accounts of the hieropoioi where we also have a record of the rent 
payable, covering the period 314 to 250 BC474.  I have also indicated where one or more of the 
guarantors for a particular estate were “wealthy” in the sense defined in chapter 1475.   
The figures in Appendix E provide examples of situations where financial considerations may 
have been taken into account when determining the number of guarantors.  Thus, in two of the 
five instances where we find a sole guarantor, that guarantor was from a wealthy family.  In the 
case where there were eight guarantors, the tenant concerned in the event failed to pay the rent 
in full and his guarantors made payments to make up the difference.  The tenant then failed to 
renew his guarantors and the land was re-let to a different tenant476.  Here it was not so much the 
financial strength of the guarantors that must have been taken into account as the financial 
weakness of the tenant.   
However, it can also be seen that the norm was to provide two guarantors and that there was a 
very wide range of rents where two guarantors were provided – from 48 to 1400 drachmai.  
This is in marked contrast to the bulk record of leases of sacred lands in Athens of the fourth 
century BC, where, as discussed above, a clear relationship between the amount of the rent and 
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the number of guarantors is discernible, and suggests that on Delos factors other than financial 
concerns may often have influenced the number of guarantors.  This possibility is further 
emphasised by the fact that sometimes comparatively low rents are guaranteed by two 
guarantors, at least one of whom is “wealthy”.  What these factors might be, we do not know; 
possibilities include: a fear on the part of the hieropoioi of being criticised if they departed from 
the norm of two guarantors even where one guarantor would do; a smaller pool of individuals 
from which guarantors could be chosen, which imposed constraints where it might be better to 
have more than two guarantors; or a perception that including a guarantor who had actual 
experience of farming the sacred estate concerned might be preferable to having a greater 
number of guarantors.   
Molinier studied the numbers of guarantors provided for the leases of the sacred houses.  He 
noted that these changed over time477: in 279BC (the earliest date for which we have records of 
the number of guarantors) the accounts record two guarantors for each tenant478; in the lettings 
of 257BC some of the tenants provided two guarantors and some only one479; the accounts of 
207BC record that, in a re-letting of a xylon following non-renewal of guarantors by the existing 
tenant, the new tenant provided only one guarantor480.  By the time of the lettings of 192BC, 
only one guarantor is provided by each of the seventeen new tenants481, and the accounts of 
189BC record that when one of those tenants failed to renew his guarantor, the new tenant 
likewise provided only one482.  The reason for the reduction in the number of guarantors is not 
known – Molinier suggested that it was perhaps a measure of confidence on the part of the 
hieropoioi; or that perhaps, with the increase in the wealth of Delians in the later period483, there 
were more individuals capable of assuming responsibility for the whole of the guarantee.  
Molinier may well be correct.  However, it is also clear that the number of guarantors was not 
dictated by the amount of the rent in any of the periods concerned.  This can be seen from 
Appendix F, which shows the numbers of guarantors provided by tenants of leases of the sacred 
houses taken from the accounts of the hieropoioi where we also have a record of the rent 
payable, covering the period 314 to 250 BC.  Here the approach seems to have been similar to 
the one taken in relation to the leases of the sacred estates and, again, is in marked contrast to 
the Athenian approach to the leases of sacred lands.   
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Turning now to the number of guarantors of loans granted to individuals by Apollo, the figures 
for the period from 314 to 250BC are set out in Appendix G.  Here it seems that two was the 
norm.  Indeed for those where we know of only one guarantor, we cannot be sure that there was 
not another one.  The number of guarantors thus remains the same regardless of the amount 
borrowed.  This may have been because the borrower offered immovable property as security 
for the loan.  The financial assurance provided by the guarantors was therefore less important 
and the financial standing of guarantors less significant in determining their number.   
In the case of building contracts, unlike other transactions mentioned so far, there is a clear 
correlation between the number of guarantors and the contract price.  This can be seen from 
Appendix H.  At one extreme there is a contract for 30,300 drachmai: there were three 
contractors and seven guarantors.  At the other extreme is a contract for 300 drachmai for which 
only one guarantor was provided.  The highest value contract for which we can be certain that 
only one guarantor was provided is 912 drachmai. There is an overlap between contracts that 
had two guarantors (highest value was over 2990 drachmai) and a contract that had three 
(lowest value 1715 drachmai 5 obols and with three contractors).  Nevertheless the pattern is 
fairly clear and is a great contrast with, for example the leases of the sacred houses and the loans 
to individuals.   
Requiring guarantors to provide security 
Whereas requiring guarantors to provide security appears to have been the exception at Athens, 
there is considerable evidence of it on independent Delos.  When recording the grant of a loan in 
their accounts, the hieropoioi usually mention that the borrower provided security over real 
estate (e.g. a loan to Autokles son of Teleson e)piì u(poqh/kei teiÍ oi¹ki¿ai th=i e)n Qw¯kwi - 
Cat#B17 L126).  They then often add that the loan was also granted, for example in the case of 
the loan just mentioned, e)pi\ toi=j a)/lloij toi=j u(pa/rxousin Au)toklei= pa=sin (Cat#B17 
LL126-127).  The precise nature of this security is not stated, but it appears to have been some 
kind of general pledge of the borrower’s possessions484.  Sometimes the guarantor’s possessions 
are also included in this general pledge (e.g. kai\ e)pi\ toi=j a)/lloij toi=j u(pa/rxousin au)tw=i 
pa=sin kai\ e)pi\ toi=j tw=n e)ggu/wn - Cat#B24 LL119-120)485.   
In relation to the leases of the sacred estates, the i(era\ suggrafh\ (Cat#B32 LL46-49) 
specifically provided that all the possessions of the guarantors of the tenants shall be pledged to 
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the god.  Here again the precise legal nature of the security is not spelt out but it appears to have 
given the god some kind of preferential rights over the guarantors’ possessions486.   
Boiotia 
Approval of guarantors 
Two of the prorrh/seij from Thespiai specifically required the guarantors to be approved by 
the officials (in one, the katoptai; in the other, the archa)487.  Two other prorrh/seij (Cat#C3 
and Cat#C6) required the tenants to provide guarantors “for the hierarchs” and “for the archa” 
suggesting that here too the approval of the relevant officials was required488.   
As discussed in chapter 1489, it is possible that the no/moj referred to in the building contract 
from Lebadeia set out the procedure to be followed for the approval of guarantors for building 
contracts, leases and other contracts entered into with the koinon, a city, or one of their gods or 
goddesses.   
The same contract concludes with a general “sweeping up” provision to the effect that any other 
matters not expressly provided for in the contract are to be in accordance with the katoptiko\n 
no/mon kai\ naopoi ko\n490.  Further possibilities, therefore, are that (a) the naopoi ko\j no/moj 
required guarantors of building contracts with the koinon or one of its gods or goddesses to be 
approved by the naopoioi, who had wide powers under the contract to monitor the performance 
of the work, to accept completed work and to award the contract to other contractors if the first 
contractor defaulted491, or (b) that the katoptiko\j no/moj required all those who gave a 
guarantee to the koinon to be approved by the katoptai (who, at state level, also had that 
function under one of the Thespian leases).   
I turn now to the criteria applied by the officials when approving guarantors.   
Citizenship 
For the leases of Thespiai, all but two of the guarantors for whom sufficient details have 
survived were Thespian citizens.  The records include one Theban and one Thisbean 
guarantor492.  Since the citizen of any of the confederated Boiotian cities had the right to own 
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land in any other confederated Boiotian city493, an offer of a guarantee from a non-Thespian 
Boiotian who owned unencumbered land in Thespiai may have been no worse, from a financial 
point of view, than an offer from a similarly circumstanced Thespian citizen, since in both cases 
the guarantor had land which would be available to the community as a means of recovering 
payment of sums owed by the guarantors.  Even if the proposed non-Thespian Boiotian 
guarantor did not own land in Thespiai, it would probably have been a relatively straightforward 
matter for the Thespian officials to take similar action to enforce the guarantee against that 
guarantor in another federated city494.   
We find no instance in the records of a guarantor who is not a citizen of a federated city.  
Nevertheless the evidence is so sparse that it is not possible to say that non-Boiotian guarantors 
were never appointed.  We know that judicial conventions entered into between Greek city 
states sometimes provided for the resolution of disputes arising from obligations entered into 
between one city and an individual citizen of another city495 and although no such convention 
between the koinon of Boiotia or any of its member states and another Greek city state has 
survived496, the possibility of such a convention cannot be ruled out, and thus it is possible that 
it may in certain circumstances have been feasible for a non-Boiotian guarantor to be appointed.  
So far as concerns the Thespian leases, however, as Osborne remarked, these are characterised 
by their very local nature.  Local men took leases of local land and their obligations were in the 
main guaranteed by local men as well497.   
Wealth 
All the Thespian prorrh/seij referred to above required guarantors to be a)cio/xreoi498.  This 
also appears to have been a requirement of the building contracts from Lebadeia499, and so 
perhaps also of the no/moj discussed in chapter 1500.   
We do not know how the officials decided whether a guarantor was a)cio/xreoj, although a key 
factor in many cases would no doubt have been ownership of unencumbered land.  There is, 
however, almost no evidence as to the wealth of the guarantors501 or of the tenants.  It may have 
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been that a guarantor of a rent of 340 drachmai (the highest recorded rent) had to pass a stiffer 
test than the guarantor of a rent of 1 obolos (the lowest recorded rent).  Thus, we cannot assume, 
as Osborne does502, that because the guarantors had to be a)cio/xreoi, they must have been 
wealthy (however one defines wealth).   
Other criteria 
As in Athens and on Delos we find that some of the guarantors of public or sacred land were 
themselves tenants503.  Their skills in farming might have provided additional assurance to the 
officials who were responsible for approving them as guarantors.  However, it has to be 
remembered that the prorrh/seij stipulated only one criterion, that they should be a)cio/xreoi.   
Guarantors who are relatives of contractors whom they guarantee 
As at Athens and Delos, there are instances in the records of the leases of Thespiai of a tenant 
being guaranteed by a member of his own family504.  The advantages and potential 
disadvantages of this type of arrangement from the point of view of the community, already 
discussed in relation to Athens and Delos505, could have applied equally in Thespiai.   
At Thespiai, as at Athens506, there is also evidence of more complex interrelationships between 
many of the guarantors and the tenants.  This complexity has been noted and described by 
Osborne507.  Pernin also notes the existence of groups of men interested in the estates either as 
tenants or guarantors or both whose connections, if they are not recognised as family links, are 
nevertheless very close.  She argues that there is evidence of a desire to keep leased properties 
within the same group.  Pernin has suggested that the numerous examples of a tenant agreeing 
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to stand as guarantor for someone who had been his guarantor previously are evidence of 
mutual assistance within family or friendship groups which had as their intent the maintenance 
of leases of certain properties within the group508.  It may be that the officials were prepared to 
permit this type of arrangement on the basis that the lessor would benefit from it in turn.  It was 
not however free of certain risks as far as the community was concerned.  It could result in a 
group of individuals, whether as tenants or guarantors or both, carrying a considerable amount 
of credit risk between them.   
The best example of this complexity can be found in the case of Klearetos son of Medon.  
Klearetos stood as guarantor for three tenants of three of the plots of land owned by the god 
Hermes at a total rent of 272 drachmai509.  The three tenants were Philomeilos son of Nauton, 
Eukrateis son of Damokrateis and Eneisias son of Saon.  As to the three tenants: 
1. Philomeilos son of Nauton was tenant of one other property recorded in this inscription 
at a rent of 54 drachmai. His guarantor for that property was Nikon son of Chareitidas, 
who was also the guarantor of Eneisias son of Saon as tenant of another property 
recorded on this inscription – see 3 below510.  Philomeilos was also probably the father 
of Epinion511, who is recorded in the same inscription as the guarantor of Nommos son 
of Alexion of two tenancies at a rent of 60 drachmai each512.   
2. Eukrateis son of Damokrateis was guarantor in turn of Klearetos son of Medon, who is 
recorded in the same inscription as a tenant of land at a rent of 128 drachmai513.   
3. Eneisias son of Saon was recorded in this inscription as tenant of two other properties at 
rents of 51 and 59 drachmai514.  His guarantor on one of these properties was Nikon son 
of Chareitidas, who, as mentioned in 1 above, was also a guarantor of Philomeilos son 
of Nauton. Further, Eneisias was probably the son of Saon son of Hiaron515, who is 
recorded in this same inscription as the tenant of four properties at rents of 52, 70, 50 
and 105 drachmai516.  Saon’s guarantor for all four tenancies was Aristokritos son of 
Aristokritos.  Aristokritos also held two tenancies of the god’s property at rents of 71 
and 120 drachmai.  His guarantor for one of these tenancies (at a rent of 120 drachmai) 
was Saon son of Hiaron, the tenant whose obligations he was guaranteeing under the 
four tenancies517.   
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The complicated relationships between these tenants and guarantors are shown in diagram form 
in Appendix I.   
The total of the annual rent owed to Hermes for which Klearetos, Philomeilos, Eukrateis, 
Eneisias and their families were responsible was 1081 drachmai, spread over a total of fourteen 
tenancies.  The close interdependency between these individuals in respect of their obligations 
to the god could have meant that if one of them encountered financial difficulties the others 
would feel the effects.  This would have to be taken into account in determining whether the 
guarantors in this closely connected network were a)cio/xreoi.  The officials concerned would 
have had to look beyond the rent payable under a particular tenancy.  If information was 
available as to the value of any unencumbered land owned by the guarantors, for example from 
a register of ownership of land in Thespiai, this should not have been too arduous a task.  
However, although Faraguna has argued that registration of real property was, at least from the 
fourth century and with increasing intensity up to the end of the Hellenistic period, widespread 
in the Greek world518, we have no direct evidence that such registers existed at Thespiai in the 
second half of the third century BC.  If this information was not readily available to the 
officials, or if it was not checked by the officials, it is possible that the community could have 
been exposed to a risk of default.   
Numbers of Guarantors 
Two of the Thespian prorrh/seij (Cat#C1 LL6-7 and C2 LL6-7) required that there should be 
no more than two guarantors.  The other two set no limit on the number of guarantors.   
An upper limit on the number of guarantors has no parallel in Athens or Delos.  It seems, on the 
face of it, to be contrary to the interests of the temple and of the guarantors.  It can probably be 
explained if there was a rule or practice that, where there was more than one guarantor, each 
guarantor was liable for only a part of the rent519.  This would have meant that tenants could, if 
they wished, provide a large number of guarantors, each of whom would only be liable for a 
small part of the sums due.  This would have been unwelcome to the community, which would 
have been faced with considerable extra cost in collecting unpaid rent from numerous 
guarantors and with the problems that might arise in case an individual guarantor contested his 
obligations.  Hence the authors of these pro/rrhseij placed a limit on their number.  In fact, no 
instances of two guarantors have survived in the lists of tenants, guarantors and rents of land 
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whose leases were governed by the two prorrh/seij containing this stipulation520.  One is the 
norm.  On the other hand, where the prorrh/seij contained no restriction on the number of 
guarantors, we find no instances of more than two guarantors in the very fragmentary lists of 
tenants and their guarantors associated with them.  We do occasionally encounter two 
guarantors but here too one is the norm521.   
There does not appear to have been any correlation between the amount of the rent and the 
number of guarantors.  There are nine cases of two guarantors where the information is 
sufficiently well preserved to permit comment.  In one case of these cases, the tenant was a 
Theban522.  However, as a citizen of the koinon, a Theban did not necessarily present any greater 
risk to the city of Thespiai than a Thespian citizen.  Non-Thespian citizenship cannot on its own 
have been a reason for requiring two guarantors.  In another case the rent is 325 drachmai523, the 
second highest rent recorded out of a total of 86 plots for which the rent is reasonably well 
preserved.  However, for the plot which commanded the highest rent (340 drachmai) only one 
guarantor was provided524 and, in five cases where two guarantors were provided, the rents are 
very low by comparison with the rents payable under other leases (in one case as low as 6 
drachmai, yet two guarantors were provided525).  The amount of the rent cannot on its own 
therefore have been a reason for requiring more than one guarantor.  In three of the cases where 
the rent was very low yet two guarantors were provided, the tenant was a woman and in two of 
those one of the guarantors was her husband526; in the other two cases where the rent was very 
low the tenants were boys527.   
It appears, then, that in order for the officials to require (or permit) two guarantors there had to 
be special circumstances, or a combination of circumstances, of some kind.  What those special 
circumstances might be may have varied from case to case.  The reason for treating female or 
child tenants as special cases was probably related to their legal status.  It seems clear that in 
Boiotia a woman had to be represented by a man in taking certain acts such as taking a lease of 
sacred land, granting a loan or granting manumissions528.  It is possible that the subordinate 
legal status of women may have restricted the ability of the officials to take action to recover 
unpaid rent from women by seizing and selling property.  For example, the consent of a 
woman’s kyrios may have been required if her property was to be sold to meet demands by the 
                                                
520
 IThesp 46, 47, 50, 51 and 52; Foucart (1885:416); (1909:120 and 400); Pernin (2014:499). 
521
 IThesp 53 L58: two guarantors (see Feyel (1937: 226)); IThesp 54 LL49-50: two guarantors; IThesp 55 LL7-8: 
two, possibly three, guarantors; IThesp 56 LL16-17; 20-23; 24-27; 31-33; 34-37; 39-41 and 42-43: two guarantors.   
522
 IThesp 56 LL16-17. 
523
 IThesp 54 LL49-50. 
524
 IThesp 54 LL46-48. 
525
 IThesp 56 LL39-41. 
526
 IThesp 56 LL24-27; IThesp 56 LL39-41 and 42-43.  
527
 IThesp 56 LL31-33 and 34-37. 
528
 Leases: IThesp 56 LL26-27, 40-41 and 43.  Loan: IG VII 3172 LL79-80.  Manumissions: Darmezin (1999:196 
and 201).  
 107
officials for payment of rent.  This may have meant that it would be preferable from the point of 
view of the community to proceed directly against the guarantors.  The same may have applied 
to minors.  We know that they acted through fi/loi in the case of grants of leases of sacred 
lands529, as did one of the female tenants already mentioned530, and as did women who granted 
manumissions531.   
Requiring security 
Finally, it is to be noted that the prorrh/seij also required the tenant to provide a sum of 
money as security (e)ne/xuron) for himself and each of his guarantors.  In two of them the 
security required was two oboloi for the tenant and two for the guarantor (Cat#C3 LL15-16 and 
No.C6 LL16-17).  Two earlier prorrh/seij required security of one obolos each rather than 
two (Cat#C1 LL7-8 and Cat#C2 LL7-8).  The amounts of security are extremely small and 
Roesch must therefore surely have been correct in suggesting that, despite being described as an 
e)ne/xuron, it was in reality no more than a registration fee532.   
Common legal principles and practices underlying the vetting of guarantors 
The review of the evidence in this chapter indicates that it may well have been a principle that 
all guarantors of transactions involving the community had to be formally vetted before 
acceptance by the community.  The significance of such formal approval would have been 
twofold: to emphasise to the guarantor the seriousness of the commitment involved in becoming 
a guarantor; and to reveal publicly the person who had agreed to stand as guarantor as the 
person who was approved as being able and willing to make that commitment to the 
community.   
However, the procedures for such vetting seem to have differed between the different 
jurisdictions and between different transactions.  In Athens and on independent Delos the 
Council or other body such as a dikasterion was involved in the approval of guarantors, in 
addition to the officials in charge of the transaction, for some, but not all, transactions.  
However, there is no evidence of the involvement of these kinds of bodies in Boiotia.  Rather, 
the responsibility for approval seems to have rested with a committee of officials such as the 
katoptai.  On independent Delos we know that there was a formal process and although direct 
evidence of such a process in Athens and Boiotia is lacking, this does not mean that formal 
events of approval of guarantors did not take place there as well.  So far as concerns Athens, the 
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fact that the tenant of the quarry leased by the deme of Eleusis had to swear an oath before the 
demesmen suggests that there may well have been a formal procedure in that case.   
In all three states the guarantors were normally citizens of the state concerned.  Use of citizen 
guarantors may have made it easier for the officials to collect sums due where the contractor 
was a non-citizen (although evidence from independent Delos provides some examples where 
they nevertheless encountered problems, albeit not necessarily on the scale that might have 
applied if the guarantor had been a non-citizen without e)/gkthsij).  However, a relevant 
citizenship requirement does not seem to have been an overriding principle of law or practice.  
On Delos during the amphiktyonic period, all guarantors except possibly one (who was a 
Delian) were Athenian.  It would have been relatively straightforward for the amphyktyons to 
recover sums due from the Athenian guarantors in Athens and from any Delian guarantors on 
Delos (although it appears that there may have been some resistance from the latter).  At 
Thespiai all non-Thespian guarantors attested were Boiotian citizens and recovery of amounts 
due from them in their “home” states should not therefore have been a problem533.  From 
independent Delos, we have two examples of non-Delian guarantors.  This would not 
necessarily have meant that the hieropoioi were not able to recover amounts unpaid from them, 
if they had e)/gkthsij on Delos or, possibly, if a legal convention existed between Delos and the 
guarantor’s home state.  Further, it is worth recalling that the fact that we find no non-citizen 
guarantors at Athens and no non-Boiotian guarantors at Thespiai does not necessarily mean that 
there were none.   
Similarly, whilst we have ample evidence from Athens and independent Delos that many 
guarantors were wealthy and there is evidence from all three jurisdictions that in some 
transactions there was a specific requirement that guarantors be a)cio/xreoi, a requirement for 
wealthy guarantors does not seem to have been a fundamential principle of law or practice.  In 
Athens and on independent Delos it seems likely that the experience of the guarantors in the 
field of the particular type of transaction being guaranteed may have been taken into account as 
well.  This may have been particularly important in the case of building contracts and possibly 
in the case of leases of the sacred estates.  In the latter case, this may have been an added reason 
for the apparent preference for citizens (local people who would be on hand) as guarantors.   
In all three states, there is evidence that officials were prepared to accept as guarantors 
individuals of the same family as the individual whose obligations were being guaranteed.  This 
might have exposed the community to the risk that if the family fell upon hard times the 
community might be left out of pocket, and it is therefore difficult to see that there was any 
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form of principle or practice that kin guarantors would be acceptable in some cases.  Apart from 
anything else, we cannot tell from the evidence what those cases might be.  At Thespiai, the 
evidence of kin guarantors may perhaps be explained by the very local nature of the series of 
leases for which the records survive.  On independent Delos, it is especially hard to see why the 
Delians were willing to accept the risk involved in accepting kin guarantors, when one considers 
the dependence of the Delians upon the prosperity of their sanctuary.  Perhaps here, as 
elsewhere, each case would depend upon the particular facts, for example the availability of 
guarantors, whether the property of the guarantor was held separately from that of the 
contractor, what particular qualities were being looked for in the guarantor (e.g. technical 
knowledge of and skill in the subject matter of the guarantee as opposed to financial strength).   
One particular difference between the three jurisdictions concerns the numbers of guarantors.  
At Athens, the number of guarantors appears to have increased with the value of the transaction.  
On independent Delos, although there were occasions when the number of guarantors might 
reflect the financial circumstances of the tenant or the guarantor proposed, the number of 
guarantors does not, with the notable exception of building contracts, appear to have born any 
direct relationship to the value of the transaction.  At Thespiai there was for some of the leases 
of sacred and public land a limit on the number of guarantors who could be provided.  However, 
in relation to leases generally, as on Delos, there does not appear to have been any correlation 
between the number of guarantors and the amount of the rent, although it does appear that 
where the tenant was a woman or a minor the number of guarantors might be increased.  These 
differences may be regarded as an indication that a fairly wide discretion was left to the officials 
and other bodies responsible for the approval of guarantors.  Such was the variety of 
circumstances surrounding various transactions that it would perhaps have been inevitable that 
such discretion should have been allowed.  But we may also see in these differences an 
indication that there were fewer people on independent Delos and at Thespiai who were 
prepared to put themselves forward as guarantors.   
Differences can also be seen in the area of the provision of security by guarantors.  At Athens, 
evidence of guarantors being required to provide security for the fulfilment of their obligations 
is very limited.  On Delos, by contrast, there was sometimes some kind of general pledge to the 
hieropoioi of the possessions of the guarantors of loans made by the god and of the possessions 
of guarantors of tenants of the sacred estates.  At Thespiai, the security required from guarantors 
of leases was so small as to amount to nothing more than a kind of registration fee.  In these 
differences we see again534 a reflection of the greater importance to the sanctuary and to the city 
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state of Delos that the sanctuary should have the means to recover the sums lent in the event of 
the borrower’s inability to repay.   
 111
CHAPTER THREE 
What did the guarantee cover? 
The issue of what was expected of the guarantor if the contractor defaulted was obviously a 
matter of some importance not only for the community but also for the guarantor himself.  In 
this chapter, I will discuss the similarities and differences in approach to this question adopted 
by our three states with a view to determining whether we can discern any common principles at 
work in this regard.   
Athens 
The terms in which the guarantee was expressed in the surviving evidence indicate what was 
required of the guarantor.  Thus, the wording of the decree of an Athenian tribe concerning the 
grant of leases of tribe lands (Cat#A16 LL2-10) made it clear, as Partsch535 noted, that the 
guarantor owed his obligations separately from and alongside the tenant: tou\j de\ 
mis[qwsame/nou]j kaiì tou\j e)ng[u]hta\j...a)podido/nai kaiì [kataba/llein to\] me\n? pr?w½?t
on me/roj....  Both are responsible for payment of the rent and the tamias and epimeletai of the 
tribe could look to them both for payment.  If the rent was not paid, the property of both the 
tenant and the guarantor could be seized (e)nexurasi/an ei)=nai au)tw=n).  There was no 
provision in the decree for the officials to make a demand for the unpaid rent from the tenant, to 
notify the guarantor that the tenant had not paid or to make a demand on the guarantor before 
the guarantor could be considered in default536.  The guarantor was given no “grace period”.  In 
order to avoid the consequences of non-payment, it was vital for the guarantor to ensure that the 
tenant paid on time.  The guarantor was in effect acting as the enforcer for the tribe.  It is not 
hard to imagine that a particularly cautious guarantor might prefer to pay the rent himself and 
then recover it from the tenant (rather like the proeispherontes did for the collection of the 
proeisphora and contributions towards trierarchies537).   
This direct obligation of the guarantor can also be found in the Peiraieus general conditions of 
321/320 or 318/317BC for the grant of leases by the deme (Cat#A28), which required 
guarantors to provide security not for the performance of their guarantees but for the 
performance of the mi/sqwsij (L6)538.  It can also be seen in the decree of the deme of Eleusis 
of 333/332 BC for the lease of a quarry (Cat#A37), which required the guarantors to swear, not 
to ensure that the tenant would pay the rent on time but that they themselves would pay it 
(LL29-31).  This was a separate undertaking by the guarantors sitting alongside the tenant’s 
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own obligation.  The syntax is similar to that which appears in the tribal decree (Cat#A16) and 
the same comments as to its practical effects apply.   
The position was the same in an entry in the accounts of the supervisors of the dockyard at 
Peiraieus for 334/333BC, which records a guarantee of a debt owed by a trierarch following his 
trierarchy, (Cat#A20 LL65-68).  It is formulated in terms (a)nadeca/menoj.... a)podw/sein) that 
make it clear that the supervisors could expect payment of the debt directly from the guarantor if 
the debtor did not pay.  Partsch argued that a)nade/xesqai a)podw¯sein here meant the guarantor 
was liable jointly with the debtor to the creditor.  He observed that this kind of construction only 
occurred in claims for payment of money and guarantees for them539.  If, however, by “jointly” 
(“solidarisch”) Partsch meant that the creditor could demand payment from the guarantor 
without the debtor being in default, his interpretation may perhaps be doubted.  The entry in the 
dockyard accounts should be read, in my view, as making it clear that the claim could not have 
been made against the guarantor had the debt owed by the trierarch not been outstanding.  
Again, however, no prior demand upon the trierarch was necessary and no grace period was 
allowed to the guarantor.   
The position is more complicated in the hereditary lease granted by the meritai of the deme of 
Kytheros in the second half of the fourth century (Cat#A27).  Here, the tenant’s obligations 
were (a) to pay the rent in specified months each year (LL12-15); (b) to refurbish the workshop 
and the house in the first year (LL15-17).  If he failed to pay the rent kata\ ta\ gegramme/na 
(i.e. in the amounts and at the times stipulated) or failed to carry out the refurbishment work, he 
would owe double the rent and he had to vacate the workshop without protest (LL17-20).  The 
guarantee is tou= poh/sein ta\ gegramme/na ....... e)n tw½i xro/nwi tw½i gegramme/nwi.  
Two questions arise here.  Firstly what obligations did the guarantee cover?  Secondly, what 
was the guarantor required to do if the tenant failed to perform those obligations?   
As to the first, Partsch took the view that the guarantor was guaranteeing the whole of the tenant’s 
obligations under the lease - ta\ gegramme/na - including payment of rent, the execution of the 
refurbishment work and payment of double the rent if the tenant defaulted on either of these 
obligations540.  But Behrend argued that the guarantee only covered the refurbishment work541.  In 
Behrend’s view, the expression e)n tw=i xro/nwi tw=i gegramme/nwi referred to the period of one 
year within which the refurbishment had to be carried out.  Further, Behrend argued that poih/sein 
can only with difficulty be read as referring to payment and that since this was a hereditary lease it 
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would have been necessary to provide for a successor to the guarantor if his guarantee covered 
payment of the rent (here, presumably, Behrend was implying that since the guarantor in this case 
was the father of the tenant, it would not have been acceptable for the guarantee to pass in the 
normal way to the guarantor’s son upon the guarantor’s death since the tenant would then be 
guaranteeing himself).  In my view, Partsch’s interpretation is to be preferred:  e)n tw=i xro/nwi 
tw=i gegramme/nwi go equally as well with payment of rent as with execution of work given the 
preceding words, ta\ gegramme/na, which clearly apply to both.  And if it had been intended that 
the guarantee would cover only the work, e)piskeuei=n could easily have been used.  Further, there 
is evidence of the use of the general word poih/sein to cover payment of money in a lease granted 
by the deme of Prasiai dated to just after the end of the fourth century BC.  The lease provided that 
if the tenant did not pay the rent on time the tenant or his descendants, oi( mh\ poiou=ntej ta\ 
gegramme/na, had to pay a fine of 1000 drachmai (SEG 21.644 LL2-11).   
As to the second question, Partsch referred to this inscription as an example of the type of Greek 
guarantee in which the guarantor promised the beneficiary that the contractor would perform542, 
as opposed to the examples reviewed above of leases and debts, where the guarantor gave an 
undertaking directly to the beneficiary that he would perform if the contractor did not543.  
Partsch suggested that the former was the typical form of the e)ggu/h; the latter was used 
occasionally and only where the obligation was to make a payment.  Yet even the former type of 
guarantee, Partsch argued, required that if the contractor did not perform, the guarantor would 
do so himself544.  In the present case, therefore, the guarantor would no doubt have had to pay 
the rent if the tenant did not pay and to refurbish the workshop if the tenant failed to do so.  The 
lease expressly provided what else was to happen if the tenant did not pay the rent or failed to 
carry out the refurbishment work on time: in both cases the tenant was to pay a penalty of 
double the rent and vacate the workshop.  Again, therefore, if the tenant failed to pay this 
penalty, the guarantor would no doubt have had to pay it.  The position may not have been that 
different from what would have applied if the guarantee had been a “direct” undertaking to pay 
if the tenant did not pay.  In relation to the vacation of the workshop following these defaults, 
however, the position must have been different.  Only the tenant could perform this obligation.  
The guarantor could not.  As Partsch admitted, no indication is given of what the liability of the 
guarantor was in practical terms if the tenant refused to move out545.  Some kind of financial 
compensation to the meritai (for example payment of rent for the period during which the tenant 
remained in occupation) seems to be the only real possibility546.  No doubt that would have 
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provided the guarantor with the necessary “encouragement” to ensure that the tenant vacated the 
workshop.  In doing this, the guarantor would again effectively have been acting as the lessor’s 
“enforcer” so that vacant possession could be given to a new tenant.   
The leases granted pursuant to the Peiraieus general conditions of leasing of 321/320 or 
318/317BC (Cat#A28) also included non-financial obligations: that the tenants were not to remove 
soil or wood from the land leased (LL9-11); that during the last year of the lease, they were to 
cultivate the land only for half the year and that in the event of breach of this obligation, the excess 
crop should belong to the demesmen (LL15-22).  Were these obligations included in the mi/sqwsij 
which the guarantor was required to guarantee547?  In my view they were not.  It will be recalled 
that the conditions provided that for rents above 10 drachmai the tenant had to provide adequate 
security for the rent (a)poti/mhma th=j misqw/sewj a)cio/xrewn), whereas for rents under 10 
drachmai he had to provide an e)gguhth\n a)podido/menon ta\ e(autou= th=j misqw/sewj.  In both 
places, given that the context is a stipulation which makes the type of security dependant upon the 
amount of the rent, mi/sqwsij must mean “rent” and not the lease as a whole548.  The guarantee did 
not therefore cover any of the non-financial stipulations but was limited to payment of the rent if 
the tenant failed to pay.   
Another example of a non-financial obligation included in leases that required guarantors can be 
found in the introductory words of a bulk record of leases of the Lykourgan era (Cat#A34 LL35-
39).  These leases and those that preceded them in the list required not only the payment of rent but 
also the delivery of seasonal produce (th=j kataqe/sewj th=j m[isqw¯vvv]sewj kaiì tw½n 
w¨rai¿wn).  It is probable that part of the rent was payable in the form of a share of what the estate 
had produced in the year549.  It is not known whether the guarantee covered this obligation as well 
as the payment of rent; if it did, and a tenant under one of these leases did not deliver the produce, 
the guarantor might have been required to deliver the produce himself, either by bringing it from his 
own farm (if the guarantor was also a farmer550) or by buying it from the market.   
Turning now to building contracts, the primary obligations here were, of course, non-financial 
but financial obligations are to be found in them too.  Where the building contract imposed the 
payment of fines upon the contractor if he did not perform, it seems that the guarantor was 
expected first and foremost to pay that fine if the contractor did not.  Thus, in the law of 
337/336 BC relating to the rebuilding of the walls and harbour moles (Cat#A14), if correctly 
restored by Thür551, the appointed officials could impose a fine if the contractor failed to 
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complete the work.  The wording of the law, again if Thür’s restorations are followed, provided 
that both the contractor and his guarantor were responsible for the payment of this fine (LL34-
35: eiã tinej tw½m misqwsame/nwn hÄ e)gguhsame/nwn a)[peiqou=sin tau/taij tai=j zhmi/aij 
tou\j e)pi\ ta\ tei/xh h(irhme/nouj ei¹sa/gein] tou/touj ei¹j to\ dikasth/rion.).  Here again it 
appears that we have “direct” guarantees: the guarantor owes his obligation to pay the fine 
directly to the city alongside the contractor and the practical consequences, court proceedings, 
were immediate and direct.  The same applied to fines for delays to completion in the contract 
for work to the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos (Cat#A43 LL19-20).  The naopoioi were to 
enforce the payment of such fines from the contractor and his guarantors (au)to\n kai\ to[u\]j 
[e)gg]uhta\j).  The guarantor is liable directly to the god separately from and alongside the 
contractor552.   
The fines referred to above were for delay.  What might happen if the contractor executed the 
work poorly or provided shoddy materials?   The possibilities may be hinted at in the 
Erechtheion accounts of 408/407 BC (Cat#A13).  These accounts record payments to the 
contractor, Dionysodoros, for encaustic painting work and it will be recalled that they also 
mention his guarantor, Herakleides of Oe.  Davis suggested that the guarantor is mentioned here 
because this was a special case in which the state supplied the contractor with a quantity of 
expensive material553.  In my view, this cannot be the reason.  In the lines following the entry for 
the sixth prytany, payments to goldsmiths were recorded.  There is no mention of a guarantor554.   
An alternative explanation for the appearance of the guarantor in these entries may be that both 
the contractor and the guarantor received payment.  As has already been seen555, it is possible 
that Herakleides was in the building trade himself.  He may have been helping Dionysodoros 
out, perhaps because Dionysodoros was in danger of defaulting.  Thus Herakleides is named 
along with Dionysodoros as payee, and in recording the payment no effort has been made to 
stipulate how much each receives, perhaps because this is a matter between Dionysodoros and 
Herakleides and not something the treasurers making the payment were concerned with556.   
Such an interpretation is not without its problems.  In the first passage the contractor and the 
guarantor are both named in the nominative case followed by the amount of the payment.  In the 
second, however, the contractor is in the dative and the guarantor is in the nominative followed 
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by the amount of the payment.  If the guarantor was being paid in the second entry, one might 
expect that his name would be in the dative case too.  But perhaps one should not necessarily 
expect the consistent use of cases in building accounts557.  If the interpretation is correct, it does 
provide us with another alternative as to what the community might expect from the guarantor 
in the case of building contracts: actual performance by the guarantor of the obligation that the 
contractor has failed to perform.  This could include the repair of bad work or the replacement 
of shoddy materials.  As has been seen558, this in turn might have influenced the choice of the 
guarantor when the contract was originally awarded.   
As already noted559, more than one guarantor was sometimes recorded.  In most cases, the 
Athenian sources give no indication as to whether, where this occurred, each guarantor was 
liable for the full amount owing under the guarantee or whether his liability was limited to a 
particular share of that amount.  Partsch was of the view that, unless otherwise agreed, each of 
the guarantors was liable for the full amount, so that the creditor could proceed against any one 
of them for the total due under the guarantee (Partsch refers in particular to Isaios 5.18, where 
there were two guarantors but the claimant was proceeding against only one of them for the full 
amount of his claim).  Partsch’s main reason for holding that each guarantor was liable in full 
was that if liability was fragmented it would be of no interest to the beneficiary because of the 
potential difficulties of enforcement.  Nevertheless, as Partsch admitted, we cannot obtain a very 
exact picture of this from the sources560.  Erdas argued that the contractor and the guarantors 
may have entered into agreements in which they divided the guarantee into different parts561.  
However, we have no evidence of such arrangements.   
The Athenian sources do reveal that on occasion the liability of the guarantors may have been 
limited to a particular amount.  It will be recalled that the building contract for work to the 
sanctuary of Apollo (Cat#A43 LL17-18) required the contractor tou\[j de\ e)gguh]ta\j 
kaqista/nai kata\ X a)cio/xrewj. As we have seen562 there is some uncertainty as to whether 
this should be interpreted as meaning that for every 1000 drachmai of the contract price the 
contractor was required to produce one guarantor or that each guarantor must be able to pay 
1000 drachmai.  On either interpretation, however, each guarantor’s liability would have been 
limited to 1000 drachmai.   
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Another possible example of such a limitation can be found in the Athenian grain tax law, 
where the contractors were required to provide two guarantors (du/o kata\ th\m meri/da 
a)cio/xrewj).  It appears from this that, if a contractor was committed to deliver one portion, 
each of his guarantors was liable for the full amount of the portion563.  If the contractor was 
committed to deliver, say, two portions, there would be four guarantors but no guarantor was 
liable for more than one portion.   
We have seen564 that, in the case of the leases of sacred lands from 343/342BC to 320BC 
(Ath.Ag.19 L6 and L9-12), there may have been a threshold for the rents above which more than 
one guarantor would be provided.  Papazarkadas inferred that these thresholds also acted as 
limitations on the liability of each guarantor565.  The argument, however, seems to be based 
mainly on the evidence from independent Delos (discussed below).  There is no evidence from 
Athens that the liability of the guarantors of these leases was limited in this way.   
Independent Delos 
When compared with Athens, the i(era\ suggrafh/ appears to adopt a gentler approach to what 
was expected of guarantors: it stipulated that if the tenant did not pay the rent on time, he was to 
pay a hemiolion.  Here the text becomes very fragmentary but it appears to have provided that 
the hieropoioi were to recover the amount due by selling the crops from the estate before 
collecting from the guarantors a hemiolion of the amount of the rent owing to the god566; they 
were then to recover any rent still owing by selling the tenant’s cattle, sheep and slaves and if 
there was still an amount owing after that they were to recover it from the possessions of the 
tenant and the guarantors567.  It seems from this that the guarantor was only liable for the 
hemiolion on the amount of rent outstanding after sale of the crops of the estate and that he only 
became liable to pay the unpaid rent if it could not be recovered from a sale of the tenant’s 
cattle, sheep and slaves.  The guarantor would have had plenty of notice before he was called 
upon to make an actual payment.   
This “gentler” approach continued in the lines of the i(era\ suggrafh/ which follow.  These had 
the effect that if the hieropoioi were unable to recover the outstanding rent from the possessions 
of the tenant and his guarantors that they were to grant a new lease to another tenant and, if the 
new rent was less than the old, they were to write up the names of the tenant and his guarantors 
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and the amount of the shortfall plus a hemiolion568.  Once again the guarantor would have plenty 
of notice of his liability.   
Despite the gentler approach of the i(era\ suggrafh/, we can find elsewhere in it the same 
principle as that found in some of the Athenian inscriptions, namely, that the guarantor owed his 
obligation directly to the god, separately from and alongside that of the contractor.  In the first 
passage outlined above, once the guarantor became liable to pay the hemiolion, that liability was 
then owed solely by the guarantor directly to the god.  Similarly, once the guarantor became 
liable to pay any outstanding rent, his liability was owed directly to the god alongside the 
liability of the tenant.  Again, in the second passage outlined above, once the guarantor became 
liable for any shortfall following a re-letting of the estate, he owed that liability directly to the 
god alongside the liability of the tenant, although at this stage there may have been little he 
could do to satisfy that liability since by then his possessions would have been sold by the 
hieropoioi.  Further, in a subsequent passage, it was provided: toi=j de\ e)ggrafei=sn 
e)gguhtai=j tou= misqwsame/nou mh\ e)ce/stw meri/sai tw=i katasth/santi tou= e)ggraf[e/
n]toj a)rguri/ou ei)j th\n sth/lhn, a)ll' ei)=nai to\ a)po/teisma a(/pan toi=j e)gguhtai=j ka
ta\ to\ e)piba/llom [me/ro]j e(ka/stw[i], ei)a\m mh\ o( katasth/saj a)poti/nei u(pe\r au)tw=n:
569
.  This is a difficult passage.  I suggest the following translation: “the guarantors whose names 
have been written up are not permitted to allocate any part of the sum which has been recorded 
on the stele to the tenant570, but the whole payment shall be down to the guarantors571 according 
to the share which falls upon each, unless the tenant pays on their behalf.”  The prohibition 
against allocation of any part of the debt to the tenant and the emphasis upon the whole of it 
falling upon the guarantors indicates that the guarantors were, as Ziebarth remarked572, directly 
liable to the god.   
We also find that principle at work in a building contract dated to the middle of the third century 
BC which reveals a more aggressive approach than the i(era\ suggrafh/.  If correctly restored 
by Davis, it enjoined the e)gdo/tai to recover the additional cost of hiring another contractor 
following serious default by the original contractor from “the contractor and the guarantor”.  
Here, unlike in the i(era\ suggrafh/,  the guarantor is liable as soon as the contractor defaults; 
there are no intervening procedures which could have the effect that the guarantor would not 
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have to pay573.  No prior demand upon the guarantor appears to have been necessary before he 
would become liable under his guarantee.  Here was a strong incentive for the guarantor to 
make sure that the contractor did his work.   
The idea that the guarantors were separately liable to the god alongside the contractor is also 
found in the terms in which the grant of loans by Apollo is sometimes recorded: they were made 
to the borrower and to the guarantors (e.g.   )Antila/kwi Simi/dou H to/kou e)pideka/to[u 
k]ai\ e)ggu/oij Nika/nori Dio[do/t]ou, )Epixa/rmwi [ )A.....])574.  As with the accounts of the 
supervisors of the dockyards at Athens, Partsch argued that in this type of transaction the 
guarantors, as parties to the contract of loan, were jointly liable with the borrower for the 
payment of interest and, ultimately, for the repayment of the loan575.  Here again, as in the case 
of the dockyard accounts, Partsch’s argument is not, in my view, justified.  The hieropoioi make 
it clear in their records that the guarantors were guarantors, not joint debtors; they should not 
therefore be regarded as liable jointly with the borrower but rather as guarantors i.e. liable on 
borrower default.  Nevertheless the phrasing of the grant of the loan makes it clear that that 
liabilitywas owed to the god separately from and alongside the liability of the borrower.  Unless, 
therefore, there was a now lost “i(era\ suggrafh/ for loans” which prescribed a gentle, gradual 
approach to making calls upon the guarantors of loans equivalent to the approach to the 
guarantors of the sacred estates found in the i(era\ suggrafh/ (and we have no evidence of such 
a requirement), it is likely that, if the borrower missed a payment that was due, the guarantor 
immediately became liable and no prior demand upon the borrower or on the guarantor was 
required.   
Returning now to the question of what was covered by the guarantors of the leases of the sacred 
estates, we have seen that the i(era\ suggrafh\ provided that, if a lease was terminated for non-
payment of rent, the estate would be re-let and if the rent under the new lease was lower than the 
rent under the original lease, the tenant and his guarantors would be liable for the difference in 
rent and for a penalty of a h(mio/lion on that amount.   
The same principle applied where a tenant of a sacred estate failed to renew his guarantors.  For 
example, in the case of the estate of Chareteia, the accounts of 250BC record that the rent was 
700 drachmai and 3 oboloi, but when the tenant failed to renew his guarantors, the hieropoioi 
cancelled the lease and re-let the estate for 281 drachmai.  The original tenant and his 
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guarantors were recorded as being liable for the shortfall of 419 drachmai 3 oboloi plus a 
h(mio/lion of 209 drachmai and 4 ½ oboloi576.   
However, an account dating to the period before the i(era\ suggrafh\ came into effect suggests 
that the consequences of the tenant failing to renew his guarantors may have been slightly 
different then.  Here, Hermadas, the tenant of Soloe, failed to renew his guarantor and the 
hieropoioi therefore re-let the estate to another tenant.  The accounts subsequently record that 
Hermadas and his guarantor owe the amount of the rent outstanding and unpaid, to which a 
h(mio/lion is added.  The accounts then merely state that the amount of the shortfall of the rent 
from the re-let estate was 220 drachmai577.  Durrbach interpreted this to mean that only the 
tenant was liable for the shortfall in the rent.  He argued that the guarantor could have no 
liability here since the guarantor could not be responsible for the failure of the tenant to renew 
his guarantors578.  Reger, on the other hand, appears to have interpreted the text to mean that 
both the tenant and the guarantor were liable for the shortfall579.  The text is obscure, because 
the amount of the shortfall is recorded without any specific statement saying who owes it, but in 
my view Reger’s interpretation is the more likely to be correct.  The text quoted above follows 
on from a statement that both Hermadas and his guarantor are liable for the unpaid rent and the 
h(mio/lion.  In the absence of any indication to the contrary, therefore, it seems logical to 
conclude that they are both liable for the shortfall in the rent too.  Further, if the reason for the 
guarantor refusing to allow the tenant to put his name forward at the time of renewal was 
concern about the ability of the tenant to pay, this would be the very circumstances in which the 
god would be seeking protection from the guarantor580.   
The earlier account is notable, however, in that there appears to have been no h(mio/lion added 
to the amount of shortfall, whereas in the i(era\ suggrafh\ the h(mio/lion is added.  The 
i(era\ suggrafh\ may have introduced a change in the law or practice in this respect581, thereby 
increasing the potential exposure of the guarantor.   
By contrast with the position of the guarantors of the sacred estates, it is possible that the 
obligation of the guarantors of the leases of the sacred houses did not cover any shortfall in the 
rent where a lease was cancelled and the house re-let to another tenant at a lower rent.  In both 
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of the two accounts where a record of such a shortfall has survived, only the tenant is recorded 
as owing the shortfall582.   
It will be recalled that the evidence from Athens showed that there were circumstances where 
the guarantor might be expected to do something other than merely to pay a sum of money 
(rent, interest, a fine).  In the case of building contracts, I suggested583 that one possibility was 
that the guarantor could be expected to carry out or complete himself, or from his own 
resources, any work the contractor had failed to do.  The evidence from Delos shows that on 
independent Delos this was actually the case.   
The accounts of the hieropoioi for 279BC record that the hieropoioi made payment of the last 
instalment of the contract price to the guarantors for “completing the work in accordance with 
the contract” (toiÍj e)gguhtaiÍj au)tou= .... suntele/sasi to\ eÃrgon kata\ th\n suggrafh\n 
to\ e)pide/katon a)pedw¯kamen draxma\j :135.)584.  Partsch commented that it was likely that 
the payment was made to the guarantors because they were also the contractor’s business 
partners585.  However, it seems more likely that, as Feyel has argued, the contractor’s guarantors 
were receiving the last instalment of the contract price because they had completed the work on 
behalf of the contractor586.   
The accounts of the hieropoioi dating to c280BC also provide evidence of a guarantor actually 
performing the obligations of the contractor.  Antigonos son of Andromenes had stood as 
guarantor for Aristokles who had a contract to carry out building work.  Aristokles seems to 
have defaulted, for we find a record in the accounts of the hieropoioi that they paid Antigonos a 
sum of 133 drachmai for completing outstanding work (e)gguhth=i genome/nwi 
 ¹Aristokle/ouj th=?j o[i¹kodo]m?i¿a[j] [k]aiì pa/nta sunt[ele/s]anti ta\ e)nleifqe/nta tw½
n eÃrgwn to\ sunlogisqe\n tou=? [e)niau]tou= a)p[e/dome]n :133 drs)587.   
Another example of a guarantor performing work under a building contract himself can be seen 
in the accounts of the hieropoioi for 274BC.  The hieropoioi had paid the first and second 
instalments of the contract price to the contractor.  At some point after he had received the 
second instalment but before he completed, the contractor abandoned the works.  Rather than 
                                                
582
 Cat#B26 L30-31; ID 403 LL60-61; Molinier (1914:68); although Hennig (1983:455-456) doubts Durrbach’s 
restorations in the latter inscription.   
583
 pp115-116. 
584
 Cat#B10 A LL80-81. 
585
 Partsch (1909:171). 
586
 Feyel (2006:466), where he also gives the examples of the accounts of 280 and 274BC which I refer to here. 
587
 Cat#B12 LL1-3; Prêtre (2002:79). 
 122
allow the hieropoioi to award the outstanding work to another contractor and, possibly, pay 
penalties to the hieropoioi588, the guarantor completed the work himself (e)gkatalipo/ntoj 
de\ to\ eÃrgo[n h(mitele\j kaiì sunt]ele/santoj tou= e)gguhtou=, kata\ th\n suggrafh\n a)
pe/domen to\ e)pide/katon)589.   
That the guarantors of building contracts were actually expected to perform the contract 
themselves if the contractor did not complete appears from the accounts of the hieropoioi of 
c260BC.  The inscription is very damaged but the hieropoioi appear to be recording that they 
have taken certain action “since neither the contractor nor his guarantors have supplied the 
remaining tiles” ([® ® ® ® ou)]k a)pagago/ntoj ta\j kataloi¿pouj kera[mi¿]daj ou)de\  
tw½n e)gguhtw½n)590.  The fact that the hieropoioi have been careful to record the guarantors not 
having delivered as one of the justifications for their taking action suggests that the guarantors 
were expected not merely to pay a sum of money but to make the supply of tiles that the 
contractor should have made.  Indeed it was in their interests to do so in the light of the 
immediate and direct consequences for the guarantor of the failure of the contractor to perform.   
We have also seen591 that, in Athens, the evidence suggests that, where there was more than one 
guarantor, they were normally all liable for the full amount of their guarantee, although there 
were occasions when a guarantor’s liability might be limited to a particular amount.  On 
independent Delos, however, the usual case seems to have been that where there was more than 
one guarantor, and the obligation was an obligation to pay money, the liability of Delian 
guarantors was apportioned between them.   
In relation to the sacred estates, this apportionment was acknowledged in the passage of the 
i(era\ suggrafh/ cited above592, where it was provided that each of the guarantors who had been 
recorded as debtors was liable according to the share that he had agreed: ei)=nai to\ a)po/teisma 
a(/pan toi=j e)gguhtai=j kata\ to\ e)piba/llom [me/ro]j e(ka/stw[i]593.  This provision is 
reflected in the accounts of the hieropoioi.  For example, it will be recalled that, in 250BC, they 
recorded that part of the estate of Chareteia was re-let at a reduced rent after the tenant had 
failed to renew his guarantors and that the tenant and his guarantors owed the shortfall.  There 
were three guarantors.  The accounts record that two of them were brothers, Hierokles and 
Phrasilas the sons of Ammonios; they jointly owe a half of the amount outstanding and the third 
guarantor, Phanos son of Diodotos, owes a half (pro\j to\ h(/misu Fa=noj, pro\j de\ to\ h(/misu 
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 I¸eroklh=j kaiì Frasi¿laj)594.   
The principle of the apportionment of liability pre-dated the i(era\ suggrafh/, as can be seen 
from the fragment from the accounts of the hieropoioi dated to the last decade of the fourth 
century BC595.  Here one of two guarantors paid one half of the unpaid balance of the rent: 
e/)gguoj w)\n kata\ to\ h(/misu596.  A h(mio/lion was added on only after that half had been paid 
and the tenant and the other guarantor are recorded as owing that amount.  The guarantor who 
had paid had no liability for the h(mio/lion.   
Usually, the liability was shared equally between the guarantors but this was not always the 
case.  Kent argued that it was likely that where the guarantors did not agree to pay a half each, 
the amount that each was to pay was decided privately though it is not known what method was 
used to determine the amounts597.  It is not clear what Kent meant by “privately”.  Certainly the 
hieropoioi would have to be party to any such decision or agreement and the tenant would 
probably have been involved too.  Precisely when or how such a decision or agreement was 
reached is not known.  It could have been agreed at the time when the guarantor was approved – 
at the diegguh/sij; or after the tenant had defaulted and the hieropoioi were looking to the 
guarantors to do something about it, as the following examples show.   
Fragmentary accounts dated to c300BC598 record that the guarantor of the tenant of Panormos 
paid his share of the outstanding rent of 1030 drachmai; the guarantor’s share 
(to\ kaq' au(to\n me/roj) was 340 drachmai, which is approximately one third of the total.  
This could have been agreed at the time of the diegguh/sij.  Similarly, the arrangements 
regarding the apportionment of liability between the guarantors of the tenant of part of the estate 
of Chareteia referred to above – that the two brothers, Hierokles and Phrasilas the sons of 
Ammonios, would be jointly liable for one half of the overall liability whilst the third guarantor, 
Phanos son of Diodotos, would be liable for the other half – may well have been agreed at the 
time when the guarantees were entered into599.   
On the other hand, the accounts of 250BC record that Kallisthenes son of Diakritos, tenant of 
the estate of Skitoneia, paid 435 drachmai, 2 oboloi and 5 chalkoi rent600.  We know from the 
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same accounts that the actual rent due was 483 drachmai601.  There was, therefore a shortfall of 
47 drachmai 3 oboloi and 7 chalkoi.  Of this, his guarantor, Hermon son of Kallisthenes, paid 
29 drachmai - to\ e)piba/llon au)tw=i602 - and his other guarantor, Polyboulos son of 
Parmenion, paid the balance of 18 drachmai 3 oboloi and 7 chalkoi.  Thus Hermon paid 60.93% 
of the shortfall and Polyboulos paid 39.07%.  Even if these figures are rounded to 61% and 39% 
respectively, it seems unlikely that percentages of this kind had been agreed at the time that 
Hermon and Polyboulos agreed to act as guarantors.  A more realistic possibility is that there 
was a negotiation between the hieropoioi and the guarantors (and the tenant) resulting in 
agreement on the amount (rather than a percentage) that each guarantor would pay after it 
became clear that Kallisthenes was unable to pay in full and what the shortfall was.  This 
agreement was recorded in the accounts by the hieropoioi.  Perhaps the originally agreed 
percentages had been 40%/60% and precise amounts were agreed when the actual shortfall was 
known.   
A more complex situation is recorded in the next entry in the accounts of 250BC.  Here 
Timesidemos son of Antikrates, tenant of Charoneia, paid 370 drachmai and 1 obolos in rent.  
The amount of rent actually due was 435 drachmai603.  He had eight guarantors, each of whom 
made a contribution towards the shortfall - kaq' o(\ e)gi/neto e(ka/stwi - as follows604: 
Polyxenos son of Alkimachos 24 drs 2 obs 10 chks 37.8% 
Dionysodoros son of Theotimos 16 drs 4 obs 2 chks 25.75% 
Kleomachos son of Pelagon 7 drs 3 obs 11 chks 11.8% 
Eukleides son of Pyrrhides 7 drs 5 obs 3 chks 12.1% 
Polystratos son of Timothemis 2 drs 4 obs 6 chks 4.25% 
Theokydes 1 dr 3 obs 2 chks 2.3% 
Aristophilos son of Mnesimachos 3 drs 0 obs 4 chks 4.75% 
Timokratos son of Lysanias 0 drs 4 obs 10 chks 1.25% 
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 Cat#B17 LL137-138. 
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 IG XI,2 287A LL26-27; Velissaropoulos-Karakostas (2011:347). 
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 IG XI,2 287A LL27-29. 
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 See Kent (1939:239) and Reger (1994:327). 
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It is hard to believe that such percentages can have been agreed in advance. They must have 
been negotiated at the time the shortfall arose. From what basis each party was negotiating is 
impossible to tell.   
We also find apportionment of liability between the guarantors of the leases of the sacred 
houses605.  For example the accounts of 279BC record that Protoleos paid one half of the rent on 
a sacred house as “guarantor for a half” (tou= e)gguhtou= kata\ to\ hÀmusu)606.  The tenant, 
Apemantos son of Leophon, and the other guarantor (his name may have been Sphongos – the 
reading is uncertain), are recorded as debtors of the god for the other half.  Protoleos had 
fulfilled his obligation as guarantor and was not recorded as a debtor607.   
On the other hand, in the same accounts Teisikles son of Lyses and Antigonos son of 
Kydathalos, the two guarantors of Tolmides the Parian, tenant of a lease on a sacred house, are 
recorded as having paid 60 drachmai rent on his behalf608.  No indication is given of the 
particular contribution that each made towards that amount.  Perhaps each guarantor was only 
responsible for a part and the engraver made an error here in omitting to record the amount each 
guarantor had paid; or perhaps the guarantors had agreed in this case to be jointly responsible 
for the whole of the rent and this is why they were recorded as both having paid it.  In the 
following year, 278BC, the full amount of the rent owed by Tolmides is again recorded as 
having been received from “the guarantors” (para\ tw½n e)gguhtw½n) but this time only 
Teisikles seems to have been named, notwithstanding that “guarantors” is in the plural609.  This 
could, again, have been an engraver’s error610.  On the other hand it could again indicate that the 
guarantors were jointly responsible for the whole of the rent but in this case there had been an 
ad hoc agreement between the two guarantors that Teisikles would pay the full amount and 
perhaps recover a contribution from Antigonos611.   
As was the case with the guarantors of the tenants of the sacred estates, the guarantors of the 
tenants of the sacred houses sometimes shared their liability unequally612.  The accounts for 
257BC record the grant of a lease of [ta\ oi¹kh/mata t]a\ pro\j th=i qala/sshi.  The entry is a 
fragmentary one, but it appears that there were three guarantors.  Their names have not 
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 Molinier (1914:63); Hennig (1983:450). 
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 Cat#B10 A LL22-23; Molinier (1914:63). 
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 Cat#B10 D LL69-72.   
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 Cat#B10 A L24. 
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 Cat#B11 L20. 
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 Ziebarth (1926:102) argued that there was an engraver’s error, suggesting that the engraver had mistakenly 
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was mistakenly omitted. 
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 Once again the similarity with the Athenian system of proeispherontes can be called to mind (see p111). 
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 Molinier (1914:63).  The evidence he cites (IG XI,2 204 LL30 and 31) consists of an entry in the accounts where a 
payment of rent for a sacred house is made “on behalf” of someone.  For the reasons given in the Introduction (pp27-
28), this evidence is not reliable.  Instead I refer to other evidence.   
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survived, but after the patronymic of the third the entry appeared pro\j 25 drachmai, indicating 
that the share of the liability of the third guarantor was for a specified sum, rather than a 
proportion613.  This apportionment of liability between the guarantors must have been agreed at 
the time when the guarantees were provided.   
Apportionment of liability is also found in the case of the guarantors of loans by Apollo to 
individuals.  Bogaert maintained that where there were two guarantors, each guarantor was 
responsible for half the debt614.  However, this was not always the case.  For example, in the 
accounts of the hieropoioi for 250BC, Kallias son of Antipatros, the guarantor of a loan, is 
recorded as having paid interest attributable to him th=j e)ggu/hj to\ e)piba/llon au)tw=i.  The 
amount he paid was 40 drachmai; later in the same accounts the borrower, Mnesimachos son of 
Autokrates, is shown as owing 60 drachmai in interest615.  From this it appears that Kallias was 
responsible for only 40% of the loan616.   
There is also a fragmentary record that suggests that there may have been apportionment of 
liability between guarantors of those who had been awarded franchises for the collection of 
taxes or for the operation of ferries.  In this specific case, the division was into equal shares.  
The accounts of c260BC record that the heirs of Okyneides, one of the guarantors of Epiktetos, 
who had the franchise for the operation of the ship haul on the island, had not paid 25 drachmai.  
The record states that Okyneides had guaranteed half of Epiktetos’ liability ([t]o\? hÀmu?su 
 ¹Wkun[ei¿d]ou e)gguhsame/nou)617.   
Finally, another entry, in the accounts of 279BC618, indicates that liability could also be 
apportioned between the guarantors of building contractors.  In these accounts, the hieropoioi 
record that they had received: 
para\ bouleutw½n tw½n e)p' aÃrxontoj  ¸Uyokle/o<u>j: 175 aÁj e)ce/teise  ¹Ari¿gnwtoj  
 ¹Antipa/trou u(pe\r th=j e)ggu/hj hÂj h)ggu/hto Di¿aiton ¹Apollodw¯rou th=j tou=       
qea/trou perioikodomi¿aj to\ kaq' au(to\n me/roj:  
No indication is given here as to the proportion of the liability that the sum received 
represented.   
Boiotia 
Leases 
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 Cat#B10 A LL40-42. 
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As in Athens, so in Boiotia, where the obligation of the contractor was for the payment of 
money, the guarantor was liable to the community separately from and alongside the debtor.  
So, for example, in the case of the Thespian leases, where the prorrh/sij required the 
prospective tenant to provide an e)/nguoj tw= yeu/deoj, we have seen that if the tenant failed to 
provide guarantors o(/laj ta=j misqw/sioj the land would be re-let, and if there was a shortfall 
in the rent the name of the tenant and his guarantor would be written up on whitened board for 
that amount plus the hemiolion (Cat#C3 LL18-20 and Cat#C6 LL17-19)619.  The guarantor’s 
liability was the same as that of the tenant.  The trigger for the guarantor’s liability was the 
tenant’s failure to provide guarantors o(/laj ta=j misqw/sioj within three days, not the non-
payment of the shortfall in rent.  The guarantor’s name had to go straight on to the whitened 
board for the amounts concerned once they were known.  As was the case with the tribal decree 
from Athens, and, it would appear, the building contract and the loans on Delos620, there was no 
“grace period” to allow the guarantor time to find guarantors for the tenant or to pay the 
shortfall in the rent.  In order to be certain of avoiding having his name written up in this way, 
the guarantor tw= yeu/deoj had to make sure that the tenant provided the guarantors required.  
In this respect, he was effectively the community’s enforcer.  It would not be surprising if, in 
order to avoid the consequences of the tenant failing to provide guarantors as prescribed, a 
guarantor tw= yeu/deoj might himself have become the guarantor o(/laj ta=j misqw/sioj.   
In the case of the main guarantors, the prorrh/sij provided that if the tenant failed to pay the 
rent on time, both the tenant and his guarantor were to be written up on whitened board as 
owing the rent plus the hemiolion.  In addition, the land would be re-let and if, following the re-
letting, the rent under the new lease was less than the rent under the old lease, both the original 
tenant and his guarantor were to be written up on whitened board again, this time for the amount 
of the shortfall plus the hemiolion (Cat#C1 LL12-16; Cat#C2 LL11-15; Cat#C3 LL18-22; 
Cat#C4 LL1-4; and Cat#C6 LL20-24).  Once again, upon failure by the tenant to pay the rent on 
time, the liability of the guarantor is the same as that of the tenant.  The trigger for the 
guarantor’s liability was non-payment of the rent, not a demand from the officials; nor were the 
officials specifically required, as they were on Delos, to attempt to recover the amount due from 
the tenant first.  The main guarantors were therefore in a similar position to the guarantors 
tw= yeu/deoj.  In order to avoid all the consequences of non-payment by the tenant, it was vital 
for the guarantor to ensure that the tenant paid on time.  Further, there is a notable contrast with 
independent Delos here in that on Delos it was only if the guarantors did not pay the rent that 
the land was relet.  At Thespiai it was provided that if the tenant did not pay the land would be 
relet with all the consequences that followed. In such a case, it is possible that the guarantor 
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 p65. 
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 See pp111 and 118-119. 
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might prefer to reach a financial agreement with any new tenant to ensure that the new tenant 
paid the same rent as the original rent in order to avoid the guarantor appearing again on the 
whitened board and incurring another hemiolion on the shortfall.  Alternatively, it is possible 
that the guarantor might even take on the lease himself at the original rent.   
As was the case with some of the Athenian leases, the Thespian prorrh/seij placed other 
obligations upon the tenant apart from the payment of rent.  The question therefore arises 
whether these obligations too were covered by the guarantor.  The obligations fall into two 
categories.  The first category concerns tax or similar payments; the second concerns obligations 
relating to the maintenance of the land.   
As to the first category, two of the prorrh/seij required the tenant to pay an e)pw/nion of one 
drachma to the god (Cat#C1 LL8-9 and, if correctly restored, Cat#C2 LL8-9).  This seems to 
have been a one-off payment payable at the commencement of the lease621.   
Further, two prorrh/seij provided that the tenant was to bear a deka/ta (Cat#C2 L15 and 
Cat#C3 LL13-14).  This was a general, permanent, ten per cent tax known since the fifth 
century BC in Boiotia whose collection fell within the jurisdiction of the treasurers622.   
Finally, four of the prorrh/seij stipulated that if a tax was levied whether by the Boiotian 
koinon or by the city, the tenant was to bear this (Cat#C2 LL15-17; Cat#C4 LL5-6; and Cat#C6 
LL26-27).   
As to the second category of tenants’ other obligations (relating to the maintenance of the land), 
one of the prorrh/seij required the tenant to take care of the existing trees on the land; another 
required the tenant to leave the land uncultivated for a distance of 100 feet from the boundary 
with the sanctuary of Zeus Meilichios (Cat#C4 LL4-5; Cat#C6 LL27-28).  A decree concerning 
the renewal of leases of plots of public land prescribed that tenants who have not irrigated their 
land are not to have their leases renewed (Cat#C7 LL7-9).  This suggests that the relevant 
prorrh/sij included a requirement that tenants irrigate.   
None of the prorrh/seij contains any provision as to what was to happen if the tenant did not 
comply with these obligations, in particular whether the guarantor would become liable and if 
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 Pernin (2014:104 and 139).  Comparable with the e)pw/nia paid in connection with the sale of priesthoods at 
Erythrai in the first half of the third century (IErythrai 60 L3 etc).    
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obligation to pay the deka/ta appears in the place where provisions are made for the payment of federal and city taxes 
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it would be more likely that the word referred to the same thing. 
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so for what.  The absence of such a provision is noticeable when compared with the provisions 
regarding the obligation to pay the rent, although it cannot be ruled out that the relevant 
provisions have simply not survived.   
In the prorrh/seij that required guarantors tw= yeu/deoj, the main guarantors are described as 
guarantors o(/laj ta=j misqw/sioj (see Cat#C3 L15 and Cat#C6 L16).  The question arises 
whether the word misqw/sij meant “the rent” (in which case the guarantors were merely 
guarantors of the rent) or “the lease” (in which case they were guarantors of the whole of the 
tenant’s obligations under the lease).  Cat#C6 LL10-15 (which immediately precede the 
provisions regarding the guarantors tw= yeu/deoj) contain stipulations regarding the payment of 
rent: the whole of the rent will be due from the year of the archon who succeeds Nikon; for the 
year of the archonship of Nikon the tenant will pay half the annual rent; during the twenty year 
period of the lease the tenant will pay the rent each year at least five days before the end of the 
month of Alalkomenios.  In each case the word mi/sqwsij is used to refer to the rent and 
kataba/llein is used to describe the payment of it.  In this context it follows that the meaning 
to be given to guarantors o(/laj ta=j misqw/sioj in the very next line must be guarantors of the 
whole of the rent623.  In my view, this is a good indication that the guarantors did not cover the 
other obligations.   
All the signs are, then, that the liability of the main guarantors under the Thespian leases was 
confined to non-payment of rent and its consequences and did not include obligations regarding 
payment of tax or maintenance of the land.   
It also appears that in the case of the Thespian leases, where there was more than one guarantor, 
the liability of each guarantor may at one stage have been limited, as on Delos, to only a 
proportion of the amount due.  As previously discussed624, it may have been for this reason that 
two of the prorrh/seij placed a limit on the number of guarantors a tenant could provide.  
However, we have also already seen that, in two other prorrh/seij from Thespiai no limit was 
placed upon the number of guarantors625.  These two prorrh/seij were later; they also differ in 
that they included the requirement for guarantors tw= yeu/deoj.  It is possible that these 
prorrh/seij reflect a change in practice introduced at about this time in order to give greater 
protection to the community and that, at the same time, the liability of guarantors under the 
Thespian leases was now for the full amount due, so that where there was more than one 
guarantor, the community could recover the entire debt from one of them and leave that 
guarantor to seek reimbursement from the other guarantor(s).   
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 Cat#C3 LL14-15 and Cat#C6 LL15-16. 
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Building Contracts 
From the terms of one of the building contracts from Lebadeia (IG VII 3073 - Cat#C9 LL1-5), 
we see that the guarantors were liable for a number of different sums for which the contractor 
was liable as a consequence of a default by him under the contract.   
Firstly, the defaulting contractor was required to pay one fifth of something – we know not what 
(tw½n eÃ]rgwn to\ e)pi¿pempton a)potei¿se[i o( e)rgw¯nhj:]).  In his comments on the 
inscription in SIG3 972, Hiller suggested that it was a sum equal to one fifth of the original 
contract price payable as a penalty on termination of the contract following contractor default.  
He also suggested that in the preceding lines, which have not survived, it was provided that the 
contractor had to repay any money he had already received.  Hiller’s view that the sum of one 
fifth was related to the contract price for the works is supported by the fact that in the 
fragmentary text the word e)/rgwn appeared immediately before the one fifth.  Thür, however, 
rejected this theory on the basis that no similar provision is found in the other two building 
contracts which have survived from Lebadeia relating to the same project (IG VII 3074 and De 
Ridder (1896:323-324))626.  Thür suggested that the e)pi¿pempton was payable on the amounts 
which had already been paid in advance to the contractor.  He found a parallel for this in the 
hemiolion payable by defaulting contractors under the other two Lebadeian building contracts, 
which was applied to the additional costs incurred by the temple in consequence of a default.  
He acknowledged that the penalty under IG VII 3073 would be greater than a hemiolion on 
additional costs but explained this on the basis that the contract in IG VII 3073 was not, strictly 
speaking, a building contract but rather a contract for the engraving of stelai, and that a 
hemiolion on additional costs in this different type of contract would not have produced a 
sufficient deterrent to discourage the contractor from defaulting.   
Thür’s theory is certainly arguable, but his distinction between the contract recorded on IG VII 
3073 and the other building contracts may be questioned.  Even in the case of “real” building 
contracts it was possible that a hemiolion on additional costs would not provide a sufficient 
deterrent to discourage a default, if the contract price was small or the default occurred when the 
work was nearing completion.  In the latter case the additional costs suffered by the god could 
be relatively low and consequently the hemiolion would be a small amount too.  At this stage 
the god would primarily have to rely upon the “carrot” (if there was one) of a final payment 
which became due only when the work was completed, to incentivise completion without 
default.  It is therefore worth looking for other possible explanations as to what the e)pi/pempton 
might be.   
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 Thür (1984:498-499). 
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An e)pi/pempton is found in building accounts from Epidauros dating to 290-270BC627.  But 
here it refers to a one fifth deduction from payments made to the contractors, rather than a 
repayment made by the contractors.  Another possibility is that the e)pi¿pempton was a court fee.  
This is the sense in which it is probably used in the Gymnasiarchic Law from Beroia, which 
provided that where the gymnasiarch was found by magistrates (e\)pi\ tw=n kaqhko/ntwn 
a)rxei/wn) to have wrongly imposed a fine, he had to pay the successful complainant an amount 
equal to one and a half times the fine and in addition to\ e)pi/pempton kai\ e)pide/katon.  
These last two items were probably court deposits that the claimant had had to pay to be 
allowed to start or continue the proceedings628.   
Court fees also appear in the convention between Stymphalos and Demetrias of 303-300BC.  
Here, each party to court proceedings conducted pursuant to the convention had to pay one tenth 
(e)pide/katon) of the amount in dispute to the members of the court (sunlu/tai).  At the end of 
the case, the losing party had to reimburse the e)pide/katon paid by his opponent.  Thus the total 
amount payable to the court was an e)pi/pempton of the amount in dispute and the losing party 
had to pay the whole of this in the end629.  Thür and Taeuber suggest that if the defendant did 
not pay his e)pide/katon, the claimant could pay it in order that the claim could proceed.  If he 
won, he could recover all the payments he had made (i.e. an e)pi/pempton) from the 
defendant630.   
That there may have been a practice at Lebadeia to require a court fee receives some support 
from a later inscription from that city dated to 80-51BC in which the heirs of one Platon, an 
agonothetes, file an account on his behalf in which they record that he received to\ e)pide/katon 
di/khj (Cat#C13 C L72).  The editors of Nouveaux Choix comment that this was probably the 
deduction of 10% made by the judge on a fine imposed in a judgment.  However, they do not 
explain what the deduction represented or why it was recorded as a receipt in the accounts of the 
agonothetes631.  A more likely possibility is suggested by Holleaux, who regarded the 
e)pide/katon as a deposit received by the agonethetes from a litigant in a dispute that had been 
submitted to him for his judgment; the litigant having lost the case, the sum deposited remained 
with the agonothetes as judge and has therefore been recorded in his account as a receipt632.  
This evidence must, however, be treated with caution, since it is of a relatively late date. 
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If the e)pi/pempton in the Lebadeia building contract was a court deposit, one has to ask in what 
circumstances it became payable by the contractor to the naopoioi.  One possibility is that it 
became payable if the contractor had unsuccessfully resisted proceedings brought by the 
naopoioi to recover a fine imposed by one of their number.  There is a parallel for this type of 
procedure from classical Athens633.  Another possibility is that it was payable by a contractor 
who wished to challenge a fine before a court consisting of or presided over by the naopoioi.   
In my view the e)pi/pempton could well have been a court fee.  Nevertheless, the possibility that 
it represented some kind of penalty payable on termination of the contract for contractor default 
cannot be ruled out.   
The second amount the defaulting contractor had to pay according to the Lebadeian building 
contract was the u(pereu/rema.  This was the additional cost incurred by the god where, 
following a contractor’s default, the naopoioi put out to tender work that the contractor has 
failed to do.  A provision to this effect is also found in one of the other Lebadeian building 
contracts (Cat#C11 LL1-7).  There is no reference to guarantors in these lines.  However, the 
contract is only incompletely preserved and may have contained lines similar to Cat#C9 LL1-5, 
making the guarantors liable for the u(pereu/rema.   
The third amount the contractor was required to pay in Cat#C9 LL1-5 was the amount of any 
fines for which the contractor had become liable.  The naopoioi and the boiotarchs were given 
very wide powers under the contract to impose fines for non-compliance with its terms634.  The 
contractor was required to complete the work in ten days working continuously with sufficient 
men, certainly not less than five (Cat#C9 LL12-15).  If the contractor did not comply with the 
contract or was found guilty of bad workmanship, the naopoioi could impose such fine as 
appeared to them appropriate (LL15-19).  Another part of the inscription, which set out the 
technical requirements for the preparation and laying of the paving of the peristasis of the 
temple, (Cat#C10 LL154-159) included provision for the contractor to be fined by the naopoioi 
and the boiotarchs if he failed to use the correct oil.  Further on in the same section (LL170-
176), we find provisions to the effect that certain parts of the work are not to be set permanently 
unless they have first been approved by the naopoioi.  If the contractor fails to comply he must 
do the work again (even if it has been done correctly, it seems) and the naopoioi and the 
Boiotarchs are given the power to fine him such amount as may seem to them to be appropriate.   
In the case of all three sums, it appears from the text (Cat#C9 LL1-5) that both the guarantors 
and the contractor were liable to pay the amounts payable upon default by the contractor.  As 
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Partsch noted, the guarantors undertook to pay if the contractor did not pay635.  Here again we 
find that the guarantor was liable separately from and alongside the contractor.   
The terms of another of the Lebadeian building contracts (Cat#C12 LL40-43) probably adopted 
the same approach in relation to fines.  Although the text is restored here, it seems clear that it 
provided that the guarantor’s liability arose as soon as the contractor incurred the fines.  As in 
the case of the Thespian leases, there is no grace period allowed to the guarantor whereby he 
becomes liable only if the guarantor does not pay within a stipulated period of a demand from 
the naopoioi.  Some guarantors may have felt that it was necessary for them to monitor the work 
to make sure that the contractor was complying with these obligations and to avoid the 
imposition of fines but whilst it would have been relatively easy to determine, for example, that 
the contractor had the required number of men working on the job, it would have been far more 
difficult to ensure that there was no bad workmanship, unless perhaps the guarantor was a 
skilled craftsman himself.   
The building contract in Cat#C9 also provided that the guarantors would be liable if the 
contractor damaged a stone whilst carrying out the work and failed to replace or repair it within 
the time required by the naopoioi or stipulated in the contract.  If this happened, the naopoioi 
could get the repair or replacement done by another contractor and recover the additional cost 
plus the hemiolion from the contractor and his guarantors – see LL29-40636.   
Here, the guarantor’s liability is triggered by the contractor’s failure to replace or repair the 
damage to the stone within the required time limit.  The contract does not give the guarantor any 
time to remedy the problem himself.  Again, there is a similarity here with the leases.  There 
was a powerful incentive for the guarantor to take action himself before the time limit expired, 
or at the very least to keep an eye on what the contractor was doing, in other words to act as the 
de facto enforcer of the contract.   
The Lebadeian building contracts also provide us with information about the duration of the 
liability of guarantors.  The contract in Cat#C9 (LL24-29) provided that oi( e)c a)rxh=j e)/gguoi 
would not be released until a replacement contractor had provided his own guarantors and that 
in regard to work already done they would remain liable until final approval637.  There is no 
parallel example of these types of provision in either Athens or Delos.  The lines permit 
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 A similar provision appears in Cat#C12 LL43-47.  Partsch noted that here the guarantors are mentioned before the 
contractor whose obligations they were guaranteeing.  He observed that this was an indication that the liability of the 
guarantor was independent of and separate from the liability of the contractor (Partsch (1909:32 and 313)).   
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different interpretations.  The contract terms contained in this part of the inscription (LL1-89) 
related to the completion of the erection and engraving of stelai on which would be recorded the 
contracts for the construction of the temple.  This work had been started under another, earlier 
contract but work had been interrupted by war or by shortage of funds638.  Against this 
background it can be argued that oi( e)c a)rxh=j eÃgguoi must refer to the guarantors under the 
earlier contract, before the interruption639.  On the other hand, these lines could also be 
interpreted as referring to what would happen if the present contract is terminated.  On this 
interpretation oi( e)c a)rxh=j eÃgguoi would be referring to the guarantors to be appointed under 
the present contract640.   
In favour of the first interpretation it can be said that if the lines had been dealing with the 
consequences of termination of the present contract, they would have appeared immediately 
after the provisions regarding the liability of the guarantors in LL1-5 discussed above.  Instead 
there are a number of intervening lines dealing with the prices for the work to be done, the 
period for execution of this work, the resources and the skills required.   
On the other hand, the content of LL24-29 seems to be more consistent with the view that 
oi( e)c a)rxh=j eÃgguoi are the guarantors to be appointed under the present contract.  There are 
two requirements in LL24-29: firstly that the original guarantors are not to be released until the 
replacement contractor has been appointed and has provided his own guarantors and, secondly, 
in relation to the work already carried out, that they are not to be released until the final 
approval of the whole of the work.   
The purpose of the second of these requirements is clear.  It is to cover the possibility that there 
might be errors in the work completed by the original contractor before he was replaced.  The 
guarantors were to remain responsible for any such errors, which will not be the responsibility 
of the replacement contractor or of his guarantors.  This would be consistent with either of the 
two interpretations set out above.   
The purpose of the first of the requirements is less easy to understand.  Why would it be 
necessary for the guarantors of the first contractor to remain liable until they had been replaced 
by guarantors of the new contractor?  It cannot have been in case defects should appear in the 
work already completed; this was covered by the second requirement already discussed.  If the 
contractor’s obligations in regard to quality of the work were not intended to be covered in this 
clause, then the only other obligations must have been obligations regarding the time for 
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carrying out the work and the resources to be applied.  As we have seen641, the present contract 
(Cat#C9 at LL12-19) contains such obligations: to complete the work within ten days working 
continuously with no less than five suitably skilled operatives.  In the event of non-compliance, 
the naopoioi had power to punish the contractor.   
It must have been these obligations for which the guarantors remained liable until the new 
contractor had been appointed and provided his guarantors.  The earlier contract probably 
contained provisions regarding delays similar to those in the present contract, but it would make 
no sense for the guarantors under the earlier contract to continue to be liable for delays arising 
from it: the work under that contract had been suspended because of war or financial difficulties 
encountered by the temple.  If, on the other hand, the present contract had been terminated as a 
result of the contractor’s default, there would be a delay while a new contractor was appointed 
and new guarantors provided.  Any such delay could result in the sanctuary incurring further 
cost.  Such cost could, for example, be incurred because other contractors were held up until the 
new contractor had been brought in.  The fact that the Lebadeian building contracts contained 
provisions empowering the naopoioi to decide disputes arising between different contractors on 
the same site (Cat#C9 LL41-44; Cat#C12 LL35-37) indicates that their work was closely 
interrelated and that problems with the work of one contractor could impact upon the work of 
another.  Where each contractor was blaming the other for delay, the decision of the naopoioi 
could have resulted in a fine for the contractor found to be at fault and consequently in a liability 
for his guarantor as well.  The naopoioi would therefore wish the defaulting contractor’s 
guarantors to continue to be liable until the replacement contractor was appointed and his 
guarantors were in place642.  It is only in the context of the present contract that the first of the 
requirements in LL24-29 can be explained.  oi( e)c a)rxh=j e)/gguoi must therefore be the 
guarantors of the present contract, not the earlier one.   
It is to be noted that this was a potentially very open ended commitment for the guarantors.  The 
new contractor’s guarantors had to be a)cio/xreoi.  If they were not acceptable to the naopoioi, 
or if the new contractor did not provide guarantors at all, the tender process would have to start 
yet again.  Thus, there could be yet further delay, and the guarantors of the original defaulting 
contractor could be liable for this, even though the immediate cause of that delay was a default 
by the new contractor, not the default of the old contractor, whose liabilities the guarantors were 
covering.   
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 Thür (1984:499) argued that this provision marked the latest date by which the guarantor had to have paid the 
additional costs of the replacement contract to the naopoioi.  This may be correct but these lines are in my view also 
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be released from their liability to pay. The timing of the release of the guarantors referred to in these lines must 
therefore also have been about the period of continuing non-performance of the contractor for which the guarantor 
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Common underlying legal principles and practices - what did the guarantee cover? 
My review of the evidence in this chapter suggests that it may have been a principle, at least 
where the obligation guaranteed was a payment, that the guarantor was under a separate, direct 
obligation to the community to make the payment if the contractor did not pay; this obligation 
arose from the instant that the contractor should have paid but failed to do so; no prior demand 
upon the guarantor was required nor was any grace period allowed before the guarantor became 
liable.  The immediacy of the guarantor’s obligation probably acted as a considerable incentive 
for the guarantor to make sure the contractor performed and effectively made the guarantor an 
“enforcer” of the contract.  In the case of the sacred estates on independent Delos, however, we 
see this principle considerably watered down by the provisions of the i(era\ suggrafh\ which 
stipulated the order in which the hieropoioi were to take the various steps available to them to 
collect the unpaid rent.  This seems to have been part of a different approach overall to the 
question of enforcement of amounts owed by the tenants of the sacred estates on independent 
Delos, which will be discussed in chapter 4643.   
The expectation that a guarantor of a building contract could be required to carry out and 
complete work that the contractor had failed to do himself could perhaps be regarded as an 
extension to building contracts of the principle of the direct and separate obligation of the 
guarantor owed to the community.  We have good evidence of this from independent Delos and 
some from Athens.  Unfortunately, however, we have no evidence from Boiotia on this aspect 
of the role of guarantors.   
But there were also some important differences between the laws and practices of the different 
jurisdictions in regard to the coverage provided by the guarantee.  Whereas at Athens it may 
occasionally have been the case that, where there was more than one guarantor, each guarantor 
may have been liable only for a part of the overall liability, on independent Delos, it seems to 
have been the rule that the liability of each guarantor was limited.  Normally this would be one 
half where there were two guarantors.  But the shares were not always equal.  A guarantor might 
agree at the time when he gave his guarantee that his liability would be limited to a particular 
amount or a particular proportion.  Alternatively, the guarantor might be able to negotiate with 
the hieropoioi and his fellow guarantors after the default had occurred that his liability would be 
for a specific amount.  At Thespiai, there may have been a rule that, where there was more than 
one guarantor, each was responsible for only a part of the debt, but this may have changed 
during the course of the last quarter of the third century BC.  The sharing of liability between 
guarantors on Delos and, if it happened there, at Thespiai, may be an indication of a shortage of 
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people who were prepared to put themselves forward as guarantors; this may have made it 
important to offer some kind of encouragement (or less discouragement) by providing for limits 
on the liability of those who put themselves forward.   
Further, guarantees may not necessarily have covered all the obligations under the contract 
guaranteed.  At Athens, the Peiraieus general conditions of leasing may have required a 
guarantor only for the rent.  On independent Delos, the guarantors of the leases of the sacred 
houses may not have been required to cover any shortfall in the rent following cancellation of 
the lease and the re-letting of the house as a result of non-payment of the rent or failure to renew 
guarantors.  At Thespiai the guarantees of the leases of sacred and public lands covered payment 
of the rent and any shortfall in the rent under a new lease following cancellation of the original 
lease for tenant default but may not have included violations by the tenant of any other 
obligations under the lease.  One can only speculate as to the reasons for the apparent 
limitations on the scope of the guarantees.  Difficulty in obtaining guarantors may again have 
been the reason.  But there may have been others: for example, on independent Delos, it may be 
that the possibility of a shortfall in the rent on a re-letting of the sacred houses was so rare that it 
was not thought worth guaranteeing; this is borne out by the fact that very few examples of such 
a shortfall have survived in the very extensive Delian accounts.  At Thespiai, it may be that the 
likelihood that the lease would not be renewed at the end of its term (as is provided in Cat#C7 
LL7-9) was considered to provide sufficient an incentive to ensure that tenants complied with 
their non-financial obligations.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
How were the guarantees enforced? 
In chapter 3 we saw that in many cases the obligations of the guarantor arose immediately the 
contractor defaulted; no demands had to be made on the guarantor or the contractor and no 
grace periods were allowed.  In the present chapter, I will consider the incentives placed by the 
community upon the guarantor to honour these obligations, in other words how his guarantee 
was enforced against him.  My discussion will focus on three main issues: who was responsible 
for enforcing the guarantee, what powers those individuals were given to enable them to enforce 
it, and how enforcement actually took place in practice.  Once again I will review the evidence 
from each of my three chosen jurisdictions and then examine whether there were any underlying 
similarities or differences of principle or approach in relation to these issues.   
Athens 
As previously, it is most convenient to review the evidence for Athens by type of transaction.   
In relation to tax farming concessions and sales of property, the author of the Ath. Pol. describes 
how the transactions were recorded on whitened boards which were kept in the Council house 
by the public slave (demosios) who handed them over to the apodektai whenever a payment was 
made.  The apodektai would delete the sums paid in the presence of the Council.  The author 
then tells us (48.1 – Cat#A3) that if anyone failed to pay an amount due he would have his name 
written down (e)gge/graptai) and would then be obliged to pay double or be imprisoned644.  
The author adds that the Council had power to exact these sums and to imprison the debtor, 
although we know that the actual exacting of the debt and the penalty was the function of the 
praktores645.  As already discussed, the guarantor was liable to the state independently from the 
contractor.  The power of the Council to exact the sums due and to arrest must therefore have 
applied equally to the guarantor as it did to the contractor646.  No court judgment was required.  
This is confirmed by the Bouleutic Oath (as paraphrased by the speaker in Demosthenes 24.144 
(353BC) - Cat#A4) which states that guarantors who had guaranteed the obligations of tax 
farmers but did not pay could be arrested and imprisoned by the Council without trial, and by 
Demosthenes 53.27 (Cat#A7) where the speaker says that the law required that those who had 
given a guarantee to the state but did not pay were to have their property confiscated.   
It seems clear therefore that the Council, the apodektai and the praktores were all under 
obligations which, if fulfilled, should have meant that if the guarantor had the assets, the amount 
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owed and the penalty would have been recovered for the state, by confiscation and sale of the 
guarantor’s property (a)pografh/) if necessary.   
We have evidence of actual enforcement against a guarantor of debts owed to the state.  This is 
the record of the sale by the poletai in c342/341 BC of a sunoiki/a owned by Meixidemos of 
Myrrhinous, a guarantor who had guaranteed the debts of three men who had failed to pay sums 
due to the state under four tax collection agreements and an agreement relating to a quarry in 
Peiraieus (Cat#A30 LL463-498).  After Meixidemos had failed to pay under the guarantees, he 
had been registered on the Akropolis for his default (e)kgeg[gramme/no e)]n a)kropo/lei)647.  
The property was denounced (a)pe/grayen) by another Athenian citizen, Euthykles son of 
Euthymenides of Myrrhinous, and bought by Telemachos son of Theangelos of Acharnai.  
Interestingly the record does not say whether Euthykles was a pra/ktwr or a member of the 
Council or other official, such as a demarch648.  However, this seems unlikely.  As Osborne has 
pointed out, Euthykles was the owner of property next door to Meixidemos’ and a fellow 
demesman of his; the amount for which the property was sold was exactly equal to the amount 
of Meixidemos’ debt.  Osborne therefore justifiably suspected collusion between Euthykles and 
Meixidemos with the aim of relieving Meixidemos of his debt649.  How often the officials relied 
upon the efforts of volunteers in enforcing guarantees in this way is not known.   
The threat of enforcement by the officials or others provided a powerful incentive upon 
guarantors to honour their obligations.  In addition, as already mentioned650, the fact that if a 
guarantor did not pay what he owed to the state he became a)/timoj (Andokides 1.73 - Cat#A2) 
would have operated as a further incentive upon those guarantors who were citizens651.  As 
Hansen remarked, it was not easy for an a)/timoj to live at Athens, especially if he had 
enemies652.   
Turning now to guarantors of the leases of sacred land, we know from Demosthenes 43.58 
(Cat#A6) and 58.14 (Cat#A8) that a person was also a)/timoj if he was indebted to Athena or to 
one of the other gods.  This would no doubt have included guarantors who were so indebted.  As 
to penalties and who was responsible for taking steps against guarantors to recover the amounts 
owed, the question to be considered is whether the author of the Ath. Pol. in the passage cited at 
the beginning of this chapter was referring to the recovery of debts owed to the city’s gods and 
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goddesses as well as debts owed to the state.  There are good reasons for thinking that this was 
the case.  Firstly, as Rhodes has shown653, the Council was concerned with and interested in the 
finances of the sanctuaries and possessions of the city’s gods and goddesses.  This interest is 
reflected for example in the Ath. Pol., which records that the basileus introduced the leases of 
sacred lands to the Council654, and in the decree of 418/417BC relating to the leasing of the 
sanctuaries of Kodros, Neleus and Basile, which specifically required that the rent be paid to the 
apodektai (Cat#A10 L15-18).  Secondly, just before the passage dealing with payments cited at 
the beginning of this Chapter, the author of the Ath. Pol. noted that the basileus recorded the 
leases of sacred lands on whitened boards655.  There is no reason to suppose that these records 
were not included among the records which were kept by the public slave (demosios) and 
handed to the apodektai when a payment was made.  Thus if a payment was missed, the 
consequences would be the same as for public debtors.  It would follow that if a tenant of sacred 
land failed to pay his rent on time he would be obliged to pay double or be imprisoned, and the 
Council would have the power to exact the unpaid sums and imprison the defaulting tenant.  
And the same would apply to his guarantors.   
In Demosthenes 24 the speaker says that where monies owed to the gods were not paid, the 
amount due was increased tenfold656.  This seems to conflict with the evidence of the Ath. Pol. 
referred to above, that the debt was only doubled.  However, in my view Papazarkadas rightly 
argues657 that Demosthenes was being deliberately disingenuous here.  His main purpose was to 
strengthen his argument that Timokrates’ law would abolish the tenfold penalty and deprive the 
city of much needed funds; but it is not at all clear that his law would have this effect even if it 
did apply to debts owed to the city’s gods and goddesses.   
Although the actual collection of public debts was by the praktores, there is no evidence of 
praktores being involved in the recovery of sums owed to the city’s gods and goddesses.  Other 
officials may have had this responsibility.  We know that the archon basileus and the tamiai of 
Athena and the other gods kept lists of debtors658.  But whether they were directly involved in 
the collection of rent, and if so what powers they had, is not known.   
As to guarantors who were indebted to one of the civic subdivisions, the decree of the deme of 
Plotheia (Cat#A12 LL17-18) concerning the loan of the deme’s money spoke of the deme 
officials (to\j a)/rxontaj) kata\ to\ yh/fisma danei/zonta[j ka]i\ e)spra/ttontaj.  Partsch 
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interpreted e)spra/ttontaj to mean that the deme officials had a right conferred upon them by 
the decree to levy execution against defaulting borrowers by seizing their possessions without 
judgment659.  Where the borrower had provided guarantors, execution could no doubt have been 
levied against defaulting guarantors as well.  However, whether the officials had such a power 
may have depended upon what the yh/fisma referred to here provided.  The reference to 
a)/rxontaj in this inscription is not to a specific board of officials but to all the deme’s officials 
who discharge financial duties660.  This would have included the demarch, who generally did 
have the power to seize the possessions of those who were indebted to the deme661.  But it 
would also have included the tamiai and others, who may not have had such power.   
More informative is the decree of an Athenian tribe concerning the grant of leases of tribe lands 
(Cat#A16 LL10-15) which, it will be recalled662, expressly provided for the property of the 
guarantor to be seized by the tamias and epimeletai of the tribe if the rent was not paid.  Partsch 
correctly interpreted this as a contractual submission by the debtor to compulsory enforcement 
through a private seizure that would otherwise have followed a judgment in legal 
proceedings663.  Here the tribe’s officials could distrain upon the guarantor’s property without 
going through the a)pografh/ procedure of the type recorded by the poletai in the case of 
Meixidemos mentioned above.   
Further, since in the tribal decree the rent was owed to the eponymous hero of the tribe, the 
debtor would, on the basis of Dem. 43.58 (Cat#A6) and 58.14 (Cat#A8), be a/)timoj until such 
time as he paid.  This would have provided an added incentive for guarantors to honour their 
commitments.   
We have no record of tribal officials actually exacting payment from guarantors.  However, it is 
interesting to note that in the poletai records concerning the confiscation and sale of the 
property of Nikodemos, who had embezzled tribal money, the epimeletai of the tribe played an 
active part in seeking to recover sums owed to the tribe from the proceeds of sale before the 
balance was paid to the state664.   
Guarantors of debts owed by trierarchs need to be considered separately.  Hansen showed that 
debts owed by the trierarchs did not entail a)timi/a665.  The same may well have applied to the 
guarantors of trierarchs.  Further, a defaulting trierarch could not automatically be imprisoned 
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nor could his name be inscribed as a public debtor.  The powers of the epimeletai of the 
dockyards in relation to the recovery of debts owed by trierarchs for naval equipment seem to 
have been quite limited.  Although the epimeletai would record in their accounts the value of 
naval equipment that trierarchs had failed to return, responsibility for the recovery of the 
equipment (or its value) was placed on the succeeding trierarch and in the event of a dispute 
between the two trierarchs the epimeletai would bring the case before the jury court666.   
How this might affect a guarantor can be seen in the accounts of the epimeletai of the dockyards 
for 334/333BC (Cat#A20 LL60-71).  These recorded that Philomelos son of Menekles of 
Cholargos had stood as guarantor for the outstanding debt owed by Eupolis for naval equipment 
and that Philomelos had been brought into court and owed double.  We do not know who had 
prompted the epimeletai to bring Philomelos to court (perhaps it was Eupolis’ successor as 
trierarch) or why.  It is possible that there was a dispute over the guarantee (for example that he 
had not given it or that he had already paid it or that it had not yet become due or that it was for 
a different amount), and that the court found against Philomelos and ordered him to pay double.  
In this respect it may be that Philomelos was in no different position from that of a guarantor of 
other state debts: if he disputed the guarantee he could challenge the enforcement steps taken 
against him.  However, another possibility is that Philomelos did owe the money under the 
guarantee but was being deliberately evasive or defiant and could not be compelled to pay 
double unless a court ordered him to do so.  In other words, it is possible that the rule that state 
debtors automatically became obliged to pay double did not normally apply to debts owed by 
trierarchs or their guarantors.  This would be consistent with the milder debt recovery regime 
which appears to have applied to trierarchs, from which their guarantors would also have 
benefitted.   
Gabrielsen saw this more relaxed approach as the result of the state trying to solve the practical 
and serious problem of striking the appropriate balance between recovering sums incurred many 
years before on the repair and replacement of equipment on the one hand, whilst at the same 
time not alienating wealthy (and therefore possibly influential) individuals upon whom the state 
depended for the equipping of the fleet on the other667.   
Turning now to building contracts, we are primarily concerned with enforcement against 
guarantors of the payment of fines which had been imposed upon defaulting contractors by 
officials.  Our main source for this is the law of Athens of 337/336 BC relating to the rebuilding 
of the walls and harbour moles (Cat#A14).  Unfortunately, the fragmentary nature of the 
inscription means that some of the details are controversial and we will need to discuss the 
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controversies before attempting to draw conclusions about the duties, powers and practices of 
officials regarding the recovery of fines.   
The following points can be derived from the inscription with a reasonable degree of certainty: 
1. two epistatai or epimeletai668 were to be chosen by a vote of the people from among all 
Athenian citizens to supervise the works (LL27-29);   
2. responsibilities in regard to the building work were also placed upon the teichopoioi 
(ten in number, one chosen from each tribe) and the tamiai (financial administrators) 
(L33)669;   
3. contractors who failed to complete their works were liable for penalties (timwri/ai - 
LL31-32);   
4. the epistatai were to be given presidency of the court (LL30-31); and   
5. contractors and their guarantors who failed to comply with the contract were to be 
brought before the court (LL34-35)670.   
However, the following points are controversial: 
(a) who imposed the penalties on the contractor; 
(b) whether the teichopoioi as well as the epistatai were to be given presidency of the court; 
and 
(c) who brought the offending contractors and their guarantors into court.   
As to (a), the text (LL32-34) speaks of the epistatai doing something meta\ tw=n teixopoiw=n 
kai\ tw=n tamiw=n.  According to the restorations included by the editor of IG II3, the epistatai 
with the teichopoioi and the treasurers for the wall rebuilding project were to supervise the work 
to see that it was brought to completion.  According to the restorations proposed by Thür, the 
law here provided that the penalties for delay mentioned earlier were to be imposed by the 
epistatai with agreement of the teichopoioi and the treasurers for the wall rebuilding project 
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until the contractors had completed their work671.  Gauthier believed that the inclusion of the 
treasurers among those imposing penalties on the contractor was problematic672.  However, 
these tamiai were specially chosen for this project673 and they were to act meta\ the epistatai, i.e. 
they were not directly imposing penalties themselves; perhaps they were mentioned here 
because they would need to keep a record of the penalty.  As Thür pointed out674, such 
restorations as the editor of IG II3 offers to these lines are rather weak in that they merely repeat 
in part the obligation on the epistatai to supervise the work from LL28-29.  Thür’s restorations 
are in my view to be preferred.   
As to (b), the editor of IG II3 and Thür restore the teichopoioi in L30 so that they, as well as the 
epistatai, receive the presidency of the court.  The restoration is based upon Aischines 3.14 and 
3.27-29 (Cat#A1), where Aischines argues that Demosthenes, as a member of the board of the 
teichopoioi on this very project, sat as president of the court675.  Maier doubted whether the 
teichopoioi assumed the presidency, emphasising that the nature of the office of teichopoios was 
essentially honorary676.  Scafuro contended that the teichopoioi definitely did not assume the 
presidency, arguing convincingly that the passages in Aischines’ speech cannot be relied upon.  
She contended that the role of the teichopoioi was more like that of the naopoioi and trieropoioi 
and had more to do with financing the work than its actual construction677.  In my view Scafuro 
is probably right.  We cannot assume that the teichopoioi sat as presidents of the court.   
As to (c), Maier678 interpreted the text (LL32-35 in IG II3) to mean that the building commission 
(i.e. the epistatai with the teichopoioi and the tamiai) would bring the contractor and his 
guarantors before the court, where the epistatai themselves (and possibly the teichopoioi) 
assumed the presidency at the hearing and could pronounce the threatened penalty.  As Scafuro 
points out, however, tamiai are not known to have acted as prosecutors679.  Thür’s restorations680 
provided that only the epistatai were to bring the case before the court.  Thür found attractive 
the assumption that in such a case the epistatai would turn to one of the techopoioi as president 
of the court.  Scafuro, however, having ruled out the possibility that the teichopoioi might 
preside over the court, proposed a restoration of L34 (exempli gratia) to the effect that the 
teichopoioi brought the disobedient contractors and their guarantors into a court presided over 
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by the epistatai681.  Yet, as Thür rightly says, since the epistatai had imposed the fines, one 
would expect the epistatai to bring the proceedings682.  One view not argued by scholars is that 
one epistates brought the contractor and his guarantors into a court presided over by the other 
epistates.  There are parallels for this type of process in Athens, where an official referred a 
penalty imposed by him to a court sitting under his own presidency683.  This solution would 
require that Thür’s restoration to L34 be adopted.  However, there are such large gaps in the text 
here that the answer to the question of which official actually brought the contractor and his 
guarantors into court must remain uncertain.   
For the purposes of my discussion of the enforcement of guarantees under building contracts, I 
draw the following conclusions from the law of 337/336BC: that the epistatai, with the 
teichopoioi and the tamiai, had the power and were under a duty to impose penalties upon the 
contractor if he did not complete the work; if the contractor, or his guarantors, did not pay these 
penalties, either the epistatai or the teichopoioi (it is not clear which) had the power and were 
under a duty to bring the contractor and his guarantors into a court presided over by the 
epistatai.   
As presidents of the court, the epistatai would have been in a position to influence the 
proceedings.  It is true that it was the jury that gave the verdict both on liability for the penalty 
and on its amount684 and, as Todd points out, the president of the court had no right of jury 
direction, no right to rule evidence as inadmissible or to exclude certain lines of argument and 
no power of summing up685.  However, the speeches in Lysias 14 and 15 show that it was not 
necessarily forbidden for those presiding over the trial (especially if it was a body that had a 
particular interest in the case686) to “descend into the arena” and argue for or against a particular 
result.  In Lysias 15, the speaker argues that this would not be appropriate687, but the fact that he 
felt it necessary to say so suggests that there was no law or rule of procedure prohibiting it.   
It is interesting to compare the law relating to the rebuilding of the walls and harbour moles 
with the contract for work to the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos, which dates to about the same 
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period (Cat#A43 LL19-21).  This provided that if the contractor failed to complete the work 
within the stipulated time, he was to pay a fine of ten drachmai per day until the work was 
completed.  It will be recalled that the contract then required the naopoioi to enforce 
(ei)spratto/ntwn) payment of this fine against the contractor and his guarantors and do other 
things “in accordance with what was written in the suggrafh/ for other contractors and 
guarantors of works”.  Rubinstein has observed that cross references to existing legislation or 
established procedures are an indication that a praxis clause such as this permitted the officials 
in question to take action against the debtor on their own initiative688.  As has already been 
seen689, the suggrafh/ referred to here may well have been a general suggrafh/ relating to the 
execution of works to sanctuaries administered by the amphiktyons of Delos.  It is possible that 
this empowered the naopoioi to enforce these fines directly against the contractor and his 
guarantors.  If so, their powers may have been similar to those of the epistatai under the 
Athenian law.  The surviving fragments of the accounts of the naopoioi do mention a court and 
the imposition of penalties on contractors690 but we do not know what court was being referred 
to or why it was involved.  It should not be forgotten that enforcement against the guarantors in 
this contract at least four of whom were Athenian citizens, would almost certainly have taken 
place in Athens.   
In relation to enforcement against a guarantor of a fine imposed by officials under a building 
contract and indeed in relation to enforcement against guarantors of all types of transactions, it 
has to be remembered that all the officials mentioned so far in this chapter (including the tamias 
and epimeletai of a tribe and demarchs and other deme officials) were required to render 
accounts at the end of their periods in office.  Even after the accounts had been rendered anyone 
could make a complaint to the euthynoi about the conduct of the officials691.  If sums which 
should have been collected had not been collected without good reason, this could be construed 
as evidence of bribery and questions could be asked.  Further, according to Aischines, the 
possessions of an official were subject to confiscation by the state until he had rendered his 
accounts (Aisch. 3.21: e)nexura/zei ta\j ou)si/aj o( nomoqe/thj ta\j tw=n u(peuqu/nwn, e(/wj 
a)\n lo/gon a)podw=si  tv= po/lei).  Thus not only was the official under an incentive to collect 
sums due from guarantors but his personal possessions were at risk if he failed to do so.  
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Awareness of these facts would in turn have served as a reminder to guarantors that they were 
unlikely to be let off their obligations.   
To sum up, the Athenian evidence regarding enforcement is rather patchy.  But where we do 
have evidence, with the notable exception of guarantors of trierarchs, it appears that the 
enforcement regime, particularly for the payment of sums due under tax collection franchises 
and of rent on the sacred lands, was a tough one, with severe penalties imposed and mechanisms 
available to enable rapid enforcement backed up by incentives on the officials to implement 
them.  In the case of sums owed by contractors under building contracts, it appears that in some 
cases a court judgment may have been required before further enforcement action could be 
taken; but even in these cases the procedure favoured speedy recovery by the state.  In chapter 3 
I suggested that the responsibilities placed upon guarantors were such as to encourage them to 
be the enforcers of the obligations they were guaranteeing in the sense that they were required to 
see to it that these obligations were performed.  The enforcement measures which I have 
reviewed in the present chapter will have provided added encouragement to guarantors to fulfil 
this role.   
Independent Delos 
Notwithstanding the extensive records that have survived from independent Delos, the only 
transactions for which we have detailed knowledge of how guarantees were enforced are the 
leases of sacred estates.  We have some information about enforcement against guarantors of 
fines levied under building contracts but hardly any information about how guarantees of other 
types of transaction were enforced (leases of sacred houses, loans and tax collection and ferry 
operation franchises).  I will therefore start this section with an examination of enforcement of 
guarantees of the leases of sacred estates and then review the evidence regarding enforcement of 
fines under building contracts.  I will then proceed to discuss an issue which affects 
enforcement of guarantees of all types of transaction, namely what was the legal effect on 
independent Delos of the hieropoioi including a person’s name in a list of debtors.  Finally I 
will consider the approach of the hieropoioi to enforcement of guarantees for all types of 
transaction in practice.   
The sacred estates 
We have a glimpse of the steps that the hieropoioi could take to recover unpaid rent from the 
tenants of Apollo’s estates and their guarantors in the period prior to the i(era\ suggrafh\ 
coming into force.  One account records that tenants (who were named) and their guarantors 
(who were probably not named) owe monies to the god and that they have been “registered in 
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accordance with the suggrafh/”692.  As already mentioned693, Tréheux thought that this could 
well have been a suggrafh/ promulgated by the Athenian amphiktyons, to which the 
hieropoioi were working prior to the enactment of the i(era\ suggrafh/.  Whatever the origins 
of this suggrafh/ may have been, however, it must have contained provisions regarding the 
recovery of unpaid rent.   
An indication of what these provisions may have said is provided by other accounts dating to 
this period.  One of them records that the hieropoioi collected (e)pra/camen) 140 drachmai of 
the rent for the estate of Soloe by seizing barley (presumably barley grown on the estate by the 
tenant) but that 190 drachmai and the h(mio/lion were owed by the tenant and his guarantors.  
One of the guarantors, Sattos son of Timon, is named694.  The same account records that after 
Archandros, the tenant of the estate of Hippodromos, had failed to pay the rent, the hieropoioi 
collected (e)pra/camen again) 300 drachmai by seizing barley and 150 drachmai by selling two 
oxen (again, presumably the tenant’s oxen kept on the estate).  One of the guarantors, Protoleos, 
paid half the balance owing and the rest, plus the h(mio/lion, is recorded as owing by 
Archandros and Amphias, the other guarantor.  The estate was then re-let to a new tenant but 
with the same guarantors, Protoleos and Amphias695.   
It seems from this evidence that the amphiktyonic suggrafh/ may have provided that: 
1 a h(mio/lion was to be added to the amount of rent outstanding and unpaid;  
2 the hieropoioi had the power to seize the tenant’s crops and livestock in satisfaction of 
unpaid rent; and  
3 the hieropoioi were required to record publicly the names of tenants who failed to pay 
rent owed to the god and of their guarantors.   
What other steps the hieropoioi were empowered or obliged to take to recover the unpaid rent is 
unclear.  The fact that the guarantor Amphias was accepted as guarantor of the new tenants of 
the estate of Hippodromos implies that he was not without financial means.  Yet the debt 
outstanding from the previous tenant was not recovered from him.  This suggests that the 
hieropoioi therefore may not have had the power to seize assets from guarantors in satisfaction 
of outstanding rent.  It also implies that publicly recording the names of those who owed rent to 
the god did not have the effect of preventing those named from entering into further transactions 
with the god.  However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that in this particular case the 
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hieropoioi had decided to take no further action against Amphias, and to waive any prohibition 
on his entering into further transactions with the god, for some reason, for example an assurance 
from the tenant or Amphias that he would pay at a defined later date, or perhaps simply 
favouritism.  Even if this was the case, however, the enforcement régime on independent Delos 
at this time appears to have been somewhat milder than that which applied for example in the 
decree governing the leasing of tribal lands in Athens in the third century BC which gave the 
tribe’s tamias and epimeletai power to seize the property of a tenant and of his guarantor if the 
tenant did not pay the rent.   
Delian legislation regarding recovery of rent from tenants of the sacred estates and their 
guarantors appears to have changed with the introduction of the i(era\ suggrafh\ (Cat#B32).  
As we saw in chapter 3696, LL30-34 provided that if the tenant did not pay the rent on time he 
was to pay a h(mioli/on at specified times and the hieropoioi, after selling the tenant’s crops, 
were to collect (ei)spraca/sqwn) from the guarantors the h(mioli/on of the amount of the rent 
that remained owing to the god; if rent was still outstanding, the tenant’s cattle, sheep and slaves 
were to be sold to cover the shortfall.  Thus far, the new regulation was very similar to the 
existing law or practice as evidenced by the accounts referred to above.  However, the new 
regulation continued by providing (LL34-36) that, if any sum remained unpaid after the 
measures just referred to had been taken, the hieropoioi were to exact payment of the remainder 
from the possessions of the tenant and of his guarantors.  Here we can see a parallel with the 
decree of the Athenian tribe described above.  The i(era\ suggrafh\ then provided (LL36-40) 
that if the hieropoioi were unable to exact payment, they were to swear an oath to that effect, 
write up the names of those who owed money to the god and of their guarantors on a stele and 
re-let the estate.  If the new rent was less than the old, the hieropoioi were to write down the 
names of the individuals concerned, the deficiency and a h(mioli/on.  In addition, the hieropoioi 
themselves were to pay one half of the rent that they failed to collect if they did not exact 
payment from the guarantors697.  Finally, the i(era\ suggrafh\ provided (LL46-49) that “all the 
possessions of the lessees, their domestic animals, their slaves, their household furniture, and all 
that is theirs, shall be pledged to the god (u(pokeiÍsqai de\ tw½i qew½i).  All the possessions of 
the guarantors also shall be pledged to the god, just as those of the lessees.  If the hieropoioi 
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who collect (the rent) do not collect the entire amount, all the possessions of the hieropoioi shall 
be pledged to the god…..”698.   
It can be seen that LL34ff went considerably further than the law or practice that appears to 
have existed prior to the i(era\ suggrafh\ coming into effect.  In particular, if seizing the 
tenant’s crops, cattle, sheep and slaves does not meet the whole amount owing, the hieropoioi 
can take the remaining possessions of the tenant and those of his guarantors as well699.  To this 
end, all the possessions of the tenant and his guarantors were pledged to the god700.  The 
i(era\ suggrafh/ then placed a powerful incentive upon the hieropoioi to take these steps by 
making them liable for half the amount of any rent they failed to collect.  This incentive was 
reinforced by providing that the possessions of the hieropoioi were also “pledged to the god”, so 
that their possessions too could be confiscated if the hieropoioi became liable to pay one half of 
the uncollected rent under the provision mentioned earlier.   
The right of Apollo to a pledge of the possessions of the hieropoioi to cover their liability for 
uncollected rent was similar to the right of the Athenian state to seize the possessions of an 
Athenian official until he had rendered his accounts.  There were, however, also some 
differences between Athens and independent Delos as regards recovery of rent on sacred estates.  
At Athens the debt was doubled, whereas on independent Delos only a h(mioli/on was added.  
At Athens the guarantor could be imprisoned whereas there appears to have been no such 
sanction on independent Delos.  As already observed701, at Athens, in the case of the conditions 
for the leasing of tribal land, the guarantor’s possessions could be immediately confiscated and 
sold, whereas on independent Delos the guarantor’s assets could be seized only after certain of 
the tenant’s possessions had been seized and they were of insufficient value to satisfy the debt.  
On the other hand, on Delos the hieropoioi were expressly made liable for half the rent if they 
failed to exact it whereas we find no such arrangement in classical Athens.   
We have seen that in classical Athens the Council was probably involved in the collection of 
debts owed to the city’s gods.  On occasions, the Delian Council may also have had a role in the 
collection of overdue payments.  The accounts of the hieropoioi for 279BC record that they 
received from the councillors and the hieropoioi of the previous year 200 drachmai which 
Hypsokles son of Archestratos paid as guarantor of Amphistratos son of Hypsokles.  As Vial 
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noted, Amphistratos was the tenant of the estate of Sosimacheia during the 280’s BC but 
appears to have been unable to pay the rent for 280BC702.  It is not clear what powers the 
Council had in regard to the recovery of outstanding rent or how proactive it was expected to be 
in obtaining such payments.  The accounts merely record the Council receiving the sum from 
the guarantor and remitting it to the hieropoioi.  But the Council’s role may not have been an 
entirely passive one.  It may have had similar powers to those conferred by the provision in the 
i(era\ suggrafh/ which required the Council to write up the names of the tenants of the sacred 
estates on whose behalf their guarantors had made payments to the hieropoioi and who were 
then to be regarded as u(pe[r]hme/rouj (Cat#B32 LL44-45).  But the precise role of the Council 
in the recovery of sums owed remains unknown.   
Like their counterparts in classical Athens, officials on independent Delos were required to 
render accounts at the end of their period in office703.  This provided a further incentive, if one 
was needed, on the hieropoioi (and the Council) to fulfil their functions.  The accounts of the 
hieropoioi confirm that logistai were appointed to examine their accounts, as well as those of 
other officials704.  The logistai had power to impose fines on the officials.  These fines were 
recorded in the accounts.  For example, the accounts of 278BC record payments e)c eu)qunw=n 
by two of the hieropoioi of 280BC, Hegias son of Phokaieus and Anaschetos son of 
Theoxenos705.  However, it is to be noted that, unlike Athens, it appears that there was no second 
committee of magistrates (the euthynoi) who received complaints from individuals after the 
logistai had examined the accounts706. 
The activities of the hieropoioi regarding recovery of rent from tenants of sacred estates and 
their guarantors may sometimes have led to court proceedings.  The evidence for this is however 
somewhat fragmentary.  One badly damaged record which seems to have related to the sacred 
estates appears to have mentioned individuals being convicted in court ([o)fei/]lein 
au)tou\j e)n tw=i dika[sthri/wi]) but more than this we cannot tell707.  There is also an entry in 
the accounts for 269BC which refers to a grafh/ brought by Sosimenes against Euboulos708.  
Vial suggested that it was probable, although not certain, that Euboulos was the hieropoios of 
273BC709.  We do not know whether the claimant Sosimenes was a disgruntled tenant or a 
guarantor or even whether this case concerned a sacred estate; however, the entry does suggest 
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that legal action may have been available to a tenant or guarantor if the hieropoioi were acting 
improperly.   
One possibility was yeudeggrafh\.  There are two references to this in the accounts of the 
hieropoioi.  It may refer to a legal procedure similar to the action of the same name found in 
Athens where a grafh\ yeudeggrafh=j could be brought against the official who had wrongly 
included the guarantor’s name on a list of state debtors.  If the suit was successful, the name of 
the guarantor would be removed from the list and replaced with that of the official who had 
wrongly included him on the list710.  The first of the Delian references, in an account dating to 
301BC, records that as a result of Anapsyktides pursuing a case of yeudeggrafh\, Antigonos 
son of Aspheros owed the sum of 89 drachmai 4 oboloi and 5 chalkoi711.  Vial interpreted this to 
mean that Anapsyktides had proved that the debt that Antigonos had attributed to him did not 
exist and Antigonos had to pay that amount to the god.  The second reference to yeudeggrafh\, 
in the accounts for 192BC, is more fragmentary: [para\ tou= deiÍna ® ® ® ®]oÁ eÃfh 
e)piba/llein au(tw½i me/roj th=j e)ggrafh=j e)k tou= peteu/rou ouÂ a):: :HMENISE e)cagw
geu=si n?h=so?jY h( s:::u::s:i:::::::SLIP?LENECE?OEI th=j yeudengrafh=j 28712.   Vial 
interpreted this to indicate that the payment was for the payer’s part in the erroneous inscription 
of one or more debtors on a tablet713.  Vial’s interpretations of both entries are surely correct.  
Again, we do not know whether either of these cases arose from a lease of a sacred estate but 
they do show what could be done if a tenant or guarantor disputed an entry in the accounts. 
It was also possible for an official to be removed from office.  This is demonstrated by Vial, 
who convincingly argues that the absence of one of the hieropoioi at the end of his term of 
office in 297BC and of two hieropoioi at the end of their term of office in 280BC cannot have 
been voluntary or due to death in office714.  What the procedure was for the removal of a 
hieropoios from office is not known but it is possible that it may have permitted a guarantor 
who felt particularly badly treated by a hieropoios to take action, perhaps in addition to the 
yeudeggrafh\ outlined above. 
Fines under building contracts 
Two building contracts have survived which gave officials express powers in regard to the 
recovery of fines and other amounts payable by the contractor and his guarantors.  One of these 
is a contract of 297BC (Cat#B31).  It provided that if the contractor did not complete the work 
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by the required date, the e)pista/tai could award a contract for the remaining work to another 
contractor and were required to recover amounts owing from the contractor and his guarantors 
in whatever way they decided ([ei)spracan/twn de\ oi(] e)pista/tai to\n e)rgw/nhn 
kai\ tou\j e)nguhta\j wÒi aÄn tro/pwi e)[pi/stwntai]) (LL3-5).  The contract also provided 
that the e)pista/tai could disapprove work that appeared to them not to comply with the 
contract and impose a fine upon the contractor within ten days (kai\ e)pitimh=sai a)rgurion e)n 
d[e/ka h(me/raij]) and, if they did, they were required to recover it ([to\] me\n a)rgu/rion 
ei)spraca/[ntwn]) (LL5-6).  The amount of the fine is not stated.  It is possible that it was 
stipulated elsewhere in the contract or it may have been left to the discretion of the 
e)pista/tai715.  The contract may further have provided (if Feyel’s restorations are correct) that 
where the contractor failed to provide guarantors and the work was awarded to another 
contractor at a higher price, the e)pista/tai could recover the increase in price from the original 
contractor and his e)gguhth\n tou= yeu/douj without penalty and “without being subject to legal 
proceedings”  (o(/swi d'a)/n [plei=on] eu(/rei a)napwlou/menon, e)ce/stw toi=j e)pista/taij 
ei)spra=cai to\n e)rgw/nhn kai\ to\n e)n[guhth\n]…a)zhmi¿oij ouÅsin kaiì a)nupodi¿koij) 
(LL11-12).   
The other contract is dated c250BC.  It provided that if the contractor did not complete on time, 
the hieropoioi and the e)pimelh/tai were to award the remaining work to another contractor and 
the e)gdo/tai were to recover any additional cost from the contractor and his guarantor: 
kai\ o(/swi a)/[n pleion eu(rei ta\ u(poloipa tou= loipou a)rg]uri¿ou u(fairoume/nh[j tou=
 misqw?]matoj ei¹spraca/n[twn to\n e)rgwnhn kai\ to\n e)gguhth\n oi( e)gdotai poi]ou/m
enoi th\n pra=cin e)k tou= e)gguh[tou=] - Cat#B35 LL31-37).   
It will be seen that sometimes these contracts placed a duty on the officials to recover the fines 
concerned (ei)spraca/ntwn), sometimes they were couched in permissive terms (e)ce/stw toi=j 
e)pista/taij ei)spra=cai).  However, it seems clear that the officials were expected to take active 
steps to recover the amounts owed from the contractor and his guarantors.  Rubinstein has 
identified examples of the terminology of enforcement which normally indicate that active steps 
are involved, and we find such terminology in our two Delian building contracts: the verb 
pra/ssein (or one of its compounds) taking as its direct object the person against whom the 
enforcement process is directed (the contractor and his guarantors)716; a clause granting immunity 
to the enforcing officials; and a clause providing that the officials are to collect the sums owed 
                                                
715
 Partsch (1909:333) thought the amount of the fine was in the discretion of the e)pista/tai.  Vial (1985:148) 
appears to have taken the view that the laws fixed the amount.   
716
 Rubinstein (2010:199-200). We have one example where the object is the money (to\ a)rgu/rion) rather than the 
contractor and his guarantors.  However, the verb can take two accusative objects: the money and the person from 
whom it is being exacted.  The text is very fragmentary and it is possible that the contractor and his guarantors were 
also included as the objects of the verb in the lost part of the line.   
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“by whatever method they can” 717.  The contracts do not state what steps the officials could take 
but, by analogy with the procedures for the recovery of rent on the sacred estates, these may have 
included seizure of goods or other property.   
We have already seen that the officials had to render accounts at the end of their period in office.  
If there were any unrecovered fines at this stage, this might have to be explained to the logistai.  
This should have operated as an incentive for the officials under building contracts to take the 
steps they were empowered to take to recover fines, and an awareness of this fact should have 
concentrated the minds of guarantors.  Unfortunately, no record of the actual exercise of these 
powers has survived, nor do we know how frequently these powers were granted in Delian 
building contracts in general.  Court proceedings may have been involved.  The accounts of the 
hieropoioi for 304BC contain a record of a payment by the hieropoioi, described as dikasthri/wi 
misqo\j, which appears among a list of payments to contractors and suppliers, suggesting that 
some kind of dispute had arisen between a contractor (or possibly his guarantors) and the 
hieropoioi or the e)pista/tai718.  Other entries record payments dikasthri/wi toi=j 
e)pitimh/masin or similar, which may have concerned proceedings for the recovery of fines719.  
The extent to which the contractor or his guarantors could raise disputes regarding the way in 
which the fines were enforced may have however have been limited if the contract provided the 
officials with immunity from suit720.  The terms of the contract could be important to guarantors, 
as we shall see in the next chapter.   
As was the case with the collection of rent from the sacred estates, the Council also had a role in 
the collection of overdue fines from contractors and their guarantors.  The accounts of the 
hieropoioi for 279BC record that they received from the Councillors of that year the sum of 175 
drachmai from Arignotos son of Antipatros being his share of the guarantee he had provided for 
Diaitos son of Apollodoros who had contracted to build the retaining wall for the theatre721.  
Again, as in the case of the sacred estates, it appears that the role of the Council here was a 
passive one.  However we cannot conclude from the limited evidence that the Council was not 
empowered in some circumstances to adopt a more aggressive stance towards building 
contractors and their guarantors. 
What was the legal effect of including a guarantor in a list of debtors? 
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 Rubinstein (2010:200-203 and 209). 
718
 Cat#B2 A L113; Vial (1985:151-152). 
719
 IG XI,2 145 LL65-66; 199A L65; 223A L7; 287A L81 and Cat#B14 A L62.  
720
 Rubinstein (2010:202) and Rubinstein (forthcoming).  
721
 Cat#B10 A LL40-42. 
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We have seen that at Athens a citizen who owed money to one of the city’s gods was a)/timoj 
and that this should have acted as an incentive upon guarantors to pay.  On Delos, however, the 
position is less clear.  No provision has survived in the i(era\ suggrafh\ which made a tenant 
who failed to pay his rent and his guarantors automatically a)/timoj.  Partsch, however, believed 
that tenants and guarantors whose names were written down on a stele pursuant to the 
provisions of the i(era\ suggrafh/ (L37) for non-payment of rent due on a sacred estate were 
a)/timoi722.  For Partsch this meant that any such person could have his real property confiscated 
(if it had not already been seized by the hieropoioi pursuant to the i(era\ suggrafh/) and was 
deprived of rights such as the right to vote in the assembly, to hold office and to sit as a juror723.  
Partsch seems to have assumed that this would apply to all who were recorded by the hieropoioi 
as indebted to the god, including those who failed to pay rent on sacred houses, failed to pay 
interest on loans or failed to pay sums due under franchises for the collection of tax, operation 
of ferries etc. 
There are, however, reasons for thinking that Partsch’s view may be wrong.   
The accounts for 274BC contain a list of those who were indebted to the god for non-payment 
of sums due under ferry operation or tax collection franchises.  The list includes the names of 
both the contractors and of their guarantors.  One of the guarantors, Phillis son of Diaitos, was 
an epimeletes of building works in the same year as he was recorded in this list as a debtor of 
the god.  Although it is always possible that Phillis was appointed as epimeletes before he 
defaulted in paying the sums due under his guarantee, it does appear from this that being 
recorded as a debtor did not affect one’s eligibility for the position of epimeletes724. 
The accounts for 250BC record that Ekephylos and his guarantors owe (o)fei/lousi) one obolos 
in rent for the estate of Chareteia725.  In 257BC Ekephylos had paid only part of the rent which 
had been due that year.  The lease appears to have been cancelled and the estate re-let726.  Seven 
years later, a tiny amount is still outstanding.  If inclusion in the accounts as a debtor meant that 
Ekephylos was a)/timoj, there is surely no way that such an amount would have been left 
unpaid. 
Notwithstanding the extensive remains of the accounts that have survived, the words a)/timoj 
and a)timi/a do not appear anywhere in them.  By contrast there are numerous references to 
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 Partsch (1909:402-403). 
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 Partsch (1909:387-389). 
724
 Cat#B13 B LL96-97 and A L74. 
725
 Cat#B17 L196. 
726
 Cat#B16 LL30-31; Cat#B17 LL139-141; Reger (1994:325). 
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individuals being a)/timoi in Attic inscriptions727.  Further, the way in which the hieropoioi 
sometimes recorded those who owed money to the god suggests that such recording cannot have 
had the legal significance for which Partsch contended.  If the effect of recording debtors was 
intended to be that citizens were publicly confirmed as a)/timoi, one would expect them to be 
clearly identified.  But very often they are not.  In the case of the sacred estates, the accounts of 
250BC record that “the following are indebted to the god, they and their guarantors” and in the 
list that follows the tenants are named but the guarantors are not728.  In the case of the sacred 
houses, the accounts for 274BC contain a list introduced by the statement that the following of 
those who rent sacred houses have not paid the rent and owe it to the god “they and their 
guarantors”.  In the list, however, seven tenants are named but only one guarantor729.  Hennig 
noted that in the later accounts the hieropoioi did not include patronymics in the lists of those 
who owed rent on the sacred houses (which would have avoided doubt as to who might be being 
referred to)730.  In the case of loans made by the god to individuals, the early lists of those who 
owed interest to the god did not include guarantors at all and later, when guarantors were 
mentioned, they were hardly ever named.  For example, in a long list of those who have not paid 
interest in the accounts of 274BC we find one entry that merely states: Tele/swn kai\ oi( 
e)gguhtai\ 21 drs.  Another entry in the same list states: Ni/kw]n Nikod[rmou] kai\ e)/gguoi 
[Nik]wnoj Fil...... 12drs731: here, although e)/gguoi is in the plural, only one guarantor is 
named.  From about 269BC, the hieropoioi started merely to include the guarantors generically 
in the introductory words to the list of debtors, for example: kai\ oi(/de to/kouj ou)k e)/qesan 
a)ll' o)fei/lousi tw=i qew=i au)toi\ kai\ e)/gguoi732.  This becomes a regular usage from 
257BC onwards, although occasionally a guarantor is actually named733.  Vial notes that from 
about 220BC the hieropoioi started to insert at the end of their lists of debtors a statement to the 
effect that if any borrowers have not paid interest the hieropoioi record them as debtors, they 
and their guarantors734; from 179BC this was replaced by a clause to the effect that if the 
hieropoioi had not written up any individuals who were indebted to the god, they now recorded 
them as debtors to the god, them and their guarantors735.  It might have been possible to work 
out who the guarantors were by referring back to earlier records, but the leases and loans may 
have been granted many years previously and discovering who the guarantors were may not 
have been entirely straightforward. 
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 E.g. a)/timon au)to\n e)=nai kai\ ta\ xre/mata au)to= demo/sia... (IG I3 40 LL33-34). 
728
 Cat#B17 L196. 
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 Cat#B13 B LL93-94; Hennig (1983:451). 
730
 Hennig (1983:451-452). 
731
 IG XI,2 199C LL103-104, 108-111. 
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 Cat#B14 D LL67-70. 
733
 Cat#B16 L23 - generic reference; Cat#B28 D LL26-30 - guarantor for half named. 
734
 Vial (1985:224); ID 346A LL13-14, 366A L135, 369A L42, 376 L16. 
735
 Vial (1985:224-225); Cat#B28 A L250, ID 442D LL30-37, 444A L53, 449B LL15-16, 457 L17. 
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One possibility is that recording a person as indebted to the god did not have any legal effect at 
all.  It was simply a record.  The hieropoioi would no doubt have been keen to record the debt in 
order to avoid any suggestion that they had received the money and not paid it over to the 
treasury of the god.  Nevertheless, there is some evidence that this was not the only reason for 
keeping such a record and that being included in a list of debtors by the hieropoioi did have 
some legal effect upon the debtor.  The i(era\ suggrafh/ required the Council to write up the 
names of the tenants of the sacred estates on whose behalf their guarantors had made payments 
to the hieropoioi.  These individuals were then to be regarded as u(pe[r]hme/rouj kata\ to\n 
no/mon (Cat#B32 LL44-45).  We do not know what law was being referred to here but it was 
almost certainly connected with the possibility that action could be taken against the registered 
debtor to recover the debt, perhaps because his property could now be seized736.   
The references to yeudeggrafh\ in the accounts of the hieropoioi discussed earlier737 also 
indicate that the inclusion of a name in a list of debtors to the god must have had significance.  
There would have been no point in taking legal proceedings against hieropoioi who had 
wrongly included a name on a list of debtors if this was not the case. 
Whatever the legal significance of recording someone as indebted to the god may have been, it 
does not appear to have been quite the same as it was in classical Athens.  It may merely have 
meant that the hieropoioi had proceeded as far as they could within their powers in attempting 
to collect the debt, and that it was therefore open to anyone else who wished to take action 
against the debtor as a registered defaulter.  Or it may have meant only that the named debtor 
could not enter into any new transaction with the god until the debt was paid.  It may also have 
had a practical impact by deterring putative creditors.  For example, it may have meant in 
practice that the person named in the accounts as owing money would be unable to persuade 
anyone to act as his guarantor.  It could also have affected the debtor’s credit in the private 
commercial world of Delos.  Whatever the consequence was, it was probably a less powerful 
incentive upon guarantors to pay than a)timi/a was in classical Athens. 
Enforcement by the hieropoioi in practice 
So far, we have seen a number of similarities and differences between the laws and practices of 
Athens and Delos in regard to the enforcement of debts owed by guarantors to the community.  
On Delos, however, a further question needs to be addressed, which has an important bearing 
upon our understanding of the position of guarantors there.  This question is the extent to which 
the hieropoioi adopted a lenient approach to enforcement against those who entered into 
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 Ziebarth (1926:104). 
737
 p152. 
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transactions with the god and against their guarantors.  In the case of leases of sacred houses and 
loans to individuals, the overwhelming evidence is that the heiropoioi took quite a relaxed 
approach to enforcement against the tenants, borrowers and their respective guarantors.  In the 
case of the leases of the sacred estates, however, the evidence is not so clear cut and differing 
views have been expressed by scholars on how aggressively the hieropoioi pursued tenants and 
their guarantors for payment of rent.  The answer to this question is important because there 
would have been little incentive upon the guarantors to fulfil their obligations if the practice of 
the hieropoioi was not to pursue them with any vigour.  In this section therefore, I will start by 
reviewing briefly the evidence of actual enforcement in the case of the sacred houses, loans to 
individuals and tax collection and ferry operation franchises before going on to address the 
evidence regarding enforcement of the leases of the sacred estates. 
In relation to the sacred houses, we find extensive records stating that certain tenants and their 
guarantors owe rent to the god but no record of the hieropoioi confiscating the property of those 
liable in order to recover amounts owed738.  The lenient approach of the hieropoioi to 
enforcement in the case of the sacred houses was noted by Molinier who drew attention to the 
accounts for 279BC.  These recorded that one half of the rent for the house of Episthenes, which 
had been let to Apemantos son of Leophon, had been paid by one of his guarantors, Protoleos.  
The other guarantor did not pay the other half and he and Apemantos are recorded as debtors for 
25 drachmai later on in the accounts in a list of tenants and their guarantors who have not paid 
rent on sacred houses739.  Yet the lease was not cancelled for non-payment of rent, nor was the 
house re-let to a different tenant, nor is any action recorded as having been taken to recover the 
outstanding rent from Apemantos’ other guarantor.  Instead, the records show that Apemantos 
was still tenant the next year, but with different guarantors, who paid the rent on his behalf740.  
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 Molinier (1914:68), who assumes that there was an equivalent to the i(era\ suggrafh/ for sacred houses (which is 
a possibility (see p55)), says that when the indebtedness was complete on the part of the tenant and his guarantors, the 
hieropoioi certified on oath to this effect and inscribed the debt on the stele of public debtors. However, the fact that 
no records of such oaths, or of the actions taken by the hieropoioi before they swore, have survived in such extensive 
accounts is surely significant. 
739
 Cat#B10 A LL22-23; Cat#B10 D LL69-72; Molinier (1914:67).  Partsch (1909:180), who also assumed that there 
was a i(era\ suggrafh/ for sacred houses, argued that this list of debtors showed that enforcement had taken place 
against the possessions of the debtors and their guarantors.  This is hard to reconcile, however, with the fact that 
Apemantos remained in possession of the house.    
740
 Cat#B11 LL17-18.  Other examples of a defaulting tenant who was permitted to remain in possession: the 
accounts of 279BC record that a tenant who had failed to pay the rent was still living in the house that year when 
work was carried out on it (IG XI,2 161D LL72-77 and A L110 (Hennig (1983:486)); and the accounts of 179BC 
record a payment from Straton of rent of a sacred house for which he had been recorded as a debtor by the hieropoioi 
of the previous year (ID 442 L170).  The same accounts (L142) show that he was probably still tenant of the house in 
179BC (Molinier (1914:67-68)).  Hennig (1983:452) appears to go too far when he suggests that some of the tenants 
listed as owing rent for sacred houses in the accounts for 274BC (Cat#B13 B LL93-94) remained in possession.  
There is no evidence that this is the case and the suggestion that tenants of sacred houses were never evicted if they 
fell behind with the rent is inconsistent with the evidence we have of leases of sacred houses being cancelled and the 
houses re-let following a failure by the tenant to provide guarantors.  The fact that no record has survived showing a 
cancellation of a lease for non-payment of rent does not necessarily mean that it never happened.  
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If the hieropoioi did pursue those who were indebted to the god in respect of the sacred houses, 
they could take many years in effecting a recovery.  For example, we find a record in 218BC of 
a payment of 201 drachmai in rent by the tenant of the house next to the ironworks. The annual 
rent for that house was 42 drachmai, which the tenant is recorded as paying further on in the 
same account.  The first payment must have been payment of arrears; if so it represented several 
years of unpaid rent (defaulting tenants of the sacred houses were not required to pay the 
h(mioli/on741).  During this time apparently no action was taken to evict the tenant or to recover 
the rent from the tenant’s guarantors742.   
In relation to loans to individuals, the accounts of the hieropoioi contain lengthy lists of 
borrowers who are indebted to the god for interest, which suggests that the approach of the 
hieropoioi to the collection of interest on loans was similar to their approach to the collection of 
rent for sacred houses.  For example, Kleinodikos son of Stesileos is recorded by the hieropoioi 
as owing 10 drachmai interest in the accounts of 274, 257 and 250BC743.  This means that in 
each of those years, Kleinodikos did not pay the interest accrued on his loan that year.  
Kleinodikos may simply have been unable to pay: he had appeared in the lists of those who had 
paid their interest in earlier years (282, 279 and 278BC)744.  If the hieropoioi had taken steps to 
recover the money from other sources such as mortgaged property or guarantors, one would 
expect them to mention it here in their accounts.  Yet there do not appear to have been any such 
entries.  Indeed, the hieropoioi sometimes allowed interest to remain unpaid for extended 
periods.  This can be seen from the accounts of 250BC, which record that a certain Kallimos 
paid off on behalf of his father a loan of 100 drachmai and at the same time paid accrued 
interest amounting to 101 drachmai 4 oboloi745.  It is not clear how this sum was calculated, but 
on a loan of 100 drachmai, it must have represented at least ten years in which the borrower 
failed to pay the interest for the year746, and no payment was received from the guarantors 
during this period. 
Recovery of sums from guarantors could also take a very long time.  The accounts of the 
hieropoioi of 250BC record receipt of a payment of 30 drachmai from Demochares son of 
Kydron “which he said was payment of a guarantee on behalf of Harpalis son of Simos that was 
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 Molinier (1914:67-68); Hennig (1983:452). 
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 ID 354 LL26 and 34; Hennig (1983:452 note 94).  Other examples of late payment of rent were cited by Hennig 
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 IG XI,2 199C L93; 226A L24; 287A L190. 
744
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drachmai interest.  At some stage before 274BC the loan seems to have been divided between the two brothers with 
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 IG XI,2 287A L16; Bogaert (1968:145). 
746
 The interest rate was always 10%: Bogaert (1968:138); Vial (1985:380) and e.g. ID 290 LL131-132.  There is no 
evidence of any borrower ever having been required to pay the h(mioli/on on unpaid interest. 
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written down on the stele that Timokles and Xenokleides set up”.  Timokles and Xenokleides 
had been hieropoioi eleven years earlier in 261BC747.  Similarly, the accounts of the hieropoioi 
of 179BC recorded interest payments received from the guarantors of a borrower covering a 
period of five years prior to their year of office748. 
So far as concerns tax collectors and the operators of ferry franchises, there is, again, no record 
of the hieropoioi ever having confiscated their property or possessions or those of their 
guarantors.  In an account dated to 300-280BC, the hieropoioi record that they are unable to 
exact payment from individuals who are listed and that they are in debt (to the god).  The list 
includes the name of the purchaser of a franchise for the operation of the ferry to Rheneia and of 
his guarantor.  However the hieropoioi do not say what steps they had taken to try and recover 
the sums owed749.  Elsewhere, we find entries in which the hieropoioi record that the franchisee 
and his guarantor owe amounts to the god.  The guarantors are usually named along with the 
franchisee750.  In one account, the hieropoioi record that since the franchisee has not paid they 
now “write down” the guarantor as a debtor for the relevant amount751.  Unlike the case of the 
sacred houses and loans, we do not find lengthy lists of tax collectors, ferry operators and their 
guarantors who owe money to the god.  This however can be explained by the fact that far fewer 
tax collection and ferry operation franchises were granted by the god than leases of sacred 
houses and loans. 
The evidence shows, therefore, that guarantors of leases of sacred houses, loans to individuals, 
and tax collection and ferry operation franchises were operating under a fairly mild enforcement 
régime.  Was the régime under which the guarantors of the leases of the sacred estates similarly 
relaxed?  Kent argued that the extensive powers of confiscation of the possessions of the tenant 
of a sacred estate and his guarantors introduced by the i(era\ suggrafh\ produced the result that 
“bankruptcy cases are rare after this law was passed”752.  Kent could find only one example of 
both lessee and guarantors failing to pay the rent: this was Kallisthenes, tenant of Sosimacheia, 
who was recorded as owing half the rent on that estate plus a h(mioli/on in 206BC753. Kent 
commented that it would seem that Kallisthenes somehow managed to avoid any confiscations 
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 Cat#B7 LL18-20.  
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 For example, an entry in the accounts of 274BC records that the following franchisees have not paid and are in 
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 Kent (1948:279). 
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 ID 369A L41. 
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and he questioned whether the provisions of the law requiring confiscations were always 
enforced754.  The difficulty with Kent’s view is that it seems to postulate a situation where the 
law was not rigorously enforced but there were few defaults, whereas one might expect that if 
the law was not rigorously enforced there would be numerous defaults, or that the reason why 
there were few defaults was that the law was rigorously enforced. 
Vial too noted that, after the introduction of the i(era\ suggrafh/, the accounts contain no 
further indication of proceedings resorted to by the hieropoioi to recover unpaid rent.  With the 
exception of the inclusion of a few names on the lists of debtors (in particular the case of 
Kallisthenes referred to by Kent), defaults by tenants of the sacred estates appear only indirectly 
by the mention of payments by guarantors.  In Vial’s opinion this does not mean that the 
measures decreed by the i(era\ suggrafh/ became a dead letter during the course of 
independence: the hemiolion was still being imposed in 206BC and it is probable, in Vial’s 
view, that seizure of crops was still practised755.  Nevertheless it is in Vial’s opinion implausible 
that the hieropoioi ever seized the personal goods of the tenant and his guarantors.  In this 
respect the approach of the hieropoioi towards the enforcement of obligations relating to the 
sacred estates was the same as their approach to enforcement of the other contracts.  In her 
view, the Delian community did not allow one of its members to be deprived of his land or his 
house, even in the interests of the god756.  The difficulty with Vial’s view is that if the approach 
to enforcement was the same for the sacred estates as it was for the other transactions entered 
into by the god, it is necessary to explain why there were so few recorded defaults for the 
former and so many for the latter. 
Reger, on the other hand, argues that the hieropoioi proceeded with vigour against defaulters 
under the new regulations757.  Referring to the accounts already mentioned above758 regarding 
the enforcement of guarantees before the i(era\ suggrafh/ was introduced, Reger argues that 
the i(era\ suggrafh/ was a response to the high number of defaults in those years which had 
resulted in the temple of Apollo being out of pocket.  In support of his view that the new 
regulation was vigorously enforced, he notes that a number of estates and houses appear for the 
first time in the accounts of the hieropoioi after the i(era\ suggrafh/ came into effect and he 
explains this on the basis that these properties had previously belonged to tenants and 
guarantors of sacred estates who had defaulted in payment of the rent with the result that the 
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properties were confiscated by the hieropoioi pursuant to the new powers conferred upon them 
by the i(era\ suggrafh/.   
Reger admits that his arguments are hypothetical.  However, he seeks to support them by 
referring to a number of fragmentary accounts that appear to have been concerned with 
enforcement proceedings759.  He further supports his arguments by referring to the sharp decline 
in rental levels between 297 and 290BC, which, he argues, was the result of the chilling effect 
of vigorous enforcement of the i(era\ suggrafh/ during its early years760.  Conversely he 
explains the sharp rise in rents for sacred houses between 287 and 277BC on the basis that many 
Delians who found renting the sacred estates too risky turned instead to renting houses (which 
were cheaper than the estates and whose leases were only five years), thereby increasing 
demand761. 
There are difficulties with Reger’s arguments.  Firstly, the absence from the accounts after 
c300BC of any reference to the possessions of tenants of the sacred estates and of their 
guarantors being confiscated is a powerful argument against Reger’s theory in the context of the 
very extensive records that have survived relating to the financial administration of these 
estates. 
Secondly, there is no direct evidence to show that the tenants and guarantors whose estates and 
houses Reger argues found their way into the possession of Apollo had not paid the rent on their 
sacred estates. 
Thirdly, we know that at least two of the properties Reger mentions (Sosimacheia and 
Epistheneia) had been mortgaged to the god as security for loans.  If, as Reger argues, the 
hieropoioi had seized these properties in order to recover rent owed by the tenants of the sacred 
estates, they would thereby be depriving the god of the security provided by these properties for 
the repayment of the loans concerned.  One wonders whether, given the regularity with which 
the hieropoioi obtained real property as security for these loans, this would have been regarded 
as permissible.  It seems to me to be just as likely that these properties came into the possession 
of the god as a result of a default on the loans that they secured762, although there are other 
possible ways in which they could have been acquired (for example by way of a gift or bequest 
or consecration). 
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Fourthly, it is not necessary to postulate vigorous enforcement of the new law to explain the 
reduction in rents in the 290’s.  The promulgation of the new law could in itself have been 
sufficient to have this effect763.   
Fifthly, even if, in the decade after the i(era\ suggrafh/ was introduced, the hieropoioi 
vigorously enforced the new law, leading to a number of confiscations of properties and 
possessions, it is still necessary to explain the absence of evidence for confiscations in the one 
hundred and fifty years that followed.  Reger argues that there were defaults but that the nature 
of the defaults changed; in most cases the tenant defaulted by failing to renew his guarantors 
and in every case the hieropoioi found someone else to take on the lease, although sometimes at 
a reduced rent, in which case the former tenant or his guarantors were held responsible for the 
difference.  However, even if defaults were limited to the kind that Reger describes, they would 
still result on occasions in sums being owed to the god and in actions having to be taken to 
recover those sums, including confiscations of property, if vigorous enforcement continued; 
Reger does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the absence of evidence of such actions 
being taken.   
In view of the apparent differences of view between scholars, it is worth examining exactly 
what the accounts of the hieropoioi record about the steps the hieropoioi took to recover unpaid 
rent from the tenants of the sacred estates and their guarantors after the i(era\ suggrafh/ was 
introduced.  
(a) An extremely fragmentary document, which Reger dates to the 290’s BC764, (i) refers to 
the Council (meta\ boulh=[j]), (ii) appears to be referring to certain individuals incurring a 
penalty in court ([o)fei/]lein au)tou\j e)n tw=i dika[sthri/wi]), (iii) mentions certain temple 
estates, (iv) talks of the deprivation or withholding of something (a)posterh/sei th=j -), and 
(v) mentions rent (pro\j th\n mi/sq[wsin]), money ([draxm]ai=j xili/aij tetra[kosi/aij]) 
and someone in the first person handing something over to the hieropoioi ([pare/d]wka 
i(eropoioi=j).  Reger argues that this document records the trial and conviction of tenants “who 
violated the rental contract, payment of fines and/or back rent, and the seizure of property of 
those who could not or would not pay.”  As already mentioned765, the document certainly seems 
to be concerned with some sort of enforcement process.  We do not know whether guarantors 
were involved.  As to its date, as Reger admits, his argument for the 290’s is tenuous. The 
editor’s notes in IG XI,2 indicate that it could equally well be dated to the 280’s or the 270’s. 
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(b) In another account, which, according to Reger, was probably of almost the same date 
(although the editor of IG XI,2 dates it to between 297 and 279BC) 766, the hieropoioi record 
that they are unable to exact payment from certain individuals, who are in debt to the god 
(tou/touj ou)k e)duna/meqa ei¹spra=cai, a)ll' o)fei¿lousi).  The persons concerned are then 
listed.  The list includes at least three tenants and their guarantors, who appear to have been 
named.  Reger says that this record refers to “a similar disaster” to the one to which the 
document just mentioned was referring and that the guarantors were “explicitly included in the 
proceedings”.  However, Reger seems to be rather over-stating the case. Whether there were 
proceedings, and if so of what kind, we do not know.  The hieropoioi had tried and failed to 
recover these debts.  If the hieropoioi had followed the i(era\ suggrafh/ to the letter this would 
have meant that they had either confiscated the possessions of the tenants and their guarantors 
but these were insufficient to pay off the sums owed, or had not attempted to make any 
confiscations because the tenants and their guarantors did not have any assets for them to 
confiscate.  However, it is also possible that, as Kent and Vial would argue, the hieropoioi did 
not even attempt to confiscate the possessions of the tenants and their guarantors, 
notwithstanding the requirements of the law and notwithstanding the fact that any such 
confiscation would have borne fruit.   
(c) The accounts of 279BC record that the Council and the hieropoioi of the previous year 
had collected 200 drachmai from a guarantor of Amphistratos, tenant of the estate of 
Sosimacheia767.  This was probably all but one drachma of the rent for 280BC768 which had been 
outstanding for a whole year.  No mention is made of the remaining drachma and we therefore 
do not know if it was paid and if so by whom.  However, from 279BC the estate has a new 
tenant, Geryllos769.   
(d) The accounts of 274BC record that Eparchides paid one half of the rent for the estate of 
Porthmos.  He made this payment on behalf of Polyzelos, a guarantor770.  The payment cannot 
relate to the rent for 274BC since we know that this was paid in full that year by the tenant, 
Apollodoros son of Xenomedes771.  Apollodoros was tenant of Porthmos in 282, 279, 278, 269 
and 268BC772.  It is likely that he held the tenancy continuously throughout this period.  Either 
the rent that Eparchides paid related to a period from before 279 BC, or Apollodoros was 
permitted to remain as tenant of Porthmos notwithstanding the fact that he had not paid the rent.  
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In either case, the hieropoioi seem to have taken quite a relaxed view of their obligations to 
collect the rent imposed upon them by the i(era\ suggrafh/. 
(e) In 257BC, the two tenants of Chareteia paid the sum of 1200 drachmai in rent.  This 
was less than the total rent due of 1400 drachmai 3 oboloi.  The guarantors may have made 
some payments but they cannot have made up the full amount of the rent, because the lease 
seems to have been cancelled and the estate re-let in two parts to two tenants773.  The accounts 
for 250BC record that one of the original defaulting tenants and his guarantors (who are not 
named) still owe (o)fei/lousi) one obolos in rent774.  Presumably this tiny amount was thought 
not to justify any further action. 
(f) The accounts of 257BC also record that Pistes, a guarantor of the tenant of the estate of 
Leimon, paid 151 drachmai, which was half the rent for that year.  The hieropoioi then state 
that “the rest is owed” (to\ de\ loipo\n o)fei/letai)775.  Although the tenant must have been 
named (there is a lacuna in the text), the other guarantor does not appear to have been. 
(g) In the same year, the hieropoioi record that Ergoteles paid 70 drachmai rent for 
Kerameion.  The rent due for that year was 171 drachmai.  The accounts say that they 
(presumably Ergoteles and his guarantors) owe the rest (to\ de\ loipo\n o)fei/lousi)776.  We 
cannot tell from the fragmentary text whether the guarantors were named or not. 
(h) The accounts of 250BC record that Mnesimachos, the tenant of one half of Chareteia 
failed to renew his guarantors and the estate was therefore re-let.  However, the new rent was 
four hundred and nineteen drachmai three oboloi less than the rent under the old lease.  The 
hieropoioi record that the original tenant and his guarantors, who are named, owe the shortfall 
and in addition a h(mio/lion of 209 drachmai 4 1/2 oboloi777. 
(i) The accounts of 250BC also record that Moiragenes son of Kallisthenes and his 
guarantors, who were not named, owed 100 drachmai for the estate of Limnai.  This must relate 
to an earlier year, since the same accounts record that the tenant of Limnai in 250BC, 
Kynthiados, paid the rent in full that year778. 
(j) The accounts of 250BC further record that the hieropoioi received a sum from Xenon, 
son of Nikanor in respect of a shortfall (e)gdei/aj) on the estate of Soloe and Korakia.  We know 
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that the tenant of this estate in 250BC was Timoxenos, who paid his rent in full. The default 
must therefore have occurred in an earlier year and is only now being rectified779. 
(k) Fragmentary accounts of the hieropoioi dated to soon after 250BC record: [oiàde 
o)fe]i¿lousi tw=n e)nhrosi/wn au)toiì kaiì oi¸ eÃgguoi.  There is also a reference to 
to\ h(mio/lion.  Rent was owed from the sacred estates.  The names of the tenants and, if they 
were mentioned, their guarantors have not survived780.   
(l) ID 291 d LL33 and 35, which Reger dates to 247BC, appears to be dealing with tenants 
of the sacred estates ([tw=i mem]isqwme/nwi ta\ i(era\ xwr[i/a]).  The document refers to a 
judgment being given against someone by default ([w)=]flen e)/rhmon) and to someone 
destroying something (a)lla\ kate/spas[e]).  Reger contends that this records the trial and 
conviction of one tenant who had failed to pay rent and of another for causing damage781.  Vial 
does not appear to have interpreted this as referring necessarily to non-payment of rent; she 
confined herself to commenting that this was a record of proceedings against two tenants of the 
sacred estates who had contravened the rules 782.  Whatever the reason for the proceedings 
against the first tenant, it is clear that he was condemned to a payment by default; and that the 
second tenant had destroyed buildings or trees belonging to the god.   
(m) The accounts of 246BC record the receipt of two sums in respect of the sacred estates.  
The first was 366 drachmai 2 oboloi and 1 chalkos from one of the guarantors of Antikrates, 
tenant of the estate of Hippodromos.  The hieropoioi record that he had given the guarantee in 
the archonship of Elpinos, i.e. in 262BC.  The second payment was of 280 drachmai from one 
of the guarantors of Rhadis, tenant of an unknown estate.  This guarantee had been given in the 
archonship of Tharsynon, i.e. in 261BC783.  It appears that there had been defaults in the 
payment of rent in 262 and 261BC but that the rent was not recovered until 246BC.  
(n) The accounts for 207BC record that the estate of Porthmos was re-let after the tenant 
failed to renew his guarantors.  The hieropoioi record that the rent under the new lease was 691 
drachmai, and that this was a shortfall of 121 drachmai when compared with the rent under the 
old lease784.  They did not record here that the original tenant and his guarantors had paid this 
shortfall or that they “owed” it plus a hemiolion.   
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(o) In the account of 206BC, mentioned by Kent and Vial, three tenants of the sacred 
estates were recorded as owing rent to the god, to which the hemiolion had been added 
([e)pi]balo/ntwn h(mw=n to\ h(mio/lion).  The names of two of these tenants, Aristodikos son of 
Lykades and Kallisthenes, survive on the stone.  Reger argues that it was likely that these men 
did not have sufficient property to cover the full rent owed785.    
To summarise the evidence reviewed above, there do appear to have been occasional defaults by 
tenants and their guarantors.  When these happened, the hieropoioi recorded the amount owed in 
their accounts.  We are not told what steps they had taken to recover the outstanding rent before 
they made these entries.  Indeed, in only one entry (that in the accounts of 297 to 279BC 
referred to in (b) above) did the hieropoioi state that they had not been able to exact payment 
and even in this case they do not say what steps they had taken in their attempts to recover what 
was due786.  In a number of cases the hieropoioi did not receive the rent until years after it was 
due.  
It is hard to reconcile Reger’s picture of hieropoioi aggressively pursuing defaulting tenants and 
guarantors, confiscating their properties and taking them to court, with the picture outlined 
above.  Nevertheless, when compared with the long lists of those who owed interest on loans or 
rent on the leases of the sacred houses, the number of tenants of the sacred estates and their 
guarantors who are recorded by the hieropoioi as debtors of the god is extremely small.  Given 
the very extensive records that have survived, this difference is potentially significant and needs 
to be explained.  If the higher success rate for rent collection for the sacred estates was not due 
to more aggressive enforcement by the hieropoioi, what was it due to?   
Firstly, the enforcement regime prescribed for the recovery of rent on the sacred houses and 
interest on loans could have been milder than the one we find in the i(era\ suggrafh/.  There is 
some evidence that this may have been the case: the tenants of the sacred estates and their 
guarantors who failed to pay the rent were obliged to pay a fine of a h(mio/lion on the amount 
owed, but there was no equivalent fine imposed upon the defaulting tenants of the sacred houses 
and guarantors, as Molinier and Hennig both point out787.  This in itself would have made the 
tenants of the sacred estates less likely to default than the tenants of the sacred houses.  If there 
were other respects in which the laws relating to the sacred houses and loans were milder than 
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those relating to the sacred estates, this could explain the greater number of defaulters among 
borrowers and the tenants of the sacred houses and their respective guarantors.   
Secondly, the sums outstanding in rent on the sacred houses and interest on loans to individuals 
were very small when compared with the rents payable on the sacred estates.  This can readily 
be seen from the table prepared by Bogaert showing the amount of unpaid interest in each year.  
In most years the total amount of unpaid interest is considerably less than the rent for just one of 
the larger sacred estates788.  Similarly, the rents on the sacred houses were tiny when compared 
with the rents on the sacred estates.  Given the much larger sums involved, it is possible that the 
hieropoioi (possibly with the stronger powers given to them by the i(era\ suggrafh/) would 
concentrate their efforts on chasing payment of the rent of the sacred estates in priority to rents 
on the sacred houses or interest on loans to individuals, particularly in the light of the fact that 
the hieropoioi could find themselves liable to pay one half of any rent on the sacred estates 
which they failed to recover789.   
Thirdly, given the importance of the income from the sacred estates to the god, and the fact that 
the hieropoioi were at risk for half the rent, it is possible that the hieropoioi made a particular 
effort to select as tenants of the sacred estates, and their guarantors, only those who would be 
able to pay.  It has been seen from Appendices S and T that many of the tenants of the sacred 
estates and their guarantors came from the wealthiest members of the population.    This may be 
a reflection of a conscious policy on the part of the hieropoioi in regard to the selection of the 
tenants and their guarantors.   
Fourthly, there may also have been a policy not to pursue those who failed to pay on time too 
aggressively in order not to deter wealthy tenants and guarantors from putting themselves 
forward.  If the selection policies of the hieropoioi were carefully followed so that the tenants 
and guarantors were of sufficient wealth, the hieropoioi could be reasonably confident that they 
would pay, even if that meant that the god had to wait for slightly longer for payment than he 
was strictly speaking required to.  That delay might be a price worth paying if it meant that the 
largest possible pool of potential tenants and guarantors was maintained, which would in turn 
encourage competition and keep the rents high.  Obviously a balance had to be struck; but it 
appears that the hieropoioi were quite successful in doing so.  There is a parallel here, although 
admittedly not exact, with Athens and the observations of Gabrielsen that the more lenient 
approach to defaulting trierarchs could be seen as evidence of the Athenians seeking to secure 
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their interests on the one hand (the recovery of outstanding debts) whilst exerting as little 
pressure as possible on defaulting and influential guarantors on the other790.   
Finally, it has been seen that the i(era suggrafh/ imposed penalties on tenants, guarantors and 
hieropoioi if the rent on the sacred estates was not paid.  It made clear that the god was carrying 
only minimal risk of non-payment and that if the rent was not paid this would be a problem to 
be resolved not only by the tenants and their guarantors but by the hieropoioi as well.  It has 
also been seen that the Delian adult citizen community was relatively small791 and that the 
tenants and guarantors often came from the wealthiest elements of Delian society792.  There was 
a high probability that a wealthy tenant of one of the sacred estates, or a member of his family, 
would, if he had not already done so, at some time hold office as a hieropoios or stand as a 
guarantor.  This is confirmed by Appendix D from which it will be seen that of the twenty-
seven guarantors for whom we have further information for the period 314 to 250BC, they or 
their families produced thirteen hieropoioi.  The i(era suggrafh/ created a tension between the 
three groups: tenants, guarantors, and hieropoioi; and each group comprised individuals many 
of whom probably had been or would become members of each of the other groups over time.  
This created an environment in which understandings, compromises and arrangements rather 
than confiscations of property and court proceedings may have been encouraged.  The 
importance of the sanctuary to the prosperity of the community was the unifying factor that 
made the system work with (as far as we can see from the evidence) relatively few problems. 
All these factors in combination seem to me to be sufficient to account for the differences in the 
numbers of the recorded debtors for the sacred estates, sacred houses and loans to individuals.  
The consequences of this for our understanding of the role the guarantors on independent Delos 
are significant.  It means that the role differed depending upon whether the subject matter of the 
guarantee was a sacred estate on the one hand, or a sacred house or loan on the other.  In the 
case of sacred houses or loans, when someone agreed to stand as a guarantor, he could do so in 
the knowledge that his possessions, real and personal, would not in practice be at risk.  If his 
guarantee was called upon and he could not pay, the worst he could expect would be for his 
name to be written up with the consequence that he suffered some kind of disadvantage the 
scope of which is very unclear but which seems to have been less severe than a)timi/a at 
classical Athens.  Sometimes, his name would not appear but he would be described 
anonymously as a “guarantor”; in such a case only those who were prepared to look back over 
previous records could identify him as a debtor to the god.  This means that the sense in which 
on independent Delos the guarantor could be regarded as the god’s enforcer in these transactions 
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was very different from classical Athens.  He did have that function but the long lists of debtors 
indicate that he was not always compelled to fulfil it.  This did mean however that a man might 
have been more ready to stand as a guarantor for these transactions on Delos than he would 
have been had he been in Athens. 
In the case of the sacred estates, however, the position of the guarantor appears to have been 
somewhat different.  He would be expected to play his part in ensuring that the god was paid.  
This could involve him in compromises on occasions but if he played his cards right, he would 
avoid losing his property and possessions.  The community seems by and large to have received 
the protection it was seeking, although the way in which this was achieved was very different 
from classical Athens.   
Boiotia 
Here the evidence relates only to leases of sacred and public land and building contracts.  I will 
discuss each of these types of transaction in turn before going on to consider an issue peculiar to 
a federal jurisdiction such as Boiotia, namely the enforcement by a member state of a guarantee 
given by a citizen of another member state.   
As has already been seen793, the prorrh/seij of Thespiai provided that if the tenant failed to 
pay the rent, both he and his guarantors are to be recorded on a whitened board as owing the 
rent together with the hemiolion.  The whitened board was mentioned again where the land was 
re-let at a lower rent and the tenant and his guarantor thereby became liable for the shortfall plus 
the hemiolion.  Cat#C1 LL12-16 and Cat#C2 LL11-15 are good examples794.  Similar 
provisions are to be found in the pro/rrhseij that required the prospective tenant to provide a 
guarantor tw= yeu/deoj795. 
With reference to the whitened board and the penalty in IThesp 48, Partsch drew the clear 
parallel with the procedures described in Ath. Pol. 48.1 for the collection of sums due to the 
Athenian state.  He commented that no court judgment was required796.  This must be correct.  It 
is interesting to note, however, that the Thespian officials are not expressly given any powers or 
duties by the pro/rrhseij for the actual collection of the sums due (including the h(mio/lion) 
beyond writing the names of the defaulters on a whitened board.  Such an action could have 
triggered the implementation of a process of pra=cij by a specialist board, similar to the 
pra/ktorej at Athens797, but we have no direct evidence of this.  The prorrh/seij may be 
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contrasted with the enforcement procedures stipulated in the Delian i(era\ suggrafh/ for the 
recovery of rent due under the leases of the sacred estates.  These specifically set out the steps 
that the hieropoioi could take to recover the rent. Only if these were unsuccessful were the 
names of the debtors written up on whitened board798.  
The penalty of the hemiolion is also added to amounts payable by defaulting contractors under 
the Lebadeian building contracts799.  The collection of sums due from contractors and guarantors 
under these contracts was the responsibility of the naopoioi800.  One of the contracts states that 
the naopoioi a(/panta pra/c[ousin] ....to\n e)rgw/nhn kai\ tou\j e)ggu/ouj801.  Adopting 
Rubinstein’s observations mentioned earlier802 regarding the use of the verb pra/ssein in these 
circumstances, these words should be interpreted as meaning that the naopoioi were required to 
take positive steps to recover the sums owed.  However, nothing is said in the building contracts 
about the steps the naopoioi had to take in order to achieve this, in particular whether and if so 
in what circumstances the naopoioi were required to obtain a court judgment.   
The absence of any mention of the powers of the naopoioi to recover sums owed to the koinon 
could be explained by the possibility that these matters were dealt with in general laws such as 
the naopoi ko\j no/moj referred to later on in the contract in a “sweep up” clause which states 
that this law would apply to anything that was not expressly dealt with in the contract803.  
Unfortunately, however,we have no direct evidence that this law prescribed the steps that the 
naopoioi could or were obliged to take to collect fines from contractors or their guarantors.   
Partsch suggested804 that the naopoioi could immediately enforce (i.e. without a court judgment) 
sums that were ascertainable on the basis of the contract (“die auf Grund des Vertrages 
bestimmbar”).  Here he was referring to the e)pi/pempton (which he considered to be a fine 
payable on a re-letting of the contract), to the increase in price resulting from re-letting the 
contract to a new contractor, and to fixed contractual penalties.  He contrasted these with claims 
which accrued to the koinon on the ground of a contractual right to impose fines (“Forderungen, 
welche dem Staat auf Grund des vertraglichen Rechts der Behörden zur Auferlegung von 
Geldstrafen erwachsen”).  Here he appears to have been referring to fines whose amount was 
not fixed by the contract but was at the discretion of the officials805.  Partsch argued that the 
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naopoioi needed a court judgment in order to recover these types of fine.  However, whilst the 
distinction between fixed fines and fines whose amount was decided by the naopoioi is clear, 
we have no evidence from Boiotia to suggest that different procedures for recovery would apply 
depending on whether the fine was a fixed fine or not.  On the contrary, it is to be noted that in 
the calculation of the final payment to the contractor under the contract for the completion of the 
stelai at the temple of Zeus Basileus, any fines are simply to be deducted from the sums 
otherwise due (Cat#C9 LL57-62).  There is no suggestion that the naopoioi had to go to court to 
obtain an order for payment of some types of fine before they could be deducted.   
On the other hand, if, as I have argued earlier806, the e)pi/pempton was a court fee payable by the 
contractor when one of the naopoioi successfully prosecuted him to enforce payment of a fine, 
there must have been at least some circumstances in which if the contractor and his guarantors 
failed or refused to pay a fine, the officials had to bring them before a court.  Here the procedure 
may have been similar to the one prescribed in the Athenian law of 337/336 BC relating to the 
walls and harbour moles807.  This may have given a contractor or his guarantors an opportunity 
to dispute the fine and it may even have been open to them in some cases to challenge a fine by 
making an application to a court presided over, or consisting of, the naopoioi808, although they 
may have had to pay the e)pi/pempton to the naopoioi before they could proceed.  However, if 
the court consisted of or was presided over by the naopoioi, the guarantor may have regarded 
his prospects of success as remote.   
Under the Lebadeian building contract, if the naopoioi could not recover (by whatever 
procedures they were empowered to take) the sums due from the contractor and his guarantors, 
they were required to write the names of the contractor and his guarantors on whitened 
boards809.  As in the case of the Thespian leases, however, we do not know what the legal effect 
of this was.   
Although we do not know precisely what steps the officials (or any Boiotian citizen) could take 
against the guarantors of defaulting tenants at Thespiai or what steps the naopoioi could take 
against the guarantors of contractors who were alleged to owe a fine under federal building 
contracts, the likelihood is that the threat of such steps could have provided an incentive upon 
the guarantors to comply with their obligations under their guarantees and to ensure that their 
contractors performed.  This incentive would have been reinforced by the fact that, like officials 
in Athens and on independent Delos, every Boiotian official had to render an account of his 
financial conduct to the katoptai/ at the end of his term of office.  The Lebadeian building 
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contract810 refers to a katoptiko\n no/mon, which probably required the naopoioi to render 
their accounts to the federal katoptai/.  There were also katoptai/ at the level of the city who 
had a similar function in regard to city officials811.  Guarantors would therefore be aware that 
the officials would be unlikely to let them avoid their responsibilities.  
An additional issue to be considered in relation to enforcement in Boiotia is how debts could be 
enforced by the community of one Boiotian city against a guarantor who was located in another 
Boiotian city.  We know that there were procedures allowing a private individual who was a 
citizen of one city of the Confederation to register with federal officials defaults in the 
repayment of a loan which that individual had made to another city of the Confederation.  This 
can be seen from the inscription documenting the repayment of a loan by the city of 
Orchomenos to Nikareta, a Thespian citizen, who was owed the sum of 18,333 drachmai by the 
city.  The first step that Nikareta had taken in order to enforce repayment of the sums she had 
lent was to obtain notes of default (u(perameriai/) for the sums owed (Cat#C14 LL61-75).  The 
u(perameriai/ appear to have been documents formally establishing the indebtedness of the city 
of Orchomenos.  They were obtained from the thesmophylakes, a federal board of officials812.  
Possession of these notes of default entitled Nikareta to enforce the debt against the city 
(Nikareta is described in a decree as prattw/saj to\ da/neion ta\n po/lin ka\t ta\j 
u(pe[r]ameri/a[j] ta\j i)w/saj au(tv= - LL45-46).   
It is possible that this process of registration, or a process like it, would also have been available 
where the debtor and creditor roles were reversed, i.e. where the debtor was a private person 
(for example Pisias son of Daikrateis of Thebes, guarantor of Mnasigeneis son of Theodoros 
tenant of land in Thespiai813) and the creditor a public authority (in our example, the city of 
Thespiai).  We find this type of procedure at a local (i.e. non-federal) level, in a decree from 
Iasos dated to 142/141BC, which permitted the officials of the gymnasium in that city to seize 
money that was owed to the gymnasium provided that the officials had first registered 
a)pografai/ with the secretary of the Council with regard to the sums owed814. 
We also know from the Nikareta inscription that there was a law providing for the enforcement 
of a judgment against a citizen of one city of the Confederation by a citizen of another city of 
the Confederation.  The inscription included a contract between Nikareta, the four polemarchs 
of Orchomenos and their ten guarantors providing for Nikareta to be paid the agreed sum on an 
agreed date (Cat#C14 LL78-122).  The contract provided that if either the polemarchs or the 
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guarantors did not pay, execution could be levied against them by Nikareta kata\ to\n no/mon 
(LL104-112). 
The contract went on to say that “enforcement shall be against the borrowers themselves and 
against the guarantors and against one and more than one and against all and against their 
possessions” and that Nikareta could choose any of these methods (LL106-112).  Roesch 
believed that these lines repeated what the law provided.  The contract, he argued, may have 
been placed before the thesmophylakes or perhaps drafted by them in their judicial capacity, or 
may even have been the decision or verdict of the thesmophylakes as a federal judicial authority.  
In Roesch’s view, the law referred to here was therefore a federal law815.  Behrend, however, 
thought it unlikely that the contract repeated the wording of the law and he understood the 
words kata\ to\n no/mon as a reference to the method of enforcement, like the familiar phrase 
kaqa/per e)k di/khj.  He argued that the cross-reference was to an Orchomenian law that could 
be applied by a Thespian by virtue of the federal link between Orchomenos and Thespiai816.  
Migeotte, who believed that the thesmophylakes had an administrative or clerical role rather 
than a judicial one, considered that the contract does not read like a verdict emanating from a 
superior authority and he too rejected Roesch’s theory that LL106-112 set out the text of the 
law.  He regarded the words as those of an enforcement clause in well-known form817.  He 
offered no opinion on whether the law was a federal law or a law of the city of Orchomenos.  
Migeotte is surely right in his view that the contract does not read like the verdict of a judicial 
authority; and it seems unlikely that the contract repeated the wording of the law.  The clause 
gave the creditor the right to take direct action against the debtor without a court judgment.  The 
law referred to could well have been a local law of Orchomenos: whilst we do not know many 
of the details of the legal rights that membership of the Boiotian koinon conferred upon citizens 
of its member states, we do know that it permitted a citizen of one member state to own land in 
the territory of another member state818.  It is possible, therefore, that each citizen of a member 
state may also have had direct access to the courts and legal procedures of the other member 
states.  If these arrangements applied in the Boiotian Confederation, Nikareta, as a citizen of 
Thespiai, may have had the right to enforce payment of a debt owed to her by citizens of 
Orchomenos in Orchomenos by invoking the local laws, of which the law referred to in the 
Nikareta inscription may have been one.  Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be ruled out that 
the law was a federal law dealing with the settlement of disputes between citizens of member 
states.  We find this type of law in the dia/gramma of the Cretan koinon which appears in 
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inscriptions for a brief period from the end of the third century BC until the end of the first 
quarter of the second century819. 
The law in question must have set out the procedures to be followed where one person wished 
to enforce a court judgment against another person; these procedures may have empowered the 
creditor to seize the assets of the debtor in order to satisfy the judgment.  We have no examples 
from Boiotia of any law, decree, or contract giving the community the right by reference to this 
law to collect debts from its contractors, tenants and their guarantors without a judgment.  This 
does not mean that there were no such laws, decrees, or contracts; and the example of Nikareta’s 
contract makes it distinctly possible that they existed.   
Common underlying legal principles and practices – Enforcement of Guarantees 
A review of the evidence from Athens, independent Delos and Boiotia suggests that there may 
have been a number of possible shared principles underlying the enforcement of guarantees. 
Firstly, a person who owed a debt to the community could have his property seized without a 
court judgment having first been obtained against him.  This would have reinforced the 
incentive placed upon guarantors by the immediacy and directness of the guarantor’s 
obligations discussed in chapter 3 to ensure that the contractor performed, to act as the 
community’s enforcer.  There do, however, appear to have been exceptions to enforcement 
without judgment and these may have differed between the three jurisdictions.  The treatment of 
trierarchs in classical Athens is one example.  The case of fines under building contracts at 
Athens is another.  We do not know of any specific exceptions on Delos but references to the 
courts in the accounts suggest that there may well have been some circumstances in which a 
court judgment was required.  There may have been exceptions in Boiotia too but the evidence 
is very tenuous.   
There may also have been differences between the different jurisdictions as to who was 
responsible for pursuing defaulting guarantors, how far and by what means.  At Athens and on 
independent Delos it appears that the Council had a role to play in the collection of sums due 
from those who owed money to the community.  We find no evidence of such a role in Boiotia 
(although this does not necessarily mean there was no such role).  Further, whereas in Athens 
the Council had a pro-active function in the collection of debts, including the imprisonment of 
debtors, on independent Delos the Council seems to have had a more passive role. 
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Secondly, those who were indebted to the community were included in a public register of 
debtors.  In Athens we know in reasonable detail what the legal effect of this was.  On Delos 
and in Boiotia, however, we are frustratingly ignorant about what registration meant.  Further, 
the stage at which such registration would occur seems to have differed between the different 
jurisdictions.  On Delos, in regard to the sacred estates, we know that there were certain steps 
which the hieropoioi had to take to try to recover the amount owed before registering defaulting 
guarantors as debtors.  In the case of leases at Athens and Thespiai on the other hand it seems 
that registration occurred more or less as soon as the amount due was not paid.  At Lebadeia it is 
likely that the naopoioi had to take some steps to recover sums owed before registering a 
building contractor and his guarantors as debtors but we do not know what those steps were.   
Thirdly, those who were indebted to the community were liable to pay in addition a penalty for 
non-payment.  Again there are differences in detail.  In Athens the debt was doubled, on Delos 
and in Thespiai it was only increased by a half, perhaps reflecting a greater difficulty in those 
two jurisdictions at the time of attracting guarantors (as well as contractors). 
Fourthly, officials responsible for the administration of the transaction guaranteed were required 
to submit accounts at the end of their term of office for auditing by other officials.  However, it 
seems that the scope of such audits may have differed as between the three jurisdictions.  Only 
at Athens do we see evidence of the possibility that the matters to be investigated by the 
auditing officials could go beyond matters of dishonesty or corruption by officials to embrace 
for example claims for payment or the imposition of fines which were not justified by the facts 
of the case. 
The evidence from Delos shows that the first two principles of law discussed above could be 
significantly watered down by a failure to implement them.  Here we see that there was a 
general reluctance to deprive guarantors of their property and that the registration of guarantors 
as debtors could sometimes be somewhat half-hearted in that their names were sometimes not 
set out and could at best only be discovered by going back over past records of the award of the 
contracts which they guaranteed.  The approach to enforcement seems to have been particularly 
relaxed in the case of the guarantors of the tenants of the sacred houses and of loans, whose 
unpaid debts could remain outstanding for years.  In relation to the sacred estates, whilst there 
appears to have been a similar reluctance to confiscate property, the bad debts were remarkably 
few.  I have offered some explanations for this phenomenon earlier in this chapter.  One 
explanation is based upon a similarity between the treatment of the tenants and guarantors of the 
sacred estates and the treatment of trierarchs and their guarantors at Athens.  In both cases the 
state/god had to tread a fine line between ensuring that it was not kept out of pocket on the one 
hand and discouraging participation of trierarchs/guarantors by over aggressive debt collection 
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policies on the other.  Other explanations, however, are founded upon two apparent differences 
between enforcement at Athens and enforcement on Delos.  The first is that on Delos the 
i(era\ suggrafh/ imposed a fine on the officials if they failed to exact the rent from the tenants 
of the sacred estates or their guarantors.  This provided a specific incentive designed to ensure 
that the god always received his rent.  The second concerns the differences in the nature of 
society on independent Delos and classical Athens.  Independent Delos was much smaller.  The 
same individual could well be an official, a tenant and a guarantor at different points in his life.  
The success or survival of each of these tenants, guarantors and officials was closely intertwined 
with the success or survival of each of the others and above all with the success of the god and 
his sanctuary.  Thus a very different approach to the practice of enforcement is found on 
independent Delos from that in classical Athens. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
How was the Guarantor’s position protected? 
In chapters three and four we saw that guarantors were in many cases exposed to potentially 
onerous liabilities which were dependent upon the actions or failures to act of other persons 
over whom they might have had no control.  These liabilities could be immediately enforced 
against them by the community through procedures which were, in their initial stages at any 
rate, balanced against guarantors.  Even on independent Delos, where the enforcement regime 
seems to have been somewhat milder than it was in classical Athens and perhaps in Boiotia, 
guarantors could find themselves in difficult situations through no fault of their own.  
In this chapter I will examine ways in which the apparently heavy burden resting upon 
guarantors may have been alleviated.  As indicated in the Introduction820, and as we shall see in 
more detail in this chapter, the interests of the guarantor were sometimes aligned with those of 
the community against those of the contractor and sometimes aligned with those of the 
contractor against the community.  Where the interests of the guarantor were aligned with those 
of the community, the community could, by acting in its own interest against a contractor 
regarding a transaction, indirectly reduce the potential exposure of the guarantor of that 
transaction under his guarantee.  I will examine this in the first part of this chapter.  Where, 
however, the interests of the guarantor were aligned with those of the contractor, the guarantor 
would benefit from the contractor acting in his own interests and the community could become 
involved in a delicate balancing act between looking to its own interests on the one hand and 
reaching agreement with the contractors and guarantors on the other.  This particularly arose 
when it came to settling upon the terms of the contracts to be entered into.  The position became 
even more complex where some of the terms of the contracts would favour the contractor but 
not the guarantor.  I will discuss these issues in the second part of this chapter.  In addition, 
there were steps which guarantors could and did take on their own behalf in order to protect 
their position; yet even here the guarantor might to an extent be dependent upon co-operation 
from the community.  I will consider these in the third part of the chapter. Finally, in the fourth 
part of this chapter, I will examine what the guarantor could do in order to mitigate his losses if 
a call was actually made on his guarantee, whether he could recover the sums he had paid out 
from the contractor and how the community might assist him here too. 
Part One - Where the interests of the community and the guarantor were aligned.   
The community could assist guarantors in reducing their potential exposure by requiring more 
than one guarantor.  We have seen that sometimes this meant that the guarantors would be 
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jointly liable for the whole of the debt and sometimes that each guarantor would be liable for 
only a part of the debt821.  But even where the guarantors were jointly liable for the whole of the 
debt they had guaranteed there was still an advantage to them in being in numbers: they could 
reach an agreement between themselves for the sharing of the debt; they could share any 
monitoring of the performance of the contractor that they considered should be done.  From the 
community’s point of view there were clear advantages in having more than one guarantor for 
larger debts.  If the liability of the guarantors was joint, the community had more than one 
person it could pursue.  There was also an incentive upon each of the guarantors to ensure that 
each of his fellow guarantors was doing what he could to ensure that the contractor did not 
fail822.  If each guarantor was only liable for part of the debt, there could, as already noted823, be 
disadvantages to the community where there were many guarantors, but provided that the 
number of guarantors was kept within reasonable limits spreading the overall liability between a 
number of guarantors could still work to the community’s advantage.  Interestingly, however, it 
was only at Athens that we see the community taking account of its own and the 
guarantors’interests by increasing the number of guarantors.  Here, as we have already seen, in 
many but not all transactions, there seems to have been a correlation between the size of the 
transaction and the number of guarantors.  On independent Delos and Thespiai, on the other 
hand, there seems, with the exception of some types of transaction on Delos, to have been no 
such correlation824.  As suggested earlier825, this may be an indication that there were fewer 
people on Delos, and at Thespiai, who were prepared to put themselves forward as guarantors.   
The community could also help to limit the guarantors’ exposure by requiring the contractor to 
provide not only guarantors but also a hypothecation of real property as security for 
performance of his obligations.  However, as we have already seen826, we find evidence of this 
only in the case of loans from Apollo on independent Delos.  This should in theory have 
provided some comfort for guarantors, who would know that their guarantees were not the only 
security to which the god could have recourse if the borrower defaulted.  However, as has been 
seen827, the apparent reluctance of the hieropoioi to take the drastic step of seizing property 
belonging to a fellow Delian meant that the guarantors were the “first port of call” for the 
hieropoioi if the borrower failed to pay.  The additional form of security may in practice have 
provided only limited comfort, although it is possible that if property had to be seized it would 
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be the borrower’s before the guarantor’s (but we have no evidence to confirm that this was the 
case).   
Part Two – The terms of the contracts. 
The terms of the contract between the contractor and the community could affect the potential 
exposure of the guarantor.  This particularly applied to the terms of payment under building 
contracts.  The guarantor’s exposure could be limited if the terms of payment under the contract 
which he was guaranteeing provided for the contractor to be paid only after he had completed 
the work concerned, rather than in advance.  If payment in arrears was adopted, the guarantor 
would not be responsible for the repayment of the advance if the contractor defaulted before 
completing the work, but only for the penalties resulting from delays or poor work to the extent 
that these amounts exceeded the amount not yet paid for the work.  For example, a document 
from Epidauros dated to the middle of the third century BC828 records that a certain Philon had 
entered into a contract for the construction (or repair) of a starting gate for the games in the 
stadium at Epidauros.  The price was (at least) 200 Alexandrian drachmai.  Philon defaulted.  
The agonothetes and the hellanodikai imposed a fine of 500 drachmai.  In part payment of the 
fine, they withheld an amount of 200 drachmai which was due to him under the contract.  The 
Boula confirmed that the fine was justly imposed.  Because he did not pay the fine, Philon and 
his guarantor now owe not the fine of 500 drachmai but only the balance of 300 drachmai (plus 
a hemiolion)829. 
Other terms of building contracts could also be important.  For example, if the community was 
responsible for the supply of certain materials for the work, then the contractor would not be 
responsible for any delays in completing the work which were caused by shortages of such 
materials and the potential exposure of the guarantor would be reduced. 
We find a wide range of contractual terms from all three of our jurisdictions. 
Athens 
In the contract for the construction of a water channel at the sanctuary of Amphiaraos at Oropos 
(335-322 BC), the price was to be calculated in lengths of four feet at the rate of six drachmai 
per length830.  The contractor was to be paid in advance and he was to complete the work within 
twenty days of receiving the advance payment.  No doubt the advance payment would have 
been based upon an estimate of the length of the channel and there may have been a balancing 
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payment when work had been completed and the actual length constructed was known.  But if 
the contractor defaulted before the work was completed he may well have spent the advance 
payment on labour and materials and would not be able to pay any fine that might be imposed.  
Thus, the fact that an advance payment had been made would increase (possibly significantly) 
the potential risk of the guarantor being called upon actually to make a payment.  To be 
balanced against this, however, would be the provision in the specification that if there was 
insufficient stone available from the specified source for that material, the 
e)pimelhtai\ pro\j tw=i e)/rgwi would provide the shortfall831, thereby reducing the possibility 
of the contractor incurring liability for failing to complete within the stipulated twenty day 
period because of shortage of materials.   
A position more favourable to the guarantor can be seen in the contract for work on the temple 
of Apollo on Delos (Cat#A43).  Here, the contractor was to be paid half (over 2000 drachmai) 
of the contract price in advance (LL21-22).  When half the work was done the contractor would 
be paid another advance of one half of the remaining price (just over 1000 drachmai – LL22-
23).  The balance of the price was payable when the work was completed (L23).  The work had 
to be completed in eight months from contract award (L17), which occurred in the month of 
Boedromion (August - L27).  If the contractor failed to do so, there was a penalty of ten 
drachmai per day (L18).  Any fine could be deducted by the naopoioi from sums owing to the 
contractor.  Since the final payment of over 1000 drachmai was not payable until completion, 
there could be a delay of up to 100 days before the liability of the guarantors was actually 
engaged.  The delay penalty should not, therefore have caused the guarantors too much concern, 
although the unpredictability of the Aegean weather should no doubt never be underestimated, 
particularly when considering that the contract was awarded in August and its successful 
completion depended to a significant extent upon the safe transport of masonry stone from 
Athens.  To be offset against this (albeit perhaps only to a limited extent) would be the fact that 
the provision of metal connecting dowels and lead (which no doubt also had to be imported to 
Delos) was not the responsibility of the contractor (LL8-10).  This may have given the 
guarantor some assurance. 
Different again was the contract reflected in the Erechtheion accounts for 408/407 BC 
(Cat#A13).  Here payments were made as the work went along832.  Thus the risk that, if the 
contractor defaulted, his guarantor might actually have to make a payment would be reduced.   
Independent Delos 
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The building contract for paving work at the temple of Apollo (Cat#B31 – 297BC) provides 
further examples of the ways in which the terms of the contract the guarantor was guaranteeing 
could provide some protection to the guarantor.  Thus although a fine could be imposed for 
delays in completing the work (L3), procedures that applied at the end of the job provided that 
when the work was complete, the contractor was to announce this to the e)pista/tai and the 
architect.  They then had ten days to carry out their approval process, but if they failed to 
declare their approval (or disapproval) within that period, the work would be deemed to be 
complete and the final payment would be payable to the contractor (LL19-21).  This would have 
provided some comfort to the guarantor that completion would not be held up because of delays 
by officials in approving the work. 
With regard to terms of payment, the contract provided that ten percent of the contract price was 
payable only when the work was complete and approved.  As to the rest, half was payable as 
soon as the contractor had provided his guarantors, a quarter when the work was one third 
complete and a quarter when the work was two thirds complete833.   These payments were 
weighted in favour of the contractor.  For most of the job he was being paid in advance.  Only 
towards the end would the value of work done exceed the amount he had been paid.  This 
contract also provided that if the contractor failed to complete the work a fine was payable and 
the e)pista/tai could award the work outstanding to another contractor834.  This meant that if the 
contractor defaulted early on in the job and disappeared with the advance payments, the 
guarantor would have to pay the sanctuary the cost of getting another contractor to carry out 
work for which payment had already been made to the defaulting contractor.  If however, the 
contractor defaulted only towards the end of the job, the guarantor might not have to pay the 
sanctuary anything, if the cost of getting another contractor was less than the ten percent of the 
contract price that had been withheld.  If there were fines to pay, the contract specifically stated 
that the ten percent could be used to pay them835.  This too would have favoured the guarantors. 
The accounts of the hieropoioi for 279BC record the award of a building contract for the 
construction of ceiling coffers in the peristyle of the temple of Apollo.  Under this contract the 
contractors were to be responsible for providing all labour, materials and equipment needed to 
do the work except for the wood, which the temple was to supply836.  The fact that the 
contractors were not responsible for sourcing the wood for work on the island would have 
considerably reduced the risks inherent in this contract from the contractors’ and guarantors’ 
points of view.   
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Under this contract, the price was payable in three instalments.  The first was for half the 
contract price and was probably payable in advance, the second was for half the contract price 
less ten percent of the total contract price and was payable when half the work had been 
completed, and the third was for one tenth of the contract price payable when the work had been 
completed in accordance with the contract837.  Here the payments were balanced further in 
favour of the contractor, in that nine tenths of the contract price will have been paid when only 
half of the work was done.  Under this contract, therefore, the potential exposure of the 
guarantors was greater. 
In another contract, dated to the middle of the third century BC, half the contract price was to be 
paid upon the contractor providing his guarantor, one quarter upon the contractor showing that 
half of the work was complete and the remaining quarter when the work was finished838.  Whilst 
the payments were predominantly in advance, and this placed the guarantor at risk, the payment 
scheme represents a slight variation on the schemes found in the contracts described above in 
that twenty five percent instead of only ten percent of the contract price was to be withheld until 
completion.  This could have given the guarantor more confidence in putting himself forward.  
If the contractor failed to complete the work within thirty days, the hieropoioi were entitled to 
levy a penalty of two drachmai per day of delay839.  In these circumstances, the hieropoioi 
would probably have had 25% of the contract price still to pay.  We know that the contract price 
was 230 drachmai840.  Thus there could be almost thirty days’ delay (on an original contract 
period of thirty days) before the twenty five percent of the contract price in the hands of the 
hieropoioi had been exhausted and the guarantor might be called upon to pay anything towards 
the fine.  This would be of some reassurance to the guarantor.   
The way in which the right payment terms could be of significant benefit to the guarantors is 
illustrated by the accounts of the hieropoioi dated to c280BC.  As has already been seen841, these 
record that a guarantor, Antigonos son of Andromenes, was paid 133 drachmai for completing 
outstanding work originally undertaken by a contractor, Aristokles.  It appears that Aristokles 
had defaulted before he completed the work and that there were sums payable under the contract 
that had not yet been paid.  Antigonos decided to finish the work himself and be paid the final 
payment by the hieropoioi.  We do not know how much work remained to be executed, but 
presumably Antigonos could get it done more cheaply than the hieropoioi could.  He might 
even have made a profit!   
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Similarly, as has already been seen842, the accounts of the hieropoioi for 279BC record that the 
guarantors of a building contract have completed the work in accordance with the contract and 
that payment of one tenth has been made to them.  Presumably, this is the final ten percent 
instalment payment of the kind mentioned above.  Had the ten percent not been retained, the 
guarantors would be completing the work at their own expense and without any payment from 
the god.   
Finally, it can be noted that there are examples in the accounts of the hieropoioi making 
deductions for fines and then paying the balance to the contractor - a)pe/domen ...... 
u(perelo/ntej to\ e)pitimhqe\n draxma\j 12843.  The guarantor was not involved because 
payment under the contract was, at this point, to be made in arrears.   
Lebadeia 
The contract terms for the provision, erection and engraving of stelai at the temple of Zeus 
Basileus at Lebadeia contained an interesting mixture of provisions (Cat#C9 LL47-62).   
The first instalment was to be paid upon production of guarantors.  This payment was to be the 
agreed amount for placing in position all the stelai with the coping stones on them.  This was in 
effect a payment in advance and would therefore have involved a certain amount of exposure 
for the guarantors (depending upon the size of the payment) until that section of the work had 
been completed.  However, ten per cent was to be withheld by the naopoioi from this payment, 
thus reducing the guarantors’ potential exposure.   
The second instalment appears to have been partly a payment in arrears and partly a payment in 
advance.  It was to be made when the contractor demonstrated that he had completed all the 
stelai, fixed with molten lead in accordance with the contract and to the approval of the 
naopoioi and the architect.  To the extent that this was not covered by the first payment, this is a 
payment in arrears.  However, the payment also included an amount for the engraving work 
based upon the number of letters in the copy of the documents that had to be transcribed onto 
the stelai at the rate referred to earlier in the inscription (one stater three oboloi per thousand 
letters – LL10-12).  Since the payment is calculated by reference to the documents to be 
transcribed rather than the letters actually engraved, this part of the payment was probably an 
advance instalment.  This is confirmed by the reference to further payment for engraving work 
in the third and final payment.  Without knowing how much of this second instalment was for 
work done and how much was in advance we cannot make an assessment of the guarantors’ 
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potential exposure.  Once again, however, such exposure was mitigated by the fact that ten per 
cent was to be withheld by the naopoioi.   
 
The final instalment was to be paid when the whole of the work had been completed and 
approved.  This payment consisted of the release of the ten per cent withheld from the previous 
payments together with payment for the footings actually laid by the contractor (this may have 
been a balancing payment to top up the advance payment made in the first instalment to take 
account of the actual number of footings laid) at the rate referred to earlier in the inscription 
(five drachmai per stone – LL8-10), and payment for letters engraved since the contractor 
received the second payment.  From these payments are to be deducted any fines that the 
contractor has incurred.  This is a payment in arrears and the guarantor therefore has the comfort 
of knowing that, at this stage, he will not have to make any payment to the naopoioi unless not 
only the ten per cent withheld from previous payments but also the value of the footings work 
and any additional engraving are, in total, insufficient to meet the contractor’s liability for any 
fines. 
So far as concerned payment, therefore, these contract terms appear to have been reasonably 
well balanced from the point of view of the guarantors’ potential exposure if the contractor 
defaulted.  
Other provisions of the contract would also have been important.  For example, the contract 
provided (Cat#C9 LL65-67) that if any soft ground was discovered when clearing the area 
where the stelai were to be placed, the contractor would be paid the cost of any additional 
footings required.  The guarantor thus had the comfort of knowing that the contractor’s price did 
not have to cover this extra work, thus substantially reducing the likelihood of the contractor 
defaulting should this eventuality occur.   
Against this would have to be weighed the circumstances in which fines might be imposed by 
the naopoioi for non-compliance with the contract terms.  As we have seen844, these are set out 
at length in the inscription.  The broad range of circumstances in which the naopoioi and the 
boiotarchs could impose fines and the fact that in some cases the amount of the fine was left to 
their discretion made the contract potentially very onerous.   If these wide powers were 
exercised this could expose the guarantors to potential calls upon their guarantees. 
Further, anyone found guilty of bad workmanship was to be expelled from the site and not 
readmitted (LL19-22).  This may also have been of particular concern to the guarantor: 
replacement workmen may not have been that easy to find.  Finally, the naopoioi appear to have 
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had the power to order suitable additions to the work without compensation or time allowance 
being given to the contractor (LL22-24).  If the naopoioi exercised this right this would put 
pressure on the contractor’s resources and increase the possibility of a default. 
Finally, LL29-40 of the contract required the contractor to be responsible for any damage to the 
stones and to replace or repair these stones at his own expense.  Similar provisions are included 
in the other Lebadeian contracts (Cat#C11 LL9-18 and Cat#C12 LL21-33).  Although no fines 
are attached to these provisions, they could result in delays to the work and the contractor might 
find it hard to absorb the extra cost.  These would be matters of concern to the guarantors.   
On the other hand, it is to be noted that the contracts contained a provision that relieved the 
contractor from liability if there was a natural fault in the stone845; and a provision was included 
in the contract in Cat#C9 LL45-47 that if the naopoioi delayed the contractor in the process of 
the provision of the stones, they had to allow him more time to complete.  These provisions 
protected not only the contractors but also their guarantors. 
It can be seen from the review of the terms of the contracts set out above that, in all three 
jurisdictions, the potential for guarantors to be exposed to calls on their guarantees could be 
greatly reduced by payment terms which provided for part of the contract price to be paid in 
arrears or for a percentage of the price to be withheld from interim payments.  Inclusion of 
provisions that relieved the contractor of responsibility for certain events or imposed 
responsibility for certain matters upon the community could also have given guarantors some 
comfort that the contractor would not be overstretched if events should occur over which they 
had no control846.   
The wide variations in the detailed terms of the contracts that have survived, particularly the 
payment terms, suggest that in many cases they may have been negotiated.  The contractor 
would most likely prefer payments in advance and provisions which reduced his 
responsibilities.  The community would probably want to see the work done before paying 
anything and to place as much responsibility as possible on the contractors.    
We can perhaps see evidence that negotiations had taken place in the contract from Delos dated 
to the middle of the third century BC.  This contained a provision about the time (calculated in 
months) that the contractor was allowed to complete the work calculated from the date when he 
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received his first payment under the contract.  However there is a gap in the text where the 
number of months should have been given847.  Later in the contract, however, it is provided that 
if the contractor does not show that the work has been completed within the stipulated time of 
thirty days he is to pay a fine848.  It appears that a period that was to be calculated in months is 
now calculated in days.  This inconsistency in the text could merely be an engraver’s error.  
However, it could also reflect the fact that the detailed terms of the contract would sometimes 
be the subject of negotiation, which might have gone on right up to the point when the parties 
committed themselves to the contract and its terms were recorded on the stone.   
We can perhaps also see evidence of negotiations in the record of three contracts relating to the 
construction of a portico at Eleusis in 354/353BC (Cat#A25).  The first was for the foundations, 
the total area of which, in plan, was 8 feet by 30 ft (see LL4-5) i.e. 240 square feet.  The price 
was recorded as 1½ drachmai per square foot: 400 drachmai (L16).  As Kirchner in IG II2 
pointed out, 240 square feet at 1½ drachmai per square foot gives a price of 360 drachmai, not 
400 drachmai.  To explain this, Kirchner suggested that the total price included a ten percent 
retention figure, to be retained by the temple until the work was completed to the satisfaction of 
the architect.  But Kirchner does not explain why the contractor should receive an extra payment 
over and above the rate of 1½ drachmai per square foot.  Perhaps it was negotiated: one can 
envisage the contractor asking for more but the temple resisting and a compromise being 
reached on the basis that the contractor would receive the extra payment but only after he had 
completed the work.  This should also have been acceptable to the guarantors since the final 
payment was to be made in arrears.   
Further evidence that the contracts may have been negotiated can be seen in the Lebadeian 
building contracts.  In the terms set out in Cat#C9 LL1-5, and probably Cat#C12 LL40-43, the 
contractor and his guarantors were not required to pay the hemiolion on sums owed to the 
sanctuary.  This may be contrasted with the stipulations of Cat#C11 LL1-7, and the provisions 
of Cat#C9 LL29-40, both of which provided for payment of the hemiolion849.  It is hard to 
explain these inconsistencies850; unless they are to be regarded as an indication that there had 
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been a negotiation of the terms of the contract in which the naopoioi thought it appropriate to 
make a concession to the contractors and their guarantors in some cases851.   
The differences in the detailed terms between the various contracts must also have reflected 
differences in the balance of bargaining power in particular cases between the contractor and the 
community, but may also have reflected the influence of the guarantors.  Where the interests of 
the guarantors were aligned with those of the contractor, the community would not wish to deter 
guarantors by proposing contract terms that exposed the guarantors to excessive risk.  On the 
other hand, where the interests of the community and the guarantors were aligned, the 
community could have involved the guarantor to resist demands by contractors for advance 
payments.   
We know that most of the guarantors in all three jurisdictions were citizens and, as citizens, they 
would have had access to political and legal procedures which could allow them to influence the 
letting of contracts of various different types by the community.  If a guarantor was wealthy, he 
may have been a man of influence and could have been involved in negotiations.  In the case of 
the Lebadeian building contracts, for example, we know that the guarantors were required to be 
a)cio/xreoi852.  They may well have been men of sufficient influence in the Boiotian koinon or 
in the Boiotian cult of Zeus Basileus to enable them to take steps to protect their position as 
guarantors should they wish to offer themselves to perform that role.  At the same time some 
contractors may have had particular skills which the community was anxious to use.  This gave 
them bargaining power which could have been yet another reason for the differences in detail 
between the terms of many of the contracts. 
Part Three - Steps which guarantors could take on their own behalf. 
One way in which a guarantor could limit his potential exposure under his guarantee would be 
by ensuring that he had a close working relationship with the man whose performance he was 
guaranteeing.  We have already seen853 evidence of family relationships between guarantor and 
contractor.  Such a relationship could provide the guarantor with an obvious opportunity to 
influence the contractor’s conduct, although much would depend upon the actual relationship in 
question in each case.  However, as discussed, this may have presented the community with a 
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difficulty on occasions and in such cases the guarantor would have been dependent upon the 
community agreeing to accept as guarantor someone from the contractor’s close family854.   
Other types of relationship may have been important.  Walbank has suggested855 that the record 
of property sold at Athens c350-325BC (Cat#A19) reveals that the guarantors may have been 
neighbours of the purchasers, though often not close neighbours856.   Whether this meant that the 
guarantor would have any influence over the contractor would depend very much on the type of 
transaction and sums involved.  Regrettably, we do not know exactly what was being sold in 
this inscription or even the prices.  
In other cases, there may have been an important commercial relationship between guarantor 
and contractor which may have given the former influence over the latter.  For example, in the 
case of leases, where a guarantor, A, stood as guarantor of a tenant, B, of one property and that 
tenant, B, agreed to stand as guarantor of A as tenant of another property, a relationship of 
mutual financial dependency could be created such that a default by A as tenant could affect the 
ability of B as tenant to pay his rent which could in turn result in A being called upon under his 
guarantee of B; and vice versa.  Such an arrangement could have created the kind of close 
working relationship which gave the guarantors influence over the tenants.  At the same time, 
however, it could have been to the disadvantage of the community that the fortunes of 
guarantors and tenants should be so closely interwoven and the guarantors may therefore have 
been dependant upon the community agreeing to these arrangements.  This may explain why, 
from our three jurisdictions, we only have examples of this from Thespiai, although this may be 
no more than the result of the accidents of survival of our evidence.  Two of these examples 
were mentioned earlier857: Klearetos son of Medon stood as guarantor for Eukrateis son of 
Damokrateis in respect of the latter’s tenancy of a property belonging to Hermes, and Eukrateis 
stood in turn as guarantor for Klearetos in respect of Klearetos’ tenancy of another property 
belonging to Hermes; likewise, Aristokritos son of Aristokritos stood as guarantor for Saon son 
of Hiaron in respect of four tenancies and Saon stood as guarantor for Aristokritos in respect of 
one tenancy. 
A more complex web of relationships between tenants and guarantors, also mentioned earlier858, 
is found in the records of the leases of two properties at Athens from c330-320 BC (Cat#A33 
LL27-37).  It will be recalled that a second property was leased to the brother of the guarantor 
of the lease of the first property and guaranteed by the tenant, or the brother of the tenant, of the 
                                                
854
 See pp78-79, 96-98 and 103. 
855
 Walbank (1995:69ff).   
856
 For example, Philippos of Halai guaranteed the purchase by Aristomachos, also of Halai (col. II LL9-10). 
857
 pp104-105. 
858
 pp79-80. 
 190
lease of the first property.  A default by the tenant of the first property under his lease would 
expose the guarantor of the first property to liability that could impact upon that guarantor’s 
brother, who was the tenant of the second property.  If he then defaulted under his lease, that 
would lead to exposure of the guarantor of the second property, who was the first tenant or the 
first tenant’s brother, to liability.  These arrangements created a relationship between tenants 
and guarantors and their respective families rather like a partnership that placed the guarantors 
in a position of influence over the tenants.  However, as already pointed out, if that influence 
was not exercised or was ineffective, the consequences could be serious for all, including the 
community.  The officials would therefore have to think twice before accepting guarantors who 
were operating under these types of arrangements.   
A guarantor could also limit his exposure by being careful whose obligations he agreed to 
guarantee.  One could expect a man of substance to be more likely to perform and therefore less 
likely to cause a call to be made upon the guarantee.  We have already seen that, at least in 
Athens and on independent Delos, numerous contractors were themselves wealthy 
individuals859.  Here, the interests of the guarantor and the community were aligned and the 
community could make the position of the guarantors more secure by selecting individuals 
whom it knew to be wealthy as contractors.  In many cases, however, the community may have 
relied upon the guarantor to carry out the necessary due diligence on the contractor.  This is 
indicated for example by the provisions of the building contracts from all three jurisdictions 
which stated that the contractor would receive payment only when he had provided guarantors 
(Cat#A43 LL21-22; Cat#B35 LL20-23; Cat#C9 LL47-48).  It is also implicit in the provisions 
of the Thespian prorrh/seij which provided that if the tenant failed to produce guarantors the 
land would be re-let, a position which also seems to have applied to the leases of the sacred 
estates and the sacred houses on independent Delos860.  In each case, if the contractor could not 
produce guarantors, the transaction would not go ahead.  Further, on independent Delos, the fact 
that the tenants of the sacred estates and houses were required to renew their guarantors every 
year861 indicates that the sanctuary relied upon the guarantors to monitor the creditworthiness of 
tenants.   
But even wealthy contractors sometimes defaulted, as is illustrated at Athens by the record in 
the accounts of the supervisors of the dockyard for 334/333BC that Philomelos son of Menekles 
of Cholargos was summoned into court and ordered to pay double when the trierarch, Eupolis 
son of Pronapes of Aixone, failed to pay a debt that Philomelos had guaranteed862.  From 
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independent Delos too, there is evidence that even wealthy individuals sometimes defaulted 
with the result that calls were made upon their guarantors863.  In the end the risk of insolvency of 
the contractor lay with the guarantor.   
On independent Delos, the requirement for the tenants of the sacred estates and houses to renew 
their guarantors every year was primarily designed to protect the interests of the god.  As 
mentioned earlier864, it provided the hieropoioi with a means of checking the tenant’s continuing 
ability to perform his obligations under the lease.  However, the requirement to renew could 
also assist the guarantor.  He could limit his exposure by refusing to renew his guarantee.  If he 
did, and the tenant was unable to find a replacement guarantor, the property would be re-let to a 
new tenant.  If this happened, the guarantor could still find himself exposed if the new rent was 
less than the original rent and the original tenant was unable or unwilling to pay the shortfall865.  
However, it could be preferable from the guarantor’s point of view to withdraw, particularly if 
he was confident that the estate could be re-let at the same rent866, and if the tenant was able to 
find new guarantors, the original guarantor would of course have no liability.  The advantages 
of withdrawing are illustrated by the case of Protoleos, one of the guarantors of Apemantos son 
of Leophon, tenant of one of the houses of Episthenes.  Proteleos paid his share of the rent he 
had guaranteed in 279BC.  In the following year we find that he is no longer Apemantos’ 
guarantor.  This appears to have been a wise decision on his part, because in that year the new 
guarantor appears to have had to pay on behalf of Apemantos867.  Protoleos’ decision can be 
compared with that of Teisikles son of Lyses.  As guarantor of Tolmides of Paros, tenant of 
another of the houses of Episthenes, Teisikles, with his co-guarantor, paid the rent for Tolmides 
in 279BC.  We find that he was still guarantor in the following year and he appears to have had 
to pay the rent again.  By 274BC, however, Teisikles had ceased to be Tolmides’ guarantor.  On 
this occasion another guarantor paid the rent868. 
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The absence of evidence for the practice of renewing guarantors from classical Athens and the 
koinon of Boiotia of the third century BC does not necessarily mean that it did not exist in those 
jurisdictions too.  However, if it did not, the role of the guarantor of leases in those two 
jurisdictions could be considerably more onerous than it was on independent Delos. 
The guarantor could also limit his exposure by limiting the number of transactions for which he 
stood as guarantor for the same contractor.  From Athens, we have an example of a guarantor 
who failed to do this to his cost: Meixidemos had stood as guarantor for three men under five 
transactions.  They all defaulted and Meixidemos was unable to pay.  His property was 
confiscated and sold in satisfaction of the debt (Cat#A30 LL463-498)869. 
The evidence of Meixidemos’ transactions may be contrasted with that found on the record of 
the grant of leases on Salamis of the mid fourth century BC (Cat#A18).  Here, one of the 
tenants, Naumachos of Perithoidai, held two leases with a combined rent of 50 drachmai, but 
with a different guarantor for each lease, Nausigenes son of Nausikles of Anagyrous (LL5-7) 
and Smikythion son of Isonomos (LL8-9).  It is possible that his first guarantor decided not to 
put himself forward for a second time, thereby prudently limiting his exposure to one person. 
Similarly, the record of property sold at Athens c350-325BC (Cat#A19) shows that, as Walbank 
noted870, where the same purchaser buys more than one property he has a different guarantor for 
each purchase: Aristomachos of Halai purchased two properties (col. II LL9-12);  Xenokles of 
Sphettos purchased three properties (col. II LL20-25)871; his brother, Androkles of Sphettos, also 
purchased three properties (col. II LL26-31); finally, a purchaser whose name ended in 
“machos” and whose deme was Oe purchased two properties (col. II LL32-35).   
The bulk records of leases of sacred lands show that Aristodemos son of Aristokles of Oinoë 
leased two properties in about 330BC at annual rents of 122 and 180 drachmai.  In each case, 
Aristodemos provided a different guarantor872.   
It is possible that the community had some part to play here by refusing to accept the same 
person as guarantor of more than one transaction involving the same individual.  In doing so, 
the community would have been acting in its own interest and thereby indirectly protecting 
guarantors from over-exposure.  However, there is not enough evidence for us to conclude that 
there was a rule that a tenant/purchaser of more than one property had to provide different 
guarantors. 
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On independent Delos, the picture is more mixed.  The accounts for 250BC show that 
Mnesimachos son of Autokrates had different guarantors for his tenancy of Chareteia and for 
his loan of 1000 drachmai.  This was prudent from his guarantors’ perspective; it appears that in 
250BC Mnesimachos had run into financial difficulties.  His guarantors for Chareteia refused to 
renew and his guarantor for the loan had to pay the balance of the interest that he owed that 
year873.  Similarly, Pythokles son of Pherekleides, a man of a wealthy family according to the 
criteria I have adopted in chapter 1, was tenant of two of the sacred estates in 250BC, Nikou 
Choros and Porthmos, but he provided different guarantors for each estate874.  On the other 
hand, in 250BC Autokles son of Teleson provided the same guarantors for his tenancy of 
Limnai as for two loans totalling 600 drachmai875.  Further, Autokles was probably related to 
both his guarantors876.  On the face of it, this was not a very satisfactory position for the 
hieropoioi to accept, and it could have been somewhat risky from the point of view of the 
guarantors too. 
In contrast to both Athens and Delos, at Thespiai we find fifteen instances where a guarantor 
stood as guarantor for the same tenant in respect of the leases of two properties877, one instance 
where the guarantor guaranteed the leases of four properties for the same tenant878 and one 
where the guarantor guaranteed five879.   
It is hard to explain the different practices in regard to “repeat” guarantors between Athens, 
Delos and Thespiai.  It is possible that the differences are simply the result of the accidents of 
survival of the evidence.  However, it could also be argued that the apparent greater willingness 
on independent Delos and at Thespiai to accept “repeat” guarantors may be an indication that 
there was a much smaller “pool” of potential guarantors available in those two city states than 
there was at classical Athens.   
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Part Four - What could the guarantor do if a call was made on his guarantee?   
There were various steps a guarantor could take to mitigate his loss if the community made a 
demand upon him under his guarantee.   
In the case of building contracts, the guarantor could attempt to minimise the amount he had to 
pay out under his guarantee if the contractor defaulted by taking over the contract and 
performing the work himself.  We have already noted examples from classical Athens and 
independent Delos of a guarantor actually doing building work (or procuring that it be done by 
others) following default by the contractors and I have suggested880 that this may indeed have 
been expected of him.  It may have been cheaper for him to do the work than for the community 
to organise others to do it and then recover the cost from the guarantor.  Where a payment 
became due from the community following completion of the work by the guarantor, this would 
further reduce the guarantor’s costs.    
A similar idea may have been behind a provision in the i(era\ suggrafh\ which appears to have 
provided that where the tenant of one of the sacred estates died, his guarantors could in certain 
circumstances take over the lease.  These lines of the i(era\ suggrafh\ are very fragmentary, 
but it appears that this option was open to the guarantors where the tenant’s heirs were still 
children at the date of the tenant’s death.  If the guarantors chose to take up the option, they did 
so as trustees for the heirs.  The approval of the hieropoioi to the guarantors continuing with the 
lease may have been required881. The guarantors would of course incur a cost in continuing with 
the lease, but they may have been able to recoup that cost from the revenue generated by the 
operation of the sacred estate.   
It also appears from these lines that where the tenant’s heirs were of full age at the date of the 
tenant’s death, they too had the option of continuing with the lease, but if they decided not to 
take up the option the land would be re-let and the heirs would be liable for any shortfall 
between the new rent and the old.  It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that where (i) the 
heirs were still children at the date of the tenant’s death, (ii) the guarantors decided not to take 
up the option to take over the lease as trustees for the heirs and (iii) the land was re-let at a 
lower rent, the guarantors would be liable for the shortfall882.  If this assumption is correct, it is 
likely that, if the land could not be re-let at the same or a higher rent, the guarantors would 
prefer the option of continuing with the lease until the heirs came of age.  The i(era\ 
suggrafh\ gave the guarantors the opportunity of avoiding a call on their guarantees by 
performing the lease contract themselves as trustees of the heirs.   
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In other cases where a call was actually made upon his guarantee, however, the guarantor was 
left with the possibility of recovering the amount he had paid out from the defaulting contractor. 
There is no evidence from Boiotia to indicate that the guarantor who had paid out had a right to 
claim that sum in turn from the contractor.  At Athens, however, there does appear to have been 
such a right.  In Demosthenes 33, the speaker says that he had stood as guarantor for Apatourios 
in respect of a loan of 30 minae made to Apatourios by a banker, Herakleides (33.7).  The 
speaker also claims that he agreed to act as intermediary in respect of a loan of 10 minae agreed 
to be made by Parmenon to Apatourios (33.8) and that he took security, which MacDowell has 
in my view correctly interpreted as being in the form of a prasis epi lysei883, over Apatourios’ 
ship and slaves in respect of both Parmenon’s loan of 10 minae and the loan of 30 minae which 
the speaker had guaranteed: 
w)nh\n poiou=mai th=j new\j kai\ tw=n pai/dwn, e(/wj a)podoi/h ta/j te de/ka mna=j, a(\j di' 
e)mou= e)/labe, kai\ ta\j tria/konta, w(=n kate/sthsen e)me\ e)gguhth\n t%= trapezi/t$.  
Beauchet rightly in my opinion described the taking of security by the speaker in his capacity as 
guarantor as one of the precautions that a guarantor could take against the insolvency of the 
contractor and which could take various forms according to the case884.  Partsch regarded this as 
an example of an agreement by the contractor (Apatourios) to place at the disposal of the 
guarantor (the speaker) the means to make a payment arising from the e)ggu/h885.  Partsch had 
argued that the contractor was under a legal duty to protect his guarantor from liability and that 
if he failed in that duty the guarantor would have a claim against him for the amount which the 
guarantor had had to pay out under his guarantee886.  Further, the guarantor had the right to take 
security over the property of the contractor in advance of any call being made upon his 
guarantee in order to assure himself of the necessary means of fulfilling his guarantee887.  
Partsch’s arguments are compelling and certainly they help to explain why in Demosthenes 33 
Apatourios agreed to grant the speaker security, even though the loan of 30 minae had already 
been made (33.7 h)/dh de\ tw=n tria/konta mnw=n peporisme/nwn).  
We find further evidence of the guarantor’s rights against the contractor in the horos stones 
from Attica.  One of these (Cat#A38) records a prasis epi lysei for the sum of 3000 
drachmai  (Agnodh/m[w]i kai\ sunenguhtai=j.  Harris has probably correctly argued that here 
“an unnamed individual has pledged his land and house as security to Hagnodemos and others 
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who are acting as his sureties for another transaction”888.  In other words, Hagnodemos and his 
fellow guarantors have agreed to stand as guarantors for the contractor on condition that the 
contractor provides security for the eventuality that he defaults on his obligations and 
Hagnodemos and his fellow guarantors have to pay the contractor’s creditor.  The contractor’s 
name is not known.  Nor were his obligations necessarily owed to the community.  The security 
is provided by way of a prasis epi lysei of the contractor’s land, which would remain in place 
until the contractor had performed whatever obligations the guarantors had guaranteed889.   
A similar interpretation can be applied to another horos stone from Attica that mentions 
guarantors (Cat#A39).  This concerns an eranos loan.  The translation of Tuite, as adjusted by 
Harris, would be as follows: “Horos of a house sold (i.e. pledged as security) to De[xithe]us of 
Melite in regard to the pledge of personal security which he (De[xithe]us) gave to Dion (?) (for 
repayment) for the five-hundred drachma eranos loan.  The person who collected the loan was 
Demo.  Until it expires…”890  This translation is said to be based upon the parallel which Harris 
rightly saw between the language of this stone ([e)ggu/]hj hÂj e)negu/h[sato DiY]w=na tou= 
e)ra/n[ou]) and that which appears in the poletai records for 342/341BC, which record the 
confiscation and sale of property of Meixidemos of Myrrhinous following his failure to pay to 
the state sums he owed as a guarantor (Cat#A30 LL463-498), for example:  
Meicidh/mou Mur o)fei¿lontoj tw½i dhmosi¿wi tw½i  ¹Aqhnai¿wn e)ggu/hn hÁn e)neguh/sat
o Filisti¿dhn Filisti¿dou Ai¹c (LL468-470)891   
Strictly speaking, however, Harris and Tuite’s translation does not accurately follow the 
parallel.  De[xithe]us’ “pledge of personal security” (i.e. his guarantee) would not have been 
given to Dion(?), who was the borrower, but on behalf of Dion to the lenders, Demo and her 
fellow eranistai.   
Harris argued that the reason why the debtor has pledged his property to a guarantor rather than 
to the person who collected the eranos loan and the others who contributed to it892 was that 
Demo, as a woman, was unable to initiate legal proceedings.  "This meant that if the borrower 
defaulted on his payments, she could not proceed against him in court or seize his property.  For 
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this reason (De[xithe]us) intervened and pledged to repay the loan in case the borrower 
defaulted.  In exchange for this pledge, (De[xithe]us) obtained from the borrower the right to 
claim his property in the event that the latter could not repay”.  However, whatever the reasons 
may have been for structuring the transaction in this way, it is clear that De[xithe]us is acting as 
a guarantor and, like the speaker in Demosthenes 33, he is therefore taking security over the 
debtor’s land as a means of protecting his interests in case the debtor defaults.  
In addition to having the right to recover sums paid out from the contractor, it seems that a 
guarantor who paid a contractor’s debt could stand in the shoes of the contractor vis-à-vis those 
who were indebted to the contractor so that he could use the sums recovered from the 
contractor’s debtors to reimburse himself for the sums which he had paid out under his 
guarantee.  In Demosthenes 33, the speaker says that after the loan had been made to 
Apatourios, Herakleides the banker went bankrupt.  The speaker then records that he discussed 
the position with Herakleides’ guarantors and agreed to assign the security that he had taken 
over Apatourios’ ship to them (Dem.33.10).  These guarantors were the guarantors of 
Herakleides’ debts and it seems that they may have been looking for ways of recovering sums 
which they had paid out on behalf of Herakleides.  They would inevitably look to the loan that 
Herakleides had made to Apatourios, and to the guarantor of that loan, the speaker in 
Demosthenes 33.   
We can see another possible example of this in the Erechtheion accounts for 408/407 BC 
(Cat#A13) which, it will be recalled, recorded the names of both a contractor and his guarantor 
in connection with a payment for work done.  I have argued earlier893 that the reason why we 
find a reference to the guarantor here may have been that the guarantor was coming to the aid of 
the contractor by carrying out work himself.  We can now go further and argue that he may have 
been entitled to payment not only because he had done the work but also because, having 
fulfilled his guarantee, he was entitled to access to the contractor’s right to payment.   
As in classical Athens, so on independent Delos, the guarantor appears to have had a right to 
recover from the defaulting contractor the sums he had been compelled to pay out on his behalf.  
This can be seen from the i(era\ suggrafh\, which, as we have seen894, provided a specific 
procedure to enable a guarantor who had paid the rent for a tenant of a sacred estate to recover it 
from the defaulting tenant.  It required the Council to inscribe the tenant as owing to his 
guarantor one and a half times the amount that the hieropoioi had collected from the guarantor, 
or that the guarantor had paid on behalf of the tenant, in the same manner as the Council 
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inscribes debtors (kaqa/per tou\j w)flhko/taj); and the tenants were to be classified as 
debtors who are overdue with their payments (kai\ ei)=nai tou\j e)ggrafe/ntaj 
u(pe[r]hme/rouj kata\ to\n no/mon).  If the Council does not so record it, it is to pay the 
guarantor double the money he paid895.   
Unfortunately, no records of such inscriptions have survived.  Partsch argued that the effect of 
the provision was to transfer to the guarantor the right of the state to enforce payment of the 
debt896.  This is based upon the words kaqa/per tou\j w)flhko/taj – in the same way as those 
who are public debtors.  However, it seems more likely that, as Vial argued, the role of the 
Council was to establish officially the obligations of the debtors towards their guarantors who 
had been required to pay a sum to the god.  The Council’s function was to provide in an official 
and legal manner written proof that an individual owed a sum of money to another individual.  
This was valid proof that would allow the guarantor to undertake private legal proceedings to 
recover the money897.  Here, then, we see the community giving assistance to guarantors by way 
of specific legislation adding a h(mioli/on to the debt and enabling them to recover from the 
defaulting contractors.  This should have provided some encouragement to guarantors to put 
themselves forward.  Vial believed that the Council would have performed the same role in 
relation to the guarantors of other types of debtors, including tenants of the sacred houses and 
borrowers of sacred monies.  We have no direct proof of this.   
Finally, the idea which we have already seen at Athens that a guarantor who paid could stand in 
the shoes of the contractor vis-à-vis the contractor’s debtors may also have been recognised on 
independent Delos. We can see this in the records of payments made to guarantors of building 
contracts who had completed the work in accordance with the contract898.  One record in 
particular, from 279BC, states that payment of one tenth has been made to them “on behalf of 
the contractor”899.  By completing the work himself, the guarantor had effectively “paid” what 
was required of him under his guarantee.  He therefore stood in the shoes of the contractor and 
could recover payment of what was due to the contractor from the god (in this case the 
remaining one tenth of the contract price).   
Common underlying legal principles and practices - How was the Guarantor’s position 
protected?   
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So far as concerns the actions open to a guarantor discussed in Part Four above, there were in 
my view three underlying principles at work.   
Firstly, a guarantor was entitled to take security over the property of the contractor in order to 
protect himself against the risk that the guarantor might be required to pay out under this 
guarantee.  Secondly, a guarantor who had paid out under his guarantee was entitled to recover 
the amount he had paid from the contractor.  Thirdly, a guarantor who had paid was entitled to 
stand into the shoes of the contractor vis-à-vis the contractor’s own debtors and to use any 
money recovered from those debtors towards the satisfaction of the amounts which he had paid 
out under his guarantee.  The three principles are linked in that the first principle (that the 
guarantor was entitled to take security) aniticipated the second principle (that the guarantor who 
had paid was entitled to be reimbursed by the contractor) and the third principle (that the 
guarantor who had paid was entitled to stand in the shoes of the contractor) was a corollary of 
the first principle (that the guarantor could take security over the contractor’s property 
(including his contractual rights against others)).  The fact that the evidence for these principles 
comes only from Athens and Delos should however give us pause for thought, since Athens 
dominated the sacred island for such a long period.  On the other hand the fact that we find no 
evidence of these principles from Boiotia does not necessarily mean that the guarantor in 
Boiotia had no such rights.   
Delos is particularly noteworthy in extending the second principle by introducing through the 
i(era\ suggrafh/ a mechanism designed to assist guarantors in recovering the sums they had 
paid out from the defaulting contractor.  
As to the other ways in which a guarantor’s position could be protected, we have already 
noted900 that the fact that at Athens and on independent Delos the guarantor of a building 
contract might sometimes himself carry out and complete the work that the contractor had failed 
to do could be regarded as an application to building contracts of the principle of the direct and 
separate obligation of the guarantor. 
Apart from this, it is hard to find any common underlying legal principles or practices.  On the 
contrary, we have already seen that there were differences in approach in regard to the number 
of guarantors required901, requiring security over property in addition to personal guarantors902  
and requiring the contractor to renew his guarantors903.  The fact that the community, the 
contractors and their guarantors in all three jurisdictions appear to have been ready on occasions 
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to negotiate the terms of the contracts which would be put in place between the community and 
the contractor does not seem to me to evidence any kind of underlying principle or practice 
apart from a willingness to be pragmatic and flexible where circumstances required.  Nor does 
the fact that in all three jurisdictions on occasions there may well have been a close working 
relationship between the contractor and the guarantor (whether these be family ties, commercial 
realtionships or other arrangements) show that common principles or practices were applied.  
Similarly, although a significant number of the contractors guaranteed in all three jurisdictions 
seem to have been wealthy, this does not seem to me to be sufficient to support an assertion that 
there was a principle or practice that guarantors should only provide guarantees for wealthy 
contractors.  So far as concerns the concept of not guaranteeing the same person on more than 
one transaction, the practice seems to have differed not only between the three jurisdictions but 
also within one of the jurisdictions itself.   
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Conclusions 
Unity of Greek Law 
In the introduction to this thesis904 I set out the principles underlying the concept of the 
guarantee which emerge from the ancient Greek sources, as outlined by Partsch.  My review of 
the evidence from the three jurisdictions in this thesis has enabled me to identify a number of 
other potential principles relevant to the role of the guarantor in transactions involving the 
community.  These can be summarised as follows: 
1. If guarantors were to be required this was to be provided in an instrument having the 
force of law. 
2. All guarantors of transactions involving the community had to be formally vetted before 
acceptance by the community.   
3. Where the obligation guaranteed was an obligation to make payment, the guarantor was 
under a separate, direct obligation to the community to make the payment if the 
contractor did not pay; this obligation arose from the instant that the contractor should 
have paid but failed to do so; no prior demand upon the guarantor was required nor was 
any grace period allowed before the guarantor became liable. 
4. A guarantor who owed a debt to the community was liable to have his property seized 
without a court judgment having first been obtained against him. 
5. Guarantors who were indebted to the community were included in a public register of 
debtors. 
6. Contractors who were indebted to the community were liable to pay in addition a 
penalty for non-payment and this also formed part of the guarantor’s liability. 
7. Officials responsible for the administration of the transaction guaranteed were required 
to submit accounts at the end of their term of office for auditing by other officials. 
8. A guarantor was entitled to take security over the property of the contractor in order to 
protect himself against the risk that the guarantor might be required to pay out under his 
guarantee. 
9. A guarantor who had paid out under his guarantee was entitled to recover the amount he 
had paid from the contractor.   
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10. A guarantor who had paid was entitled to stand into the shoes of the contractor vis-à-vis 
the contractor’s own debtors and to use any money recovered from those debtors 
towards the satisfaction of the amounts which he had paid out under his guarantee. 
The question arises whether these similarities can only be explained on the basis of the 
existence of a concept of “Greek law” or whether there may be other explanations.  As 
intimated in my Introduction905, where one of these principles is only found in Athens and on 
independent Delos, it is quite possible that the reason for the similarity lies in the fact that Delos 
was dominated by Athens for so many decades before becoming independent.  This applies to 
principles numbered 4, 8, 9 and 10 above.  Further research is required in the evidence from 
other Greek city states which had not been dominated by Athens before this possibility could be 
eliminated.  In the meantime however it is worth noting that despite the longevity of the 
Athenian domination, my review has shown a number of differences between Athens and 
independent Delos in the laws and practices relating to guarantors.  The Athenian hegemony 
argument should not therefore be overplayed. 
The problem of the potential effect of Athenian hegemony does not, however, apply to 
principles 1-3, and 5-7, for we find these principles at work in Boiotia as well as at Athens and 
on independent Delos and whilst there was frequent contact between Boiotia and the other two 
jurisdictions this could hardly be said to be such as to give rise to a realistic possibility of 
Boiotia merely imitating and following legal principles and practices established at Athens.   
Nor could it be argued that these principles are simply the inevitable result of the transactions 
with which they were concerned.  They can in my view be identified as independent principles 
or practices.   
However, we are still some way from confidently concluding that these principles and practices 
are evidence of a unity of Greek law.  Firstly, my review of the evidence from the three 
jurisdictions, although it covers the majority of the surviving evidence, is just a start.  Further 
research is required to see whether these principles or practices are evidenced in other Greek 
city states before they could be relied upon with more confidence.  Secondly, it would also be 
necessary to investigate whether they are uniquely Greek.  A determination of this question 
would require a consideration of other, contemporaneous systems of law (for example Jewish 
law).  These further lines of enquiry are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Thirdly, my review has also shown that there appear to have been differences between the three 
jurisdictions in the practices and procedures relating to guarantors.  It must be asked, therefore, 
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whether these differences are so significant that it makes no sense to speak in terms of a unity of 
Greek law and whether, even if it is sensible to speak in these terms, the differences are such as 
to cast doubt on whether the common principles and practices which I have identified are at all 
useful.  Clearly, they form an important part of the background to understanding the 
relationships between community, its contractors and the guarantors in the jurisdictions 
concerned.  However, if the potential for differences is significant one may doubt whether the 
principles could be used to determine the laws and practices in other Greek city states for which 
we have no or very limited evidence, or even to explain and amplify an otherwise obscure text 
from another Greek city state.   
The principal differences which I have identified in the three jurisdictions are as follows: 
a. There seems to have been a requirement for guarantors tw= yeu/deoj at Thespiai and on 
independent Delos but this is not found in classical Athens. 
b. On independent Delos the guarantors of leases of the sacred estates and, possibly, 
sacred houses as well, had to be renewed annually whereas this type of requirement 
does not seem to have existed at Thespiai or Athens. 
c. On independent Delos individuals who borrowed from the god had to provide 
hypothecated real property as well as guarantors as security for their loans. There 
appears to have been no such requirement at Athens. 
d. The procedures for vetting guarantors seem to have differed between the different 
jurisdictions as well as between transactions. 
e. At Athens, the number of guarantors appears to have increased with the value of the 
transaction.  On independent Delos, and at Thespiai, this does not seem to have been so 
to the same degree of regularity. 
f. At Athens, evidence of guarantors being required to provide security is very limited.  
By contrast, on independent Delos, there was some kind of general pledge to the 
hieropoioi of the possessions of the guarantors of loans made by the god and of the 
possessions of the guarantors of tenants of the sacred estates.  At Thespiai, the security 
required from guarantors of leases was so small as to amount to nothing more than 
some kind of registration fee. 
g. Whereas at Athens it may occasionally have been the case that, where there was more 
than one guarantor, each guarantor may have been liable only for a part of the overall 
liability, on independent Delos, it seems to have been the rule that the liability of each 
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guarantor was so limited.  At Thespiai, there may have been a rule that, where there was 
more than one guarantor, each was responsible for only a part of the debt, but this may 
have changed during the course of the last quarter of the third century BC.   
h. At Athens and on independent Delos it appears that the Council had a role to play in the 
collection of sums due from those who owed money to the community.  However 
whereas in Athens the Council took a pro-active role in the collection of debts, 
including the imprisonment of debtors, on independent Delos the role of the Council 
seems to have been more passive. 
i. The legal effect of the inclusion of a person on a public list of those owing debts to the 
community seems to have differed as between Athens and independent Delos.  Further, 
the stage at which such registration would occur seems to have differed as between 
Athens/Thespiai on the one hand and independent Delos on the other.   
j. The size of the penalty imposed upon those who were indebted to the community 
differed as between Athens on the one hand and independent Delos and Thespiai on the 
other. 
k. On independent Delos there was specific provision which made the hieropoioi liable for 
payment of half the rent that they failed to recover from tenants of the sacred estates.  
There is no equivalent at Athens or at Thespiai.   
l. The scope of the audits of the officials’ accounts may have differed as between the three 
jurisdictions. 
m. On independent Delos there was specific provision to enable the guarantor who had 
paid to recover from the defaulting tenant.  This is not found at Athens or in Boiotia. 
Before discussing whether and if so to what extent these apparent differences should lead to the 
conclusion that it cannot be said that there is a unity of Greek law or that the common principles 
and practices which I have identified are of limited usefulness outside the jurisdictions in which 
they are found, it is important to note that where a difference has been identified on the basis of 
an absence of evidence for a legal principle or practice  in a particular jurisdiction, it does not 
necessarily follow that such a principle or practice did not exist there.  This particularly applies 
to the differences summarised in paragraphs a. and m.. 
None of the principles and practices which differed as between the three jurisdictions directly 
conflicts with the common principles and practices identified earlier.  On the contrary, most of 
them proceed from or assume the existence of at least some of the common principles and 
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practices: the requirement for guarantors tw= yeu/deoj (see a.), the requirement to renew 
guarantors (see b.) and the sharing of liability between guarantors (see g.) proceed upon and 
apply the underlying principles ascribed to guarantees outlined in my Introduction906; the 
procedures for vetting guarantors (see d.), the practices regarding numbers of guarantors (see 
e.), requiring guarantors to provide security (see f.) and the sharing of liability between 
guarantors (see g.) follow from principle 2; the differing effect of registration of a guarantor as a 
debtor (see i.) follows from principle 5; the differing size of the penalty imposed upon 
defaulting contractors and for which the guarantor was therefore liable (see j.) follows from 
principle 3; the differing scope of the audit of the officials’ accounts (see l.) follows from 
principle 7; and the Delian provision concerning the sacred estates which assisted guarantors 
who had paid to recover from defaulting tenants (see m.) proceeds upon the basis of principle 9.  
This analysis supports Thür’s view outlined in my Introduction907 that apparent differences in 
principles and practices can be viewed as adaptations or developments of core principles. 
In the same way, we find that the common principles were sometimes “watered down” or 
modified in a particular jurisdiction.  An example of this is the watering down on independent 
Delos when compared with Athens and Thespiai of the impact of principle 3 by the milder 
enforcement measures of the i(era\ suggrafh/ in relation to the sacred estates. Another example 
is the differing effect which appears to have been given in Athens and on independent Delos to 
principle 5 because the consequences of registration as a public debtor seems to have been 
milder on Delos than it was in Athens.  A third example is the difference in the size of the 
penalty for non-payment of debts as between Athens on the one hand and independent 
Delos/Thespiai on the other which meant that the effect of contractor default upon the guarantor 
was harsher in Athens than it was in the other jurisdictions. 
In particular, the very different approaches to enforcement which seem to have existed on 
independent Delos indicate that even if a principle apparently applied, it may not always have 
been implemented in practice (as appears to have been the case for example with the sacred 
houses and loans on Delos) or it may have been implemented in rather a different way from that 
which the principle might have implied (as appears to have happened in the case of the sacred 
estates on Delos).   
All this means, therefore, that we must proceed with extreme caution in applying the common 
principles to fill gaps in our knowledge of the law in other city states or to explain an otherwise 
obscure piece of evidence from another city state.  However this does not necessarily mean that 
it makes no sense to speak in terms of Greek law.  My researches have, I believe, helped to 
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identify some core principles applicable to the law and the practice of guarantees involving the 
community in the jurisdictions I have examined and they have the potential to be expanded 
further in terms of jurisdictions if not in terms of content.  Further, not only are the core 
principles useful in helping us to understand the relationships between community, its 
contractors and their guarantors in the three jurisdictions concerned, but they also provide a 
useful starting point from which further enquiry can proceed.  For they inevitably lead one to 
ask why there were differences between the three jurisdictions in the practices and procedures 
relating to guarantors and why some particular principles and practices only seem to have 
applied in one or two of the jurisdictions but not in all of them.  This has particular relevance to 
the question which I have posed in the Introduction908, namely what benefit a person would 
obtain by standing as guarantor.  It is to this question that I now turn. 
What benefit did the guarantor obtain from acting as guarantor? 
One possibility is that the motivation for standing as a guarantor was not that there was a 
potential personal benefit to be obtained from doing so.  Rather, agreeing to stand as guarantor 
may have been a matter of obligation. 
Firstly we have seen that in all three jurisdictions it was not unusual for the contractor and the 
guarantor to be members of the same family.  Familial obligations may therefore have been the 
prime motivator in these cases. 
A second possible motivation was friendship or a moral obligation.  In a passage in the second 
speech against Onetor, Demosthenes implies that, at Athens, providing a guarantee was a sign 
of friendship between the guarantor and the contractor909.  However, it is not described as an 
obligation of friendship.   
In Demosthenes 25, a person who has agreed to stand as guarantor for a friend and finds himself 
having to pay up is an object of pity: he has not done anything wrong; he is just unlucky910.  
However, although the speaker is clearly implying that the person concerned has done the right 
thing in standing as guarantor, there is no suggestion that he was under any moral obligation to 
do so.  
In Theophrastos on the other hand we do find the idea that a person was under a moral 
obligation to stand as a guarantor if asked to do so.  Theophrastos tells us that it was the mark of 
a tactless man that he would go up to a man who has just been required by the court to pay out 
                                                
908
 p12. 
909
 Dem. 31.10-11. 
910
 Dem. 25.86-87. 
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on a guarantee and ask him to stand guarantor for him: the tactless man has put the putative 
guarantor in an awkward position911; this seems to imply that standing as a guarantor was some 
kind of moral obligation. 
But Isokrates 17 shows that friendship or a moral obligation may not always have been a 
sufficient reason on its own for agreeing to stand as a guarantor.  Here the speaker is alleging 
that the banker, Pasion, has stolen money from him by refusing to return funds that the speaker 
had deposited with him.  The speaker says that he and Pasion had a close personal relationship 
and that Pasion had agreed to stand as a guarantor for him.  Yet the speaker can still ask, 
rhetorically (as a way of demonstrating that Pasion does have his money) whether Pasion would 
have agreed to stand as the speaker’s guarantor if Pasion did not hold the speaker’s money on 
deposit.  We can conclude from this that whilst a relationship of some intimacy may have been 
an important condition for an agreement to stand as a guarantor, the guarantor would also 
normally be looking for some kind of financial assurance to protect him against the possibility 
that his guarantee might be called upon912.    
A third possible motivation was public service.  Since the guarantor was the only person who 
was providing any continuous independent reassurance for the proper performance of the 
contract by the contractor throughout the period of the transaction, it could be argued that the 
guarantor was undertaking a valuable service for his community.  In his First Tetralogy, 
Antiphon has the speaker, in an attempt to win over the good will of his listeners, remind them 
that he has made several substantial payments to the treasury; he has more than once served as a 
trierarch and has furnished a brilliant chorus; he has often lent money without interest to friends 
and has frequently paid large sums under guarantees provided for others913.  We see here the 
provision of guarantees as a sign not only of great wealth but also of a selfless act performed for 
those whom the guarantor was supporting by his guarantee.  But by associating the provision of 
a guarantee with the undertaking of liturgies the passage also hints at the possibility that the 
guarantor was providing wider benefits.  A man who, for example, agreed to stand as guarantor 
of a lease of sacred land in fifth or fourth century Athens could be regarded as providing a 
benefit to the community by facilitating the grant of that lease and hence the generation of 
income that could contribute to the cost of sacrifices and festivals to the god or goddess who 
owned the land.  Nor need this be confined to the leasing of sacred land: a guarantor who had 
enabled the award of building contracts for the construction of temples and sanctuaries or the 
repair of a city’s fortifications could be regarded as having made an important contribution to 
the success of the community.  If the guarantor actually made payments under his guarantees, 
                                                
911
 Theophrastos Characters 12(1) and (4). 
912
 Isoc. 17.37. 
913
 Ant. 2.2.12. 
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thereby ensuring the cash flow of the sanctuary or community (or, in the case of building 
contracts, enabling the project to continue despite non-performance by the contractor), the 
benefit to the sanctuary and/or the community would be all the more obvious.   
There may thus have been personal advantage to be gained from standing as a guarantor in such 
transactions.  If a man’s agreement to stand could be represented as an act of euergetism, this 
could, in theory at least, by analogy with the evidence of the Athenian orators and of the decrees 
passed by Athens and other city states in honour of benefactors914, win him popularity and 
influence with the citizens of his community.  This may not, however, always have provided 
sufficient an incentive to encourage guarantors to come forward: there is evidence from 
Alipheira from the third century BC which suggests that in some circumstances a man might be 
ordered by a decision of (possibly) the Council to stand as guarantor for repayment of a loan in 
which the city state was the borrower915.  This may have meant that standing as a guarantor 
could sometimes have been akin to a liturgy.  But, as is clear from the Athenian evidence, even 
a liturgy performed as an obligation could still win the liturgist praise and influence, especially 
if it was an expensive one to perform, and the same may have applied to guarantees provided 
under an obligation916.  
That there may have been political capital to be won from standing as guarantor may be 
suggested by the fact that some of the guarantors of the grants of proxenia by the Aitolian 
koinon were leading politicians and wealthy individuals, known to us from the pages of 
Polybios917.  On the other hand, it is remarkable that among the many hundreds of honorary 
decrees that survive from the period covered by my thesis I have not been able to find even one 
that honours the recipient for having stood as a guarantor.  This suggests that from the point of 
view of the communities as recipients of the guarantees, the guarantee was a purely business 
relationship, a matter of prudent management of the communities’ assets and nothing more.  As 
                                                
914
 Evidence reviewed by Gauthier (1985:24-32).   
915
 IpArk 24 LL17-20: kai\ dikasa/sqw mhde\j i)diw/taj tw=n i)/nprosqe su[ngrafw=n,] ei) mh/ tij i)ngegu/euke 
u(pe\r ta\n po/lin do/can tai= [bwla=i: pra=cij] d'e)/stw kata\ Eu)mh/lw mna=j kai\ ei)/kosi stath/rwn, [e)pei\ i)ng
egu/]euke tw= damiorgw= keleu/santoj: It is to be noted that the reference to the Council is restored by the editors. 
Dössel (2003:232) notes that it is unclear under what circumstances the damiourgos could order the provision of a 
guarantee since in the previous sentence it was very probable that the boule appeared as the decision making body.  
916
 Gauthier (1985:28, 29 and 30). 
917 Two examples: (1) Skopas son of Sosandros of Tithronion, who stood as guarantor in grants of proxenia seven 
times between 223/222 and 205/204BC (IG IX 12 1 29 LL7-10, 20-21 and 23-24; IG IX1 2 1 31 LL46, 48, 68-69 and 
124-125).  He was grammateus of the Aitolian synedrion in 224/223BC (IG IX 12 1 4 L8) and strategos three times 
(Polyb. 4.27.1-10, 4.37.1 (220/219BC); Livy 26.24.7 (212/211BC); and IG IX 12 1 31 LL106-107, 118-119, Polyb. 
13.2.1 and IG IX 12 3 613 (205/204BC)).  He is mentioned by Polybios as a commander of Aitolian forces fighting in 
the Peloponnese (Polyb.4.3-4.13.5, 4.16.11-4.19, 4.27, 4.62 and 5.3) and as having been appointed with one other 
leading Aitolian to draw up laws to deal with problems concerning debts (Polyb.13.1-13.2); see Grainger (2000:298); 
(2) Damoteles son of Telesarchos of Physkion, who stood as a guarantor of a grant of proxenia in 210/209BC, the 
year in which he was also grammateus of the Aitolian synedrion (IG IX2 1 29 LL3-7).  He stood as guarantor in three 
other grants of proxenia (IG IX 12 1 29 LL13-14 (also 210-209BC), 31 LL52-56 (223/222BC) and 201 LL3-4 (end of 
third century BC)).  He was an envoy to Rome in 191/190 and 189BC (Polyb. 21.25.9, 21.26.7-19); and envoy to M. 
Fulvius in 189BC (21.29.4-5, 10-11; 21.30.11-13); see Grainger (2000:144-145).  
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far as the community was concerned, the role of the guarantor was simply to provide a source of 
cash for the community, and a man was not considered to have been particularly deserving of 
praise or influence simply because he had stood as a guarantor.   
If the guarantee was indeed a purely business transaction, it may be then that the primary 
incentive for guarantors was that they were paid by the contractor to stand (as Walbank has 
suggested in the case of Athenian leases918).  We have no direct evidence of any such payments.  
However, we have already seen that there may on occasions have been a commercial 
relationship between the guarantors and the contractor or their respective families.  From 
Thespiai we have possible examples of A agreeing to stand as guarantor for B on one 
transaction in return for B agreeing to stand as guarantor for A on another transaction919.  From 
Athens we have the more complex example of A agreeing to stand as guarantor for B on one 
transaction in return for a memberof B’s family agreeing to stand as guarantor for a memberof 
A’s family on another transaction920.  
All these were possible motivating factors for guarantors.  However, the legal framework was 
also important in creating an environment in which people would be prepared to put themselves 
forward as guarantors and this needs to be examined in the light of the common legal principles 
and practices which I have identified in my thesis.  Key elements of the legal environment in 
which guarantors had to operate were provided by some of these common legal principles and 
practices.  These were: the separate, direct and immediate liability of the guarantor (principle 3); 
the enforcement against guarantors without a court judgment (principle 4); the entitlement of the 
guarantor to take security over the contractor’s property (principle 8); the right of the guarantor 
who had paid to recover from the contractor (principle 9) and the right of the guarantor who 
paid to stand in the shoes of the contractor in regard to the contractor’s own debtors (principle 
10). 
Whilst principles 3 and 4 could sometimes have acted as a deterrent to guarantors coming 
forward, principles 8, 9 and 10 may have provided guarantors with some protection and 
encouragement to individuals to offer themselves as guarantors.  However, my enquiry has 
shown that in some cases additional measures were perceived as being necessary in order to 
incentivise people to put themselves forward as guarantors and we find these in those areas of 
law and practice where there were apparent differences between the three jurisdictions.  These 
were: the requirement that guarantors be renewed annually (found on independent Delos only - 
see b.), the apportionment of liability between guarantors (evidenced on independent Delos and 
                                                
918 Walbank (1983d:225). 
919
 See pp104-5 and 189. 
920
 See pp79-80 and 189-190. 
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possibly for a period at Thespiai – see g.), the postponement of the stage in the collection 
process at which the guarantor would have his name included in a record of public debtors 
(found on Delos in regard to the sacred estates – see i.), a smaller penalty for late payment 
(Delos and Thespiai compared with Athens – see j.) and specific provision to enable the 
guarantor to recover from the tenant (Delos – see m.).  In addition the communities might take 
ad hoc measures such as limiting the scope of the guarantee or negotiating the terms of the 
underlying contract so as to reduce the possibility of a call being made on the guarantee 
(measures which could well involve compromises on the part of the community).  These could 
have the effect of reducing the impact of those core principles which acted as deterrents to 
acting as a guarantor and they seem to have been developed locally, possibly to suit local 
conditions in Thespiai and on independent Delos. 
This analysis suggests that whilst some or a combination of the factors discussed above which 
may have motivated a person to agree to stand as a guarantor may have been sufficient to 
provide the community with the guarantors it needed, there nevertheless remained a problem in 
that these motivating factors may have been insufficient in particular communities and at 
particular times.  This is reflected in the local modifications to legal principles and practices 
which may have been designed to ensure that guarantors came forward.  
This illustrates the potential usefulness of the concept of the unity of Greek law.  It lies in the 
fact that where we find local departures from identified core principles, this should prompt 
further enquiry as to the reasons for such departures.  In the case of Delos, one such reason may 
have been the relatively small size of the community, which would have meant that the pool of 
potential guarantors was relatively small and that there would have been constant pressure to 
increase the size of the pool by modifying or removing factors which might deter individuals 
from standing as guarantors.  In the case of Thespiai we are poorly informed and the evidence 
base is a very narrow one, being confined to the leases.  There must have been a shortage of 
guarantors, but it is not clear why. 
Summary 
My thesis has provided a review of a large body of the evidence of the legal principles and 
practices relating to the role of the guarantor in transactions involving the community.  Much 
more work remains to be done.  However the following broad answers to the questions posed in 
my Introduction can in my view be offered at this stage: 
1. It is possible to identify some common principles and practices regarding the role of the 
guarantors in transactions involving the community in the period under review; 
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2. However, important differences in principles and practices as between communities can 
also be observed. 
3. These differences mean that it may be unwise to place too much reliance upon the 
common principles and practices in attempting to reconstruct the role of guarantors in 
those city states for which we have no or limited evidence. 
4. This does not mean that the identification of common principles and practices is not a 
worthwhile exercise. 
5. Rather, the analysis of common principles and practices and of the differences in 
principles and practices between city states can provide valuable insights into the 
problems and issues which particular city states faced in particular periods. 
6. One example of this can be found in a consideration of the problem of the reasons why 
a person would be prepared to stand as a guarantor.  My analysis suggests that whilst 
there were a number of possible motivations for standing as a guarantor, a shortage of 
guarantors may indeed have been a problem for some communities, particularly a small 
community like that of independent Delos, and that local modifications to common 
principles and practices may have developed or been introduced in an attempt to 
overcome this.  
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Appendix A – Wealthy Tenants/Contractors/Borrowers on Independent Delos 
Type of 
transaction 
and period 
Number of 
tenants/ 
contractors/ 
borrowers 
who 
provided 
guarantors 
Number of 
tenants/ 
contractors/ 
borrowers for 
whom we have 
further 
information 
Number of 
wealthy tenants/ 
contractors/ 
borrowers 
Number of 
tenants/ 
contractors/ 
borrowers who, 
or members of 
whose family, 
were 
prodaneistai 
Number of 
tenants/ 
contractors/ 
borrowers who, 
or members of 
whose family, 
were guarantors 
of prodaneistai 
Number of 
tenants/ 
contractors/ 
borrowers who, 
or members of 
whose family, 
were hieropoioi 
Number of 
tenants/ 
contractors/ 
borrowers who, 
or members of 
whose family, 
were City 
treasurers 
Number of 
tenants/ 
contractors/ 
borrowers who, 
or members of 
whose family, 
were borrowers 
of 1200 
drachmai or 
more 
Sacred 
Estates 314-
250BC 
42 29 10 9 2 6 1 3 
Sacred 
Houses 314-
250BC 
20 15 3 2 0 3 0 0 
Building 
Contracts 
314-246BC 
14 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Loans by 
Apollo to 
individuals 
314-250BC 
8 7 2 4 1 3 1 0 
Collection of 
ferry fees, 
taxes and 
duties 314–
250BC 
9 7 3 2 0 2 3 2 
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Appendix B 
General content of Thespianpro/rrhseij///  
 
Subject IThesp 44 
LL4-16 
IThesp 48 
LL4-18 
IThesp 53 
LL13-22 
IThesp 54 
LL1-6 
IThesp 55 
LL10-28 
 
When rent is 
payable 
 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Provide 
guarantors for 
approval 
 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Give an 
e)nne/xuron 
 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Pay an 
e)pw/nion 
 
Yes Yes    
Failure to 
provide 
guarantors 
 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Failure to pay 
rent 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pay the 
deka/tan 
 
 Yes Yes   
Pay any tax of 
city or koinon 
 
 Yes  Yes Yes 
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Appendix C 
Detailed content of Thespianp r o /r r h s e i j  
 
Subject IThesp 44 LL4-16 IThesp 48 LL4-18 IThesp 53 LL13-22 IThesp 54 LL1-6 IThesp 55 LL10-28 
When rent is payable 
 
 Pay in the month of 
Damatirios 
Pay to the hierarchs in 
the month of 
Alalkomenios 
 Pay to the treasurer of 
the Muses at least five 
days before the end of 
the month of 
Alalkomenios 
 
Provide guarantors for 
approval 
 
Creditworthy not more 
than two whom the 
katoptai approve 
Creditworthy not more 
than two whom the 
archa approves 
To the hierarchs 
creditworthy 
t w = y e u /d e o j  
straightaway, 
o (/l a j  t a =j  m i s q w /s i o j  
in three days 
 To the archa 
creditworthy 
t w = y e u /d e o j  
straightaway, 
o (/l a j  t a =j  m i s q w /s i o j  
in three days 
 
Give an e )n n e /x u r o n  
 
To the archa on behalf 
of the tenant and his 
guarantors one obol 
each 
To the archa on behalf 
of the tenant and his 
guarantors one obol 
each 
 
On behalf of the tenant 
and his guarantors two 
obols each 
 On behalf of the tenant 
and his guarantors two 
obols each 
Pay an e )p w /n i o n  
 
One drachma in 
accordance with the 
previous p r o /r r e i s i j  
One drachma in 
accordance with the 
previous p r o /r r e i s i j  
 
   
Failure to provide 
guarantors 
 
If any tenant does not 
provide guarantors such 
as they may approve or 
If any tenant does not 
provide guarantors such 
as they may approve or 
If he does not provide 
guarantors, let the 
hierarchs re-let.  If less 
 If he does not provide 
guarantors, let the archa 
re-let.  If less is 
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does not provide 
creditworthy guarantors 
from the beginning, the 
archa resumes 
possession; for 
whatever amount it 
obtains less the archa 
will write down the first 
tenant on whitened 
board for the shortfall 
for all the years put 
together plus a 
hemiolion  
 
does not provide 
creditworthy guarantors 
from the beginning, the 
archa resumes 
possession; for 
whatever amount it 
obtains less the archa 
will write down the first 
tenant on whitened 
board for the shortfall 
for all the years put 
together plus a 
hemiolion  
 
is recovered in the 
twenty-five years, let 
him be written down by 
the hierarchs, himself 
and the guarantor 
t w = y e u /d e o j  plus a 
hemiolion 
recovered in the twenty-
five years, let him be 
written down by the 
archa, himself and the 
guarantor t w = y e u /d e o j  
plus a hemiolion 
Failure to pay rent 
 
If anyone, having 
provided guarantors, 
does not pay the rent 
within the stipulated 
time, the archa will 
write on whitened board 
as owing the rent both 
the tenant himself and 
the guarantors plus a 
hemiolion on the 
amount due and will 
repossess the land.  For 
however much less it 
obtains the archa will 
write down the first 
tenant on whitened 
board and the 
guarantors for the 
shortfall for all the years 
If, having provided 
guarantors, he does not 
pay the rent within the 
stipulated time, the 
archa will write on 
whitened board as 
owing the rent both the 
tenant himself and the 
guarantors plus a 
hemiolion on the 
amount due and will re -
enter.  For however 
much less it obtains the 
it will write down the 
first tenant on whitened 
board and the 
guarantors in all the 
years plus a hemiolion 
 
If any of the tenants 
does not pay the rent 
within the stipulated 
time, let the hierarchs 
write him down and the 
guarantors for the rent 
for the year plus a 
hemiolion and let them 
relet the land for the 
remaining years; and if 
any less is recovered for 
the remaining period let 
them write down him 
and the guarantors plus 
a hemiolion for the 
whole of the shortfall in 
the remaining years 
…… let the hierarchs 
write him down and the 
guarantors for the rent 
for the year plus a 
hemiolion and let them 
relet the land for the 
remaining years; and if 
any less is recovered for 
the remaining period let 
them write down him 
and the guarantors plus 
a hemiolion for the 
whole of the shortfall in 
the remaining years 
If any of the tenants 
does not pay the rent 
within the stipulated 
time, the treasurer of the 
muses will write him 
down and the 
guarantors for the rent 
for the year plus a 
hemiolion and they will 
relet the garden for the 
remaining years; and if 
any less is recovered for 
the remaining period let 
them write down him 
and the guarantors plus 
a hemiolion for the 
whole of the shortfall in 
the remaining years 
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put together plus a 
hemiolion 
 
Pay the d e k a /t a n  
 
 Let the tenants pay the 
dekatan 
The tenant will pay the 
deketan in accordance 
with the law 
 
  
Pay any tax of city or 
koinon 
 
 
If any tax is has to be 
paid either to the koinon 
of the Boiotians or to 
the city, let the tenants 
pay this too without 
dispute either towards 
the city or towards the 
archa  
 
 
If any tax has to be paid 
either in the city or in 
the koinon of the 
Boiotians, the farmer 
will pay 
If any tax has to be paid 
either in the city or in 
the koinon of the 
Boiotians, the farmer 
will pay 
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Appendix D – Wealthy Guarantors of Independent Delos 
Type of 
Transaction 
Number of 
guarantors 
Number of 
guarantors 
for whom 
we have 
further 
information 
Number of 
Wealthy 
Guarantors 
Number of 
Guarantors 
who, or 
members of 
whose family, 
were 
prodaneistai  
Number of 
Guarantors 
who, or 
members of 
whose family, 
were 
guarantors of 
prodaneistai 
Number of 
Guarantors 
who, or 
members of 
whose family, 
were hieropoioi 
Number of 
Guarantors 
who, or 
members of 
whose family, 
were City 
treasurers 
Number of 
Guarantors 
who, or 
members of 
whose family, 
were borrowers 
of 1200 
drachmai or 
more 
Sacred 
Estates 314-
250BC 
79 27 17 11 2 13 4 4 
Sacred 
Houses 314-
250BC 
20 8 3 2 1 0 2 0 
Building 
contracts 
314-246BC 
19 15 5 5 1 4 1 0 
Loans by 
Apollo to 
individuals 
314-250BC 
12 12 5 5 1 4 2 1 
Loans by 
Apollo to 
the city 
12 10 6 4 N/A 6 0 1 
  
 
 
219 
Collection 
of ferry fees, 
taxes and 
duties 314–
250BC 
11 8 2 2 1 3 0 0 
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Appendix E: Leases of the Sacred Estates on Independent Delos – Numbers of Guarantors 
Date of record Estate Rent (in 
drachmai 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated) 
Number of 
guarantors 
“Wealthy” 
guarantors 
307 Soloe 330 1  
307 Soloe 110 2  
307   Hippodromos 920 2  
307 Hippodromos 920  2  
300 Panormos 1030 2(?) One 
297 Dionysios 1372 1 Yes 
297 Skitoneia 900 1  
About 282 Epistheneia 500 2  
About 282 Sosimacheia 201 2  
279 Panormos 704(?) 1 Yes 
279 Nikou Choros 271 2  
279 Charoneia 800 2 One 
257 Chareteia 1400 drs 3 obs 2 One 
257 Leimon 302 2  
250 Skitoneia 483 2 One 
250 Charoneia 435 8 Two 
250 Hippodromos 510 2  
250 Chareteia 700 drs 6 chalcs 3  
250 Hipodromos 661 2  
250 Kerameion 250 2  
250 Limne 21 1  
250 Leimon 221 2  
250 Soloe and 
Korakiai 
420 2  
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250 Phoinikes 651 2 One 
259 Rhamnoi 553 2 One 
250 Nikou Choros 260 2  
250 Limnai 343 2 One 
250 Dionysios 804 2 One 
250 Skitoneia 473 2  
250 Charoneia 1100 2  
250 Panormos 606 2 One 
250 Chareteia 1113 2 One 
250 Pyrgoi 1000 2 One 
250 Porthmos 1024 drs 7 
chalcs 
2 One 
250 Akra Delos 440 2  
250 Sosimacheia 275 2 One 
250 Phytalia 48 drs 2 obs 7 
chalcs 
2  
250 Epistheneia 726 2 One 
250 Lykoneion 122 drs 7 chalcs 2  
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Appendix F: Leases of Sacred Houses on Independent Delos – Numbers of Guarantors 
Date of record House Rent (in 
drachmai 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated) 
Number of 
guarantors 
“Wealthy” 
guarantors 
279 One of the houses 
of Episthenes 
51 2  
279 One of the houses 
of Episthenes 
60 2  
279 Not stated 39(?) 2  
279 Not stated 33 drs 3 obs (?) 2  
278 One of the houses 
of Episthenes 
51 2  
278 One of the houses 
of Episthenes 
60 1(?)  
274 One of the houses 
of Episthenes 
60  1(?)  
257  Not survived 35 2  
257 House of 
Aristoboulos(?) 
66(?) 1  
257 House next to 
Sosileos’ house 
80 2  
257 Apartments next 
to the sea 
70 3(?)  
257 A xylon 27 1  
257 Not survived 101 1 Yes 
257 House formerly 
belonging to 
Arkeon 
45 1  
257 A house of 
Episthenes 
70 1  
First half of 
third century 
Not survived 61 1  
 
  
 
223 
 
Appendix G: Borrowers from Apollo on Independent Delos – numbers of guarantors 
Date of record Borrower Amount of loan 
(in drachmai) 
Number of 
guarantors 
“Wealthy” 
guarantors 
278 Xenon of 
Hermione 
At least 200 1(?) Yes 
250 Autokles son of 
Teleson 
600 2 One 
250 Diaktorides son 
of Theorylos 
400 2 One 
250 Mnesimachos son 
of Autokrates 
1000 1(?)  
250 Glaukos son of 
Sosileos 
500(?) 1(?)  
250 Charilas son of 
Aristeides 
500 2 One 
250 Alexarchides 500 2 One 
250 Phillis son of 
Tharsydikos 
200 2 One 
 
  
 
224 
 
Appendix H - Building Works on Independent Delos – numbers of guarantors 
Date of record Contractor Contract Price Number of 
guarantors 
“Wealthy” 
guarantors 
297 Nikon son of 
Nikokles of 
Syros; Nikeratos 
son of Sosipolis 
of Syros; Simos 
son of Nikageros 
of Syros 
30,300 7  
297 Damasias son of 
Kypagoros of 
Paros  
Over 2990 2 Both 
280 Phaneas son of 
Kaikos 
300 per coffer 1 Yes 
280 Peisiboulos of 
Paros 
300 per coffer 1 Yes 
280 Aristokles  1330 1(?)  
279 Theophilos 1350 2  
246 Laches 1983 drs 2 obs 2 One 
246 Aristeas; 
Xenomenes; 
Eukleides 
1715 drs 5 obs 3 – one for each 
contractor 
One 
246 Menes 912 1  
246 Ktesisthenes 300 1  
 
225 
 
Appendix I 
 
Tenants and Guarantors at Thespiai  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
 
T = tenant 
G = guarantor 
Each figure represents the annual rent in drachmai for a plot of land. 
For each figure both a tenant and a guarantor appear in the diagram. 
Arrows go from the guarantor to the tenant he is guaranteeing. 
Double bar between boxes indicates close family relationship such as father/.son. 
Nommos son of Alexion 
 
T: 60 + 60 
Epinion son of Philomeilos 
 
G: 60 + 60 
Nikon son of Chareitidas 
 
G: 54 + 59 
Philomeilos son of Nauton 
 
T: 102 + 54  G: 128 
Klearetos son of Medon 
 
G: 102 + 90 + 80  T: 128 
Eukrateis son of Damokrateis 
 
T: 90 
Philon son of Silothos 
 
G: 71 
Eneisias son of Saon 
 
T: 80 + 59 + 51 
Saon son of Hiaron 
 
T: 52 + 70 + 50 + 105 
G: 120 
Aristokritos son of Aristokritos 
 
G: 52 + 70 + 50 + 105 
T: 71 + 120 
Ariston son of Damatrios 
 
G: 51 
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CATALOGUE OF LITERARY AND EPIGRAPHIC SOURCES 
SECTION A  
ATHENS 
 
A1. Aischines: Against Ktesiphon (330BC) 
             
              
                 
             
              
      
             
            
            
               
           
            
            
         
          
              
             
      
             
            
             
          
           
             
               
               
          
 
            
             
             
              

               
           
             
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A2. Andokides: On the Mysteries (399BC) 
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A5. [Demosthenes] 33: Against Apatourios (post 341BC) 
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               
           

            
               
                
             
                 
             
 
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               
                
             
 
A6. [Demosthenes] 43: Against Macartatus (the late 340’sBC) 
 

 
             
               
       

A7. [Demosthenes] 53: Against Nikostratos (366 or 365BC) 
             
           
   
             
             
               
            
 
A8. [Demosthenes] 58: Against Theocrines (c340BC) 
   ( )         
              
                
               
    
 
A9. Xenophon: Poroi (355BC) 
             
              
       
                
              
       
            
              
             

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A10. IG I3 84 (418/417BC)  
 
           
           
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       
        
        
     
     
        
    
        
   
    
 
A13. IG I3 476 XIII Col I LL46-54 and XIII Col II LL270-278 (408/407 BC) 
h
   h 
 h  h 
 h    
 h  
   h h
 h   
drs

     
   h  h
  h  
  h  
h   
 h  h  
   
 h h 
h   drsob 
 
A14. IG II3 429 and SEG 35.62 (337-336 BC)  
IG II3 429
     
            
             
 
           
  
              
     
            

            
          
  
 
 
234 
           
           
  
          
  
           

           

           

SEG 35.62 restorations of Thür (1985) LL30-35 (line numbers adjusted to correspond with 
those in IG II3 429): 
 
        
 
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The following is the restoration of L34 suggested by Scafuro (2006:45) (exempli gratia): 
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 
             
     
              
     
             
    
        
     
           
  
       
     
         
  
          
     
           
    
 vacat
            

               Col. I
     
      
     
drsvacat
 vacat
  

              
              Col. II
       
     
   vacat 
vacat 
        


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             Col. III
       
      
    tals 1000 drs  
   
    ( )
  :  (),
  
    
   
   
 


             Col. IV
      
     ?
 :     
 :    
    
     
 
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A17. IG II2 1241: (300/299BC) 
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      
       
    
       
        
   v   
       
      
      
    
       
       
      
    
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A18. IG II2 1590a (before mid fourth century BC) 
 
  
    
      
   : 80 drs :   
 :    
  :34drs: : : : (          
 ) :] 
   : 2 drs 3 obs :  
  :      
 :16 drs : 2 drs 3 obsvac. 
 
A19. IG II2 1593 and SEG 48.155 with SEG 52.142 (336-324BC) 
Col II 
  

  :   
  :
  :    v
   :]   v v v v]
  :]     v v]
      v v v] 
    v
     v v v v
     
    :  v v
   v v
:   
  
   :  v] 
  :   v 
c : : v 
[ ] : : v
c   v] v 
 [ : :   
  :   v
  :?  v 
  :    v 
  :  
   :   v 
  :  v
  : . . .  v [v v v]
  :  v v
  :   v [v v v] 
   :
 
A20. IG II2 1623 Face A Col a (334/333BC) 
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   
 v  
   
     
  
 drs  
  
 
    
    
  
drs
 
A21. IG II2 1629 Face A Col c (325/324BC) 
      
    
   
   
   : 
  
drs:  
   
drs:   
   :drs
  
drs: 
  
 :drs:
      
 :drs
    
drs:   
 :drs
   
drs:  
:drs
  
drs:  
  :
 :drs
  :drs
  :drs   drs


     
  
   
    
drs    
  
    
    
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A22. IG II2 1670 (c330BC) 
 
    
              
          
              
            
           
            
     
     
        
         
        
     
      
    
drs  
        
         
     
   
      
 
A23. IG II2 1675 (c330BC) 
  
        
        
         
       
     :/obs
   : 
     vv 
 
A24. IG II2 1680 (end of the fourth century BC) 
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 
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A25. IG II2 1682 (354/353 BC) 
Fragment a 
 
         
              
             
           
          
              
          
        
       
            
     
        
           
          
            v 
     :1 dr 3 obs: v 400 drsvvvvv 
      vvvvv   
           
           
          : 16:  
       
 
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c.7   
c.10       vac.  
 c.20  : 25 :     
        : 50vac
      : 21 :   
             
              
          
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  c.11  drs  : 
  c.6   
 
A26. IG II2 2492 (345/344BC) 
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 vacat  
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A30. Ath Ag 19 P26 Face B fmt b Col IV (342/341BC) 
     : 
      
  : ::  ::  :: 
 ::       :     
 :   :    
   :  
         
   : : :
       
         
      
 ::         
       
        
 ::        
  :   : :
      
          
          
      ::
        
        
   :drsobs:     
    : 
: : :    
           
       
  :drsobs:   
       
 :  :  
          
        
   :: : ::
   :: : : 
 :drsobs:    
: : :  :  : :  
    : : 
      :: 
  : :  :: 
 : :        
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  ::  : : 
        :  
    :    : : 
     :drs obs:  
         
       
         
            
          
      
 :drs obs:     
  : :  : :
 drs:    

A31. Ath Ag 19 L6 Col I (343/342BC) 
 
      :
       :
    
    ::
 :  
:     : 
   :drs: :   
      :    
:        :
drs:  :  
:       :  
      :+drs: 
:      :
   : 
 :drs:  : 
 :  
   :  
: :
   
:

A32. IG II3 447 (Ath Ag 19 L7) (335-330BC) 
      
      
       
         
     
       
    
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       
         
    
      
     

A33. Ath Ag 19 L9 Face A Col II (or III?) (330-320BC) 
  v   
 :
 v:drs :
  :   
vacat  
        
   
  v   :
   
drs: : 
 vacat 
 
A34. Ath Ag 19 L10 Face B Col I (338-326BC) 
      vvvv 
       vv 
   vvv 
    vvacat 
   vacat 
 
A35. Ath Ag 19 L11 Col I (338-326BC) 
             lacuna 

: 
  
 
 :
:: :
  
    
    
  :
  
             Lacuna 
 
A36. IG II2 1592 and Ath Ag 19 L14 Fragment a (end 4th/beginning 3rd century BC) 
        
 : ::: :
  
 
 
247 
: :  :      
: :: : :
: : :: ::    
    ::
: : :      
  : ::: :
: :   :: :
:       
::: :drs: :: :
: :: :      
: :: : :
: : ::   
  : ::: :
:     
::  :: :
    
lacuna 
 
A37. SEG 28.103 (332/331 BC) 
 
       
        
       
         
          
           
       
    



        
            
            
         
              
          
        
           
           
        
         
        
           
    

A38. Hesperia Supplement 9 (1951) p33 No 18 (= Finley (1952) No 18) (date uncertain) 
 
  
   
 
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  
  
 
drs
 
A39. SEG 42.149 (date uncertain) 
 
The following is the text published by K Tuite in Harris and Tuite (2000):101 -102 
   
  
  
     
    
  
  
    
 

A40. Hesperia Supplement 29 (1998) The Athenian Grain Tax Law of 374/373BC  
 
        
       
       
         
    
      
        
      
         
         
     
        
        
       
        
         
      
      
        
     
        
     
      
       
     
        
     
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   
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
A41. IG VII 4255 (IOropos 292) (335-322BC) 
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         
        
          
         
       
            
        
 drs       
     

A42. ID 98 Face A fragment b (Rhodes and Osborne (2003) No.28) (376/375BC-
374/373BC) 

        
       
drs  
            
     
   
drs  
     
  
           


A43. ID 104 (4) Fragment a Face A (between the middle of the 4th century BC and 315 
BC)  
 
  
                
             
           
          
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               
           
                
         
            
         
             
        
           
   
              
       
            
       
            
      
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
A46. ID 104(8) Face B (375-320BC) 
         : 65drs 
            
   :       
 :    
 drs :     
    
     
       
       : 160drs :: 
  ::  
:      
 :        
  : 50drs:  :     
 :    
    : 24drs::
:60drs ::     
    :     
      :      
      : 20 drs ::
drs::       
  : 
        :drs 
 : ::   
     : 
        
    :drs  
   :drs ::  
          :
:  
    :    
         
     :drs :  :
 :     :  
       
        
         :
3drs ::   
     :
   :  
     
   : 
      
         
    ::60drs 
2drs::      
   
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      
    
 
A47. ID 104(19) Face A (mid fourth century BC) 
 
   :
     
 :drs : 
  
     
  
   :  
A48. ID 104(26) Face A (351/350BC) 
 
        
 ::: ::+drs ::
 :::: :  
 
::: :  ::: 
 
 ::::   :

::: : :drs::
  ::::  : 
:::: :  
 
 ::: :  :
drs :
 ::: 
  :::: :   
 
 ::: :    
 
::: ::::   

 :::: :  
 
     
                                                                                
 vacat 0.02m  
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SECTION B  
INDEPENDENT DELOS 
 
B1. IG XI,2 142 (315-300BC) 
 
             
      
          
    
         
     
             
      
           
      
         
      
           
          
          
          

 
B2. IG XI,2 144 (c305BC) 
 
FACE A 
 
          drs    
 drsob     
        
   drs 
 
FACE B 
 
           
     

B3. IG XI,2 145 (302BC)  

       
             
  drs   
         :drs :


   
             

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B4.  IG XI,2 146 Face B (301BC) 
 
    
  
    
drsobschlcs
 
B5. IG XI,2 150 (297BC) 
 
FACE A

            

           
 
          

        
 
+drs3obs.           
  
       
 
          
   
      drs     
    
       
 
 c.15       
          
     
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FACE D 
 
vss. 8 consulto erasi  
    
    
    
     
    
    
  
   
  
  
  
  
   
  drsobs 
   
   
 drs  
1/2 ob  
   
  
  vac.  
vac. vss. 2 
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         
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 
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     
           
          
  
 
 
260 
             
 
    drs     
          
            
        drs



FACE B 
 
             
            
  drs       
   drsobs   drs
        drs 
 drsobs    
        
 0+drs


           
          
  drs         

c.12         
  drs     
   drsvac. 


FACE D 
 
     
     
  
      
   

B14. IG XI,2 203 (269BC) 
 
FACE A 
 
     :drsobs:  
         :
drsobs:


   
            
          
      
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     :drs1/2obs: 
           :
drs1/2obchalcs:       
     :drs1/2obchalcs:  
 
 
 
FACE B 
 
     
       :drsobschalcs:
            
 
 
 
FACE D 

   
  
   
     
  
  
  
 drs
 
 
      
   
    
      
  rasura 15 vss. 
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B16. IG XI,2 226 Face A (257BC) 
 
              
         
   
      
        
 


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   drschlcs       
   
        drs
          
          
   drsobchlcs drsob
chlcs 
            
         
         drs
obs    drs    
            drs
        
   drs drsvac   
            
  
         
           

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         
      
rasura?vac.      
           
     obs   

        
]  vac. 
 
B20. ID 338 Face A fragment ab (224BC) 
 
           
   
      
  
       
     

         
drs
 
B21. ID 356 bis Face A (210BC) 
 
          drs
chlcs    drsobchlcs  
drsobs 
    drsobs      

drs    
  drs    
drs

B22. ID 366 Face A (207BC) 
 
               
 drs    drs  
   drs    drs  
  drs     
drs       drs 
                  obs <-    drs    
drs     drsobs 
   drs     

drs     drs   
 drs   drsob  
 
 drs

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         
    
drs      
     drs
         
       drs
         
        
     drs     
        
           
    
 
B23. ID 369 Face A (206BC) 
 
              
      drs  

   drs   
 vac.drs      
drsobschlcs     drs 
  drsobsdrs   
 drs

B24. ID 372 Face A (200BC) 
 
              
   number       
   
               
       
   
             
 
B25. ID 399 Face A (192BC) 
 
            
      
          
 drs
 
B26. ID 400 (192BC)

            
        
   drs    
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      
 drs    
     drs  
      
drs      
   drs  
      
drs       
   drs  
      
 drs   
      drs 
      
 drs    
        
drs          
  drs 
        
 drs    
     
drs      
     drs  
        
     vac. 
      
  drs   
          
           

B27. ID 403 (189BC) 
 
        
            
 drs    

 

B28. ID 442 (179BC) 
 
FACE A 
 
          drs   
       
   


             
      
      


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FACE D 
 
    
   
   
     
  
    
    
     
   
drschlcs 
 
  
    
    
   
  
     
drs
   
    
   
  
  
  drs
    
  
     
   
 drs  
  
   
  
   
     
   
  

B29. ID 445 (178BC) 
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          
         
     drs  chlcs  
   vac. 
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   
            
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   
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Note: LL8-12 are as restored by Feyel (1941:161) 
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B33. ID 504 (280 or 279BC) 
 
Note: Face B LL3-10 as restored by Davis (1937:124-127)  
 
FACE A 
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B35. ID 507 (c250BC) 
 
Note: LL23 and 31-37 as restored by Davies (1937:129) 
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         
         
     
          
   
    
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SECTION C  
BOIOTIA 
 
C1. IThesp 44 LL4-16 (250-240BC) 
 
     
               
   
           

          
 
               
   
           
  
               
  
              
  
           
 
            
  
              
   
              
 
            
   

C2. IThesp 48 LL3-19 (240-220BC) 

         - Nom – Patr - 
      - Nom – Patr -           
   
                  
   
            
   
               
   
              
  
            
    
                
  
                 
  
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  
              
      
            
    
         (?)  
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               
     
             
       
           
    
              
       
              
      
               
  
    
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   
             
       
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     
         
    
             
 

C5. IThesp 55 LL1-2 (230-215BC)
 
               
        

C6. IThesp 55 LL10-28 (230-215BC) 
 
           vac.    
    
           vv 
                                   vac. 
    vac      
  vac. 
   drs]obs  vac     

              
 
     vac.        

            
 
                
  
                
  
                  
 
           
 
                 
    
               

              
  
             
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
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C7. IThesp 56 LL1-14 (after 210BC) 
 
          

           
 
             
 
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 
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          
             
       
   
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Col II 
 
        
           
         
           
        
         
              
          
          
           
       
          
           
            
          
            
          
         
              
        
           
           
        
         
          
           
            
         
     

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           
            
            
               
           
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             
              
        
         
             
              
                  
          
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          
               
          
               
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            
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           
 

C13. Nouveau choix d’inscriptions grecques/textes, traductions, et commentaires par 
L’Institut Fernand Courby Paris 2005: No 22 (end of 2nd century BC) 

FACE C 

 
    
   
    
 drs 
 drs obs
      
     
    
 

C14. Migeotte (1984) No.13 (IG VII 3172) (223BC)  
 
Part IV 
 
       
         
        
       
      
         
      
          
      
         
      
           
          
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 Part VI 
 
    
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